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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-801(8) (2001); 63-46b-14, -16 (1997); 78-2a-3(a) 
(2002). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Did the Labor Commission err in summarily dismissing Giles' 
occupational disease case against WCF and the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
based on the the March 1995 settlement agreement and the applicable version 
of Section 35-2-110 of the Utah Code? 
R. at 720-735, 1030-36, 1231-35. 
Standard of Review: 
1) With the Legislature's grant of discretion to the Labor 
Commission, the Court of Appeals upholds the Commission's determination of 
facts and application of the law "unless the determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997) (granting 
Labor Commission full power to determine the facts and apply the law); 
McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 10 fl 11, 41 P.3d 468. 
2) In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court 
of Appeals reviews the lower courts' legal conclusion for correctness. Olson v. 
Park-Craig-Olson, 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
1 
B. Are Giles' allegations of Labor Commission bias supported by 
sufficient objective evidence to warrant reversal of its decision and appointment 
of an outside adjudication officer? 
R. at 192-94, R. at 373-74. 
Standard of Review: 
The Court of Appeals reviews an agency's interpretation of general 
law under a correction of error standard. King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 
1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993). 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-110 (Supp. 1993) (currently renumbered as 34A-3-
111). Compensation not additional to that provided for accidents, [full text] 
The compensation provided under this chapter is not in addition to compensation 
which may be payable under Title 35, Chapter 1, and in all cases where injury 
results by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment 
and compensation is payable for the injury under Title 35, Chapter 1, no 
compensation under this chapter shall be payable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (2001)(formerly § 35-1-16) Commission 
jurisdiction and power, [full text] 
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter and any other title or chapter 
it administers. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802 (2001). Rules of evidence and procedure 
before commission - Admissible evidence [full text] 
(1) The commission, the commissioner, an administrative law judge, or the 
Appeals Board, is not bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of 
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or procedure, other than as provided 
in this section or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its 
investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the 
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the chapter. 
(2) The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in 
dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to the 
following: 
(a) depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings; 
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists; 
(c) reports of investigators appointed by the commission; 
(d) reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book 
accounts, or other records; or 
(e) hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-33-116 (2003). Dividends 
[full text] 
The board may declare a dividend to policyholders if it determines that a surplus 
exists in the Injury Fund at the end of a fiscal period after the payment of all 
claims, administrative costs, and the establishment of appropriate reserves for 
future liabilities. In making this determination, the board shall require a certified 
audit and actuarial report of the financial condition of the Injury Fund. The board 
shall establish uniform eligibility requirements for such dividends. In determining 
the amount of dividend to be paid to policyholders, the board may establish a 
procedure which takes into consideration the claims loss experience of 
policyholders as an incentive to encourage safe working conditions for 
employees. The Workers' Compensation Fund may use dividends to offset 
amounts due or owing by policyholders or former policyholders. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
Utah Admin. Code § R-568-1-16 Settlement Agreements (effective Jan. 1, 
1995) [full text] 
A. Section 35-1-90, U.C.A., invalidates any agreement which 
requires an employee to waive his rights. Settlement agreements are 
appropriate, however, when the parties, in good faith, view the claim as one of 
doubtful compensability. 
B. In determining if a claim is of doubtful compensability, the 
Commission will look to the facts of the matter and will not be bound by mere 
recitations in the settlement agreement. 
C. The Commission encourages the settlement of disputed claims 
on an amicable basis whenever possible. If the claim is not of doubtful 
compensability, the settlement agreement must be open-ended to the extent 
allowed under the Workers' Compensation Act. Parties will be bound by their 
agreement to pay and receive a given amount of compensation for a given injury. 
D. Settlement agreements involving claims of doubtful 
compensability shall be subject to approval by the Commission. 
E. The agreement shall be final and not subject to further review 
upon the same facts merely because of subsequent dissatisfaction. 
F. The Commission shall suggest a format for use by parties 
desirous of settling claims of doubtful compensability. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
Giles seeks review of the Labor Commission's Order denying her 
Request for Reconsideration and dismissing her claims for workers' 
compensation benefits for an occupational disease allegedly related to her 
employment at Oakridge Country Club. The Commission upheld the 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) June 6, 2002 Order. The ALJ found that Giles' 
settlement in her earlier industrial accident claim barred her from asserting an 
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additional claim for the same injuries as an occupational disease. 
~ Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
1
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insurer the Workers Compensation Fund1, claiming benefits for injuries caused by 
an alleged exposure to chlorine case while employed at Oakridge. R. at 2. The 
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Giles also requested that the Commission appoint an ALJ 
independent of the Commission to preside over her case. R. at 96. The 
Presiding ALJ denied her request, R. at 121, and the Commission upheld his 
decision on Giles' motion for review and request for reconsideration. Addendum 
B at 013-015, 017-018, R. at 129-132,192-94, 198-319, 373-374. Giles filed for 
judicial review, and the Court of Appeals dismissed her claim for lack of 
jurisdiction. R. at 416, 686-89. The Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari. R. at 
701-703. 
The Commission joined additional respondents, including the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund and Giles' previous employers and their insurers. 
R. at. 195-96. 
The ALJ issued a Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment and 
Motions to Dismiss on June 6, 2002. Addendum B at 019-034, R. at 720-735. 
The ALJ dismissed Giles' claims against WCF and the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund based on the agreement reached in the March 8,1995 settlement and the 
then version of Section 35-2-110 of the Utah Code. Addendum B at 029-031, R. 
at 731-33. 
Giles filed a Motion for Review on July 5, 2002. R. at 736-789. The 
Commission issued an Order Denying Motion for Review on May 1, 2003, 
affirming the ALJ's dismissal of her claims against WCF and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund. Addendum B at 035-041, R. at 1030-36. Giles filed a Motion 
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Addendum B at 043-047, R. at 1231-35. The Commission also found no basis to 
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VII. FACTS 
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4. On March 8,1995, while her appeal was pending, Giles, through her 
attorney Phillip Shell, WCF, and the Employers Reinsurance Fund settled her 
1992 claims on a disputed basis. Addendum A at 003-008, R. at 150-55. The 
parties stipulated that Giles was permanently and totally disabled due to her 
multiple physical and mental conditions, including organic brain damage, and 
agreed to payment of a $135.00 weekly disability rate beginning December 1, 
1991. Addendum A at 004, R. at 150-151. Because WCF's statutory limit of 
liability was 156 weeks of compensation2, WCF paid Giles $21,060.00 as an 
accrued lump sum from December 1, 1991 to December 1,1994, and $6,000 for 
medical expenses. Addendum A at 004-005, R. at 151-152. The Employers 
Reinsurance Fund paid $6000 for medical expenses and placed Giles on the rolls 
for lifetime permanent total disability compensation commencing December 1, 
1994. Addendum A at 005, R. at 152. Under the agreement, upon reaching age 
65, Giles' compensation rate will convert to the prevailing minimum amount 
based on 36% of the state average weekly rate, adjusted yearly. Id. 
5. On or about May 26, 1995, shortly after executing her settlement, Giles filed 
a claim with the Workers Compensation Fund3 for workers' compensation 
2At the time of Giles' claim, the employer/carrier's liability for permanent 
total disabilty was limited to the first 156 weeks of compensation if the injured 
worker has a pre-existing 10% whole person impairment. Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-
1-67, -69 (Supp. 1993). 
3The claim was actually received by the Fund on May 31,1995. 
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benefits for the same mental and physical conditions as her 1992 claim, but 
claimed these conditions as an occupational disease, porphyria. R. at 56, 66-70. 
She contended that her porphyria was caused by exposure to chemicals at 
Oakridge Country Club. R. at 66,68-70. Giles worked at Oakridge for six 
months, from June 1 to December 1,1991. R. at 66. The Fund's claims 
department processed her claim by assigning a claim number and requesting an 
Employers First Report of Injury or Illness from Oakridge. R at 179,182. 
6. Giles filed an Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission on 
December 27, 2001, against WCF, claiming permanent total disability as a result 
of an occupational disease, porphyria. R. at 96-117. At the same time, she 
requested assignment of an independent ALJ "because of the treatment I 
received from the Industrial Commission and its agencies in the past." R. at 96. 
7. Two months later, the Labor Commission sent WCF a copy of Giles' 
Application for Hearing. R. at 123-124. WCF filed a timely Answer on March 22, 
2001. Addendum A at 009-010, R. at 147-148. WCF requested dismissal from 
the case, noting in part as follows: 
Prior to the actual appellate review, the parties entered 
into a settlement agreement which was a full and final 
release of any claims resulting from [Giles] exposure at 
Oakridge Country Club. The settlement agreement was 
approved by the Labor Commission on March 8,1995. 
The Petitioner was paid substantial amounts of money 
in consideration for her release of all claims. At the time 
of the release, the Petitioner was also represented by 
legal counsel. It is our belief Petitioner must be bound 
g 
by her agreement in 1995. We have attached a copy of 
that agreement to substantiate our request for a 
dismissal. 
Addendum A at 010, R. at 148. 
8. The Presiding ALJ advised Giles that workers' compensation claims can only 
be heard by the Labor Commission's administrative law judges. R. at 121. Giles 
filed a Motion for Review on the ALJ's decision, and the Commission denied her 
Motion, holding that "unfounded, subjective opinion regarding bias, prejudice or 
conflict of interest is not sufficient to disqualify an ALJ." R. at 129-32; Addendum 
B at 013-015, R. at 192-194. The Commission also denied her Request for 
Reconsideration. Addendum B at 017-018 R. at 373-374. 
9. While pursuing administrative review of the ALJ assignment issue, Giles 
responded to WCF's answer and request for dismissal on April 4, 2001. R at 165-
182. 
10. The Labor Commission joined several respondents, including the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund and Giles' previous employers. R. at 195-96. 
11. Giles filed a timely request for judicial review of the Commission's interim 
order denying her request for an independent ALJ. R. at 416-417. This Court 
dismissed her case for lack of jurisdiction because the Commission's decision 
was not a final order. Giles v. Oakridge Country Club, mem. decision, 2001 UT 
App 381, reh'g denied, January 7, 2002, cert, denied, April 2, 2002. R. at 686-89, 
701-703. 
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12. To allow her an opportunity to respond, the ALJ notified Giles that multiple 
parties had filed motions for summary judgment and dismissal. R. at 386. Giles 
informed the ALJ that she had already responded to WCF's request for dismissal. 
R. at 409-10. 
13. The ALJ dismissed Giles' claims against WCF and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund as part of his June 6, 2002 Order. Addendum B at 019-034, 
R. at 720-735. Relying on the applicable version of Section 35-2-110 of the Utah 
Code, the ALJ found that Giles could not "recast her claim for permanent total 
disability compensation as an occupational disease rather than an industrial 
accident" and create a new remedy that is separate from her first claim. "In short, 
Ms. Giles is not allowed double recovery for permanent total disability 
compensation from the same injury by the same employer under both the 
industrial accidents, and occupational disease, chapters of the Workers' 
Compensation Act." Addendum B at 030, R. at 731. The ALJ found that the 
March 8,1995 agreement was a valid settlement of Giles' claim for permanent 
total disability and related benefits. Addendum B at 031, R. at 732. 
14. Giles filed a Motion for Review on July 5, 2002, contending that the March 
8,1995 settlement agreement did not bar her current occupational disease claim 
against WCF and the Employers Reinsurance Fund. R. at 736-789. 
15. The Labor Commission denied her Motion for Review on May 1, 2003. 
Addendum B at 035-041, R. at 1030-36. The Commission noted that summary 
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dismissal, in accord with Utah R. Civ. P. 56, requires a record that shows "'no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.'" Addendum B at 038, R. at 1033. It found, in part, 
as follows: 
When Mrs. Giles filed her first claim for benefits 
against Oakridge in 1992, she initially described her 
injury in terms of symptoms: "seizures, memory loss, 
sinus, heart and lung injury." As her claim progressed 
and additional medical evaluations were conducted, 
these descriptive symptoms were brought within a single 
over-arching diagnosis of porphyria. Thus, at the time 
Mrs. Giles settled her initial workers' compensation 
claim, that claim was for the injury of porphyria. 
Now Mrs. Giles has recast her initial claim for 
workers compensation benefit for the injury of porphyria 
into a claim for occupational disease benefits for the 
illness of porphyria. 
Addendum B at 039, R. at 1034 (emphasis in original). The Commission affirmed 
the ALJ's finding that section 35-2-1104 of the Occupational Disease Act does not 
allow payment of benefits in addition to benefits received for the same injury as 
an industrial accident. Id. 
16. Giles filed a Request for Reconsideration on May 21, 2003, in which she 
argued that her 1992 injury claim was different from her current occupational 
disease claim. R. at 1037-1120. She also introduced new evidence and claims 
4
 Although the Commission erroneously identified the statute as "§ 34A-2-
311," it quoted the text of Section 34A-3-111, the current, renumbered version of 
the statute in effect in 1995, Section 35-2-110. Both statutes contain the same 
substantive provisions. 
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not asserted in her motion for review, including medical records, affidavits, and a 
1997 federal wage claim settlement agreement. Id. 
17. The Commission denied Giles' Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 
2003, finding that both her 1992 accident claim and her current occupational 
disease claim relate to the same medical condition. Addendum B at 044, R. at 
1232. The Commission also reaffirmed its determination that the benefits paid in 
the March 1995 settlement agreement between Giles, WCF, and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund precludes additional benefits as an occupational disease claim 
for the same medical condition. Addendum B at 045, R. at 1233. The 
Commission also found no reasonable basis for accepting or considering Giles' 
newly submitted evidence and additional allegations. Id. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 35-2-110 of the Utah Code precluded dual payment of 
workers' compensation benefits for the same injury filed as separate industria 
accident and occupational disease claims. In 1992, Giles claimed impairment 
from multiple injuries arising from an alleged accident involving chlorine gas. 
Because Giles received benefits, including permanent total disability 
compensation, in the March 1995 settlement agreement of her industrial accident 
claim, section 35-2-110 prevents a second claim of benefits for the same set of 
disabling injuries reformulated as an occupational disease claim. 
The Labor Commission had jurisdiction to approve the 1995 
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settlement agreement while the case was pending on appeal before the Court of 
Appeals. Settlements are favored by the law, and are promoted by the 
Commission and the Court of Appeals. By analogy, the current Appellate 
Mediation Program follows the same procedural sequence of agency approval 
and case dismissal as the procedural path taken by the parties in the March 1995 
settlement agreement. 
The March 1995 settlement agreement is a valid defense to Giles' 
occupational disease claim. However, Giles failed to properly introduce her 
argument of purported invalidity, and the underlying evidence, in administrative 
proceedings. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court of Appeals declines 
any review of issues and evidence not properly presented at the trial court, or 
administrative, level. Moreover, even if the issue and evidence had met 
submission and relevance standards, Giles' evidence has no force or effect on 
Giles' workers' compensation case. 
There are no objective indicia of bias in the record of the Labor 
Commission's proceedings to warrant either reversal of its decision or 
appointment of an outside ALJ. Actionable bias requires evidence in the record 
of active hostility, a clear demonstration of partiality, manifested prejudice, and 
preconceived attitudes on points of law or policy in dispute. The Commission has 
made a concerted effort to address Giles' issues to the point of providing her 
relevant case law so that she was able to cure an incorrectly filed petition for 
14 
review. 
Additionally, the State of Utah's industrial insurance policy does not 
meet reasonable criteria for a direct pecuniary interest between the Workers 
Compensation Fund and the Labor Commission. The Commission does not 
receive financial benefits through the Fund's dividend distributions that may flow 
to the State treasury. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
POINT I. SECTION 35-2-110 OF THE UTAH CODE BARS GILES' 
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIM BASED ON THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN HER PRIOR INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT CLAIM 
The Labor Commission "has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, 
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other 
title or chapter it administers." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (2001). With this 
authority, the Commission dismissed Giles' occupational disease claim by 
applying the 1991 version of Section 35-2-110 of the Occupational Disease Act to 
the facts in the case. Section 110 provides as follows: 
The compensation provided under this chapter 
[occupational disease] is not in addition to compensation 
which may be payable under Title 35, Chapter 1, and in 
all cases where injury results by reason of an accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment and 
compensation is payable for the injury under Title 35, 
Chapter 1 [industrial accidents], no compensation under 
this chapter shall be payable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-110 (1991 version, Supp. 1993). 
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Giles brought an industrial accident claim in 1992 against her 
employer, Oakridge and its insurer the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. R. 
at 2. She claimed permanent impairment due to multiple physical and mental 
impairments and injuries, including seizures, memory loss, sinus, heart and lung 
injury, allegedly caused by exposure to chlorine gas on September 7,1991. Id. 
After her claim was adjudicated by the Commission, Giles settled it through a 
compromise settlement agreement while her case was on appeal before this 
court. Addendum A at 003-008, R. at 150-55. As part of the settlement, WCF 
and the Employers Reinsurance Fund agreed that Giles was permanently and 
totally disabled due to her claimed physical and mental impairments, and paid 
both medical expenses and permanent total disability compensation. Id. 
In the case at hand, Giles filed an occupational disease claim, with a 
diagnosis of porphyria allegedly due to chemical exposure, against the same 
parties based on the same physical and mental impairments that were at the 
heart of her prior industrial accident case. R. at 2 (1992 Application), 96-
117(current Application). At the time she executed her settlement in March 1995, 
a Seattle allergist, Dr. Gordon Baker, had already diagnosed her constellation of 
symptoms as porphyria. R. at 110. 
The Commission, affirming the ALJ's order, found that the 1995 
settlement agreement, signed by all parties and approved by the administrative 
law judge, awarded her benefits for her physical and mental impairments. 
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Addendum B at 037, R. at 1032. Section 35-2-110 therefore precluded a second 
award of benefits, as an occupational disease, for the same conditions and 
impairments. Addendum B at 039, R. at 1034. Characterization of Giles' various 
conditions as an accident due to chemical exposure or an occupational disease 
due to chemical exposure does not change the nature and extent of her physical 
and/or mental injuries. Giles' state of permanent total disability, and her 
underlying injurious impairments, were no different when she filed the Claim for 
Occupational Disease than they were at the time she filed her industrial accident 
casein 1992. 
The Commission's decision is consistent with case law that upholds 
the binding nature of settlement agreements. In an analogous case, this Court 
affirmed the Industrial Commission's denial of the applicant's permanent total 
disability claim based on a prior settlement agreement. Wilburn v. Interstate 
Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 587-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Addendum C at 095). In 
Wilburn, the applicant's compromise settlement agreement did not include a 
claim for permanent total disability compensation for his back injury, yet the 
Commission found that the settlement barred his subsequent claim for such 
compensation. Id. at 586-87 (Addendum C at 094-095). 
In the instant case, the parties, including Giles, agreed through the 
March 1995 settlement that she was permanently and totally disabled beginning 
December 1, 1991 due to multiple physical and mental impairments. Her current 
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occupational disease claim alleges that she is permanently and totally disabled 
as a result of the same injurious impairments. While the Wilburn case did not 
involve an applicant who reformulated his industrial accident into an occupational 
disease, the Court affirmed the Commission's determination that a compromise 
agreement settling claims for compensation for a disabling medical condition 
foreclosed a subsequent claim for different compensation for the same disability. 
Likewise, the Commission determined that Giles cannot seek a second award of 
permanent total disability and related benefits because her March 1995 
agreement settled claims for the same disabling conditions. 
In addition, the Commission's application of section 35-2-110 is 
based on the premise that Giles is not allowed double recovery for permanent 
total disability compensation for the same injury by the same employer under 
both the industrial accident and occupational disease chapters of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Addendum B at 045, R. at 1233. The Utah Supreme Court 
has opined that double recovery of compensation is contrary to the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Johnson v. Harsco/Heckett, 739 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1987) 
(Addendum C at 052). 
The Commission upheld the ALJ's summary dismissal of Giles' claim 
against WCF and the Employers Reinsurance Fund because there were no 
material facts in dispute and the law barred her new occupational disease claim 
for the same injuries. The parties agreed, per the March 1995 agreement, that 
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Giles was permanently and totally disabled due to multiple mental and physical 
problems. Addendum A at 004, R. at 151. The parties settled their dispute as to 
the compensability of Giles' claims by a compromise award of lifetime benefits. 
Addendum A at 004-005, R. at 151 -152. Section 35-2-110 of the Utah Code 
precludes claims for an injury due to an occupational disease when the injured 
worker received benefits for the same injury as an accident. 
Accordingly, the Commission applied the facts to the law and 
correctly found that Section 35-2-110 barred Giles' second claim against WCF 
and the Employers Reinsurance Fund for benefits under the Occupational 
Disease Act. 
POINT II. THE LABOR COMMISSION HAD JURISDICTION TO APPROVE 
THE MARCH 1995 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Giles contends that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to 
approve the March 1995 settlement agreement because this Court did not 
remand the pending appeal case back to the Commission for its approval of the 
agreement. This position is without merit. Her case was before the Court of 
Appeals under its authority to review the Commission's order, but that jurisdiction 
does not take away the parties' right to pursue and execute settlement of that 
case, with the Commission's concomitant approval. 
Settlement agreements are favored by the law. Sackler v. Savin, 
897 P.2d 1217,1220 (Utah 1995). Moreover, the Commission encourages and 
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supports settlement through its administrative rules. Utah Admin. Code § R568-
1-16 (1995)5 (full text in section V at page 4, supra). The Court of Appeals also 
promotes dispute resolution and compromise settlement through the Appellate 
Mediation Office. See Utah R. App. P. 28A (added April 1, 2000). While this 
program was not in effect when Giles' industrial accident claim was before the 
Court in 1995, the appellate mediators utilize sequential procedures that are 
analogous to this case. If the parties reach a compromise settlement agreement 
through mediation, the executed document is then submitted to the appellate 
mediator and the court of appeals issues an order of dismissal. See Addendum 
D at 099 (February 26, 2004 letter from which the names of the parties have been 
redacted).6 
The March 1995 settlement agreement was executed in the same 
sequence as cases currently settled in the appellate mediation program: the court 
dismissed the case after the' parties and the Commission executed the 
agreement. If agency-approved mediated settlements are valid while the case is 
under the Court's jurisdiction on appeal, then the March 1995 settlement was 
valid while Giles' 1992 case was under the same jurisdiction. 
5This rule was in effect when the March 1995 settlement agreement was 
approved. The current version of the settlement rule is Utah Admin. Code § 
R602-2-5. 
6This letter is not intended as evidence but is included in the Addendum for 
the Court's convenience. 
20 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction to review 
administrative decisions did not prevent the Commission from approving the 
March 1995 settlement agreement.7 
POINT III. WCF IS NOT BARRED FROM RELYING ON THE MARCH 1995 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Giles erroneously contends that extraneous statements in a 1997 
federal overtime wage agreement between Giles and her employer, Oakridge, 
abrogates her prior 1995 workers' compensation settlement agreement. 
First, Giles' 1997 wage claim settlement document was not 
evidence in the Commission's record. She did not raise the abrogation argument 
or submit the documents until she filed her Request for Reconsideration. R. at 
1037-1120. In contrast, WCF asserted the March 1995 settlement agreement 
as an affirmative defense in their Answer to Giles' Application for Hearing. 
Addendum A at 003-010, R. at 147-155. Giles filed a response to WCF's Answer 
and also acknowledged to the ALJ that she had responded to WCF's request for 
dismissal. R. at 165, 409. Thus, she had ample opportunity to present the 
proported evidence and any related claims prior to the ALJ's Order. 
The Labor Commission declined to accept Giles' additional argument 
7Moreover, requiring the Court to remand the case to the Labor 
Commission for settlement and approval before execution of the settlement 
leaves a petitioner at risk of no remedy. In the event the parties failed to reach an 
agreement, or the Commission did not approve the settlement, a petitioner would 
be left with a dismissed appeal and no settlement. 
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and new evidence in her Request for Reconsideration, noting that they have 
"consistently declined to consider evidence or issues raised for the first time as 
part of a request for reconsideration, unless such matters could not reasonably 
have been raised earlier." Addendum B at 045, R. at 1233. The Commission 
has statutory discretion to receive evidence and manage the agency's 
adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802 (2001) (full text in 
section V page 3, supra). Giles' ostensible reluctance to proffer a settlement 
agreement containing a confidentiality clause does not pass muster as newly 
discovered evidence or similar situation that would compel submission of 
evidence and related arguments after the record was closed. 
Absent plain error or other exceptional circumstances, the Court of 
Appeals declines consideration of issues not properly raised below. See, 
e.g.,Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) ("[w]e may, however, weigh only those facts and legal arguments 
preserved for us in the trial court record") (Addendum C at 063-064). Giles' did 
not properly submit her argument and underlying evidence to the Commission. 
Nor has she presented any exceptional circumstances that would justify the 
Court's consideration of this issue for the first time on appeal. 
Even if the documents Giles submitted in her Request for 
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Reconsideration were admissible as evidence8, her wage claim settlement 
agreement has no force or effect on her workers' compensation claims. Except 
in limited circumstances prescribed by statute, district courts in Utah do not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce workers' compensation claims. See 
Sheppick v. Albertson's Inc., 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 1996) ("[district courts have no 
jurisdiction whatsoever over cases that fall within the purview of the Workers" 
Compensation Act") (Addendum C at 072). Likewise, federal district courts, 
incident to adjudication of federal wage claims, have no jurisdiction over state 
workers' compensation claims. See United States Smelting v. Evans, 35 F.2d 
459, 461 (8th Cir. 1929), cert, denied, 281 U.S. 744, 50 S. Ct. 350 (1930) 
(Addendum C at 076-077). 
Accordingly, Giles cannot enforce whatever extraneous provisions 
related to her workers' compensation claims that may have been injected into her 
1997 federal wage claim settlement agreement. District courts, regardless of 
their adjudication of Giles' federal wage issues, do not have jurisdiction to enforce 
superfluous terms in that agreement relating to Giles' past or present workers' 
compensation claims. 
Further, by basic principles of contract law, the purported terms of 
her federal wage claim agreement cannot modify Giles' workers' compensation 
8Given the inherent lack of connection between Giles' federal wage claim 
agreement and her workers' compensation case, her evidence may have been 
inadmissible for lack of relevance. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802(2) (2001). 
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settlement agreement. All parties must agree to alter, supplement, supercede, 
or modify a prior contract. See Rapp v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph, 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980) ("[p]arties to a contract may, by 
mutual consent, alter all or any portion of that contract by agreeing upon a 
modification thereof [emphasis added]); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 500 
(2004) ("[t]he same meeting of minds is needed that was necessary to make the 
contract in the first place"). Neither the Workers Compensation Fund nor the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund were parties in Giles' federal wage claim dispute 
with Oakridge. Additionally, the Commission did not approve any purported 
changes to the March 1995 agreement. Without the mutual consent and 
agreement of all parties involved in her prior workers' compensation settlement 
and approval by the Labor Commission, the abrogating provisions bootstrapped 
into her wage claim settlement have no legal force or effect. 
In summary, the Commission correctly declined to consider Giles' 
late submission of evidence and accompanying argument raised for the first time 
at the last stage of administrative review. Because her claim was not properly 
raised below, it cannot be raised on appeal. Notwithstanding the improper 
submission issue, the purported settlement provisions upon which she relies are 
not enforceable, both on jurisdictional grounds and on contract law principles. 
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POINT IV. THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE OF BIAS THAT JUSTIFIES 
EITHER REVERSAL OF THE LABOR COMMISSION'S DECISIONS OR 
APPOINTMENT OF AN OUTSIDE ADJUDICATION OFFICER 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed bias issues, both actual 
impermissible bias and the unacceptable risk of bias, in the context of 
administrative proceedings. V-1 Oil Co. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 
939 P.2d 1192,1195-1198 (Utah 1997) (Addendum C at 082-084). In V-1 Oil, 
the court examined agencies' adjudicative functions in deciding that the 
Department of Environmental Quality satisfied due process with sufficient 
separation between their adjudicative and investigative/prosecutorial functions. 
Id. at 1203 (Addendum C at 088). The court noted the following scenarios that 
may compel a judge's recusal, or new proceedings, due to bias: 1) previous legal 
representation of one or more parties; 2) clear demonstration of partiality on the 
face of the record; 3) a direct and personal pecuniary benefit; 4) preconceived 
attitudes on points of law or policy at the heart of the dispute (rarely severe 
enough for disqualification)9; 5) overt prejudice against a person or group of 
people. Id. at 1197-99. 
9
"'[0]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events 
occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not 
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated 
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.'... Mere 
'expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger,' are 
insufficient to establish the existence of bias or partiality." Campbell Maack & 
Sessions v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397 ^ 25, 38 P.3d 984 (quoting Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994)). 
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Giles has asserted multiple claims regarding the Commission's 
alleged procedural irregularities in the summary disposition of her case as 
evidence of bias. However, the Commission has followed appropriate 
procedures despite a constant barrage of lengthy documents and filings. Giles 
was given full opportunity to respond to WCF's request for dismissal. When the 
ALJ notified Giles of pending motions for dismissal and summary judgment to 
allow her an opportunity to respond, she acknowledged that she had already 
responded to WCF's request for dismissal. R. at 165, 386, 409. 
Additionally, when Giles filed a premature petition for judicial review, 
the Commission's general counsel informed her of a recent relevant court 
decision so that she was able to cure her faulty filing with an amended petition. 
R. at 1236,1238,1239. Thus, the Commission showed understandable 
deference to Giles by leveling the playing field for her, despite the fact that pro se 
parties are nominally presumed to know the law. See Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 
11,H 3-4, 67 P.3d 1000. 
Giles alleges a financial conflict of interest between the Workers 
Compensation Fund and the Commission. However, she fails to present rational 
criteria that may be construed as direct pecuniary interest. The State of Utah 
insures all of its entities through the Workers Compensation Fund, a quasi-public 
corporation. If funds are distributed to policyholders in accordance with Section 
31A-33-116 of the Utah Code, the State, as the policyholder, may qualify for 
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such payments. The funds are not distributed to a specific division of the State. 
Consequently, the Labor Commission reaps no more financial 
benefit than this court and the entire state court system, which as state entities 
are covered by the State's policy with the Workers Compensation Fund.10 Giles' 
contrived financial nexus does not qualify as "the presence of a clear, substantial 
pecuniary benefit." V-1 Oil Co., 939 P.2d at 1198. 
Accordingly, by the criteria discussed in V-1 Oil Co., there is no 
objective evidence in the record of the established indicia of bias or prejudice that 
may compel reversal of the Commission's decisions in this case and/or 
appointment of an outside adjudicative officer. Likewise, there is no financial 
conflict of interest between the Commission and the Workers Compensation 
Fund based on the State of Utah's industrial insurance policy. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The Labor Commission correctly dismissed Giles' claim against 
WCF and the Employers Reinsurance for permanent total disability due to an 
occupational disease. The applicable version of Section 35-2-110 of the Utah 
Code precludes awards of benefits for the same injury claimed as both an 
industrial accident and an occupational disease. Because the parties' March 
l0Possibly the Utah taxpayers are beneficiaries of this arrangement insofar 
as a small amount of their tax dollars are returned to the treasury to offset future 
state expenditures. 
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1995 settlement agreement deemed her permanently and totally disabled and 
awarded benefits for an industrial accident, Giles cannot receive the same 
benefits for the same injurious impairments as a separate occupational disease. 
The record is devoid of any bias or partiality that would necessitate 
appointment of an outside administrative law judge or reversal of the 
Commission's decision. 
Respondents Workers Compensation Fund and Oakridge 
respectfully request the Court of Appeals affirm the Labor Commission's decision. 
Submitted th is^4lay of Jut*., 2004. 
Floyd Vg/Holm, Attorney for Oakridge Country Club 
and the Workers Compensation Fund 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two true and correct copies of the brief of Respondents 
Workers Compensation Fund and Oakridge Country Club in Giles v. Utah Labor 
Commission, et al, Case # 20030577-CA were mailed, first class postage 
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Glenda W. Giles Alan Hennebold 
Petitioner Counsel for the Labor Commission 
P.O. Box 354 Labor Commission 
Eureka, MT 59917 P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Lorrie Lima 
Counsel for the Employers Reinsurance Fund. 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Michael E. Dyer 
Counsel for Adecco, f/k/a TAD Technical Svc. Corp and/or Liberty Mutual Ins. 
Blackburn & Stoll 
257 East 200 South Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mark R. Sumsion 
Counsel for Oakridge and/or Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. 
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Counsel for ACE USA/Pacific Employers Ins. 
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple Suite # 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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SECTION A 
PHILLIP B. SHELL (3861) 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorneys for Applicant 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
GLENDA GILES, 
Applicant, 
: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
vs. AND ORDER 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB, and/or 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND : 
OF UTAH, and EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE 
FUND : 
Case No. 92-693 
Defendants. : Judge Timothy C. Allen 
1. THIS IS A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT between Glenda Giles, 
applicant; Oakridge Country Club, the employer; the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
as insurance carrier for the employer, and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
2. The applicant has filed a claim for workers' compensation insurance 
benefits in connection with allegations that she was exposed to chlorine gas in the course of her 
employment with the Oakridge Country Club on September 7, 1991. She submits that she is 
permanently and totally disabled from further employment as a direct result of the physical and 
mental injuries allegedly, including organic brain damage, sustained via the exposure. 
3. The employer, and its workers' compensation insurer, denies that the 
applicant's claim is valid. First, the employer denies that the applicant was exposed to 
chlorine gas, but rather the smell of chlorine fumes coming from so-called superchlorinated 
water. Second, the employer denies any causal relationship between this incident and the 
applicant's health difficulties. 
4. In light of this dispute, and in light of the varying odds for success for 
the claims of the parties, it is the desire of the parties to reach a compromise settlement of a 
claim of disputed validity. The parties are willing, as set forth below to stipulate that the 
claimant is permanently and totally disabled, but that any benefits paid shall be as set forth and 
limited by the terms of this agreement. 
5. For the purpose of this compromise of this disputed claim, the 
defendants agree to pay the applicant compensation for permanent total disability at the rate of 
$135.00 per week. 
6. It is further agreed that the applicant has at least a 10% whole body 
impairment rating due to pre-existing conditions, including cervical degenerative disk disease. 
7. The applicant's commencement date for permanent total disability is 
agreed to be December 1, 1991. In light of her age and physical limitations, she is not 
considered to be a candidate for successful vocational rehabilitation. She qualified for Social 
Security Disability beginning December L 1991. 
8. Based upon the foregoing, the employer/carrier shall pay the applicant 
the lump sum amount of $21,060.00 in compensation in full settlement of their portion of her 
workers' compensation claim of September 7, 1991. This represents $135.00 per week for 
156 weeks beginning December 1, 1991. The defendants shall not be responsible for any 
medical or health care benefits, except that the Defendants shall reimburse the applicant in the 
sum of $12,000.00 for past medical bills and expenses incurred in connection with her alleged 
September 7, 1991 injury. Of this amount, $6,000.00 shall be paid by the employer/carrier 
and $6,000.00 shall be paid by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. The total lump sum 
payment of $33,060.00, less attorneys fees as set forth below, shall be paid upon approval of 
this agreement by the Industrial Commission. 
9. The Employers1 Reinsurance Fund agrees to place the applicant on its 
permanent total disability rolls beginning December 1, 1994 at the rate of $135.00 per week. 
Applicant shall remain on the Fund's payroll for so long as she shall live, or until further order 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, subject to any arfcct3 afforded by the terms of §35-1-
67(5), U.C.A.. Upon the applicant reaching the age of 65 years (June 17, 2004), her weekly 
compensation rate shall convert to the then prevailing minimum amount based on 36% of the 
state average weekly wage, as adjusted yearly. 
10. Based upon the legal services provided by applicant's attorney in 
connection with this case and in reaching this settlement, it is agreed that an attorneys fee of 
$4,212.00 should be awarded and deducted from the lump sum due the applicant and be paid 
by the Workers' Compensation Fund directly to the applicant's attorney. 
11. It is understood that this is the full agreement of the parties. No other 
terms, express or implied, are intended. 
12. The parties agree that the appeal pending in the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Case No. 940468-CA shall be remanded back to the Industrial Commission for approval of 
this settlement agreement. 
It is understood that this Settlement Agreement becomes binding and effective 
only when approved by the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
By this Settlement Agreement, the parties hereto jointly petition the Industrial 
Commission for the entry of an Order approving this Settlement Agreement. 
Dated this^^day of February, 1995. 
GLENDA GILES 
Applicant 
Dated this 1_ day of February, 1995. 
// 
Dated th is^_ day of-Febftfaryr 1995 
PHILLIP B. SHELL 
Day & Barney 
Attorney for Applicant 
RICHARD G. SUMSION 
Attorney for Workers' Compensation Fund 
ERIE V. BOORMAtf Administrator 
Employers^Reinsurance Fund 
ORDER 
The parties hereto, having settled the claim of Glenda Giles, and good cause 
appearing therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the stipulated terms of the settlement 
agreement of the parties, as set forth above, are accepted in full and are hereby adopted as the 
order of the Industrial Commission in this matter. 
Dated this £ day of OJlJL^L l 9 9 5-
illen 
inistrative Law Judge 
Industrial/Commission of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March j [_ , 1995, a copy of the attached Settlement Agreement and Order, 
in the case of Glenda Giles, was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, 
postage pre-paid: 
Glenda Giles, P.O. Box 411, Kaysville, UT 84037 
Phillip Shell, Atty., 45 East Vine Street, Murray, UT 84107 
Richard Sumsion, Atty., P.O. Box 57929, SLC, UT 84157-0929 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
P.O. Box 146611, SLC, UT 84114-6611 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By ^,Q o2yV-A | ^ ( A V ^ V ^ / 1 
WCF 
March 22, 2001 
Loretta Woodmansee, Hearing Clerk 
Legal Division 
Labor Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
RE: Claimant: 
File No.: 
Inj Date: 
Employer: 
Case No.: 
Glenda W. Giles 
1995-24547-8J 
^09-07-91 
Oakridge Country Club 
2000-1228 
Dear Ms. Woodmansee: 
We are in receipt of your letter dated February 23, 2001 together with the Application for 
Hearing filed by the above-named Petitioner. 
With regard to the specific allegations contained in the Application for Hearing, Respondents 
respond as follows: 
1. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 1, 2, and 3 of the Application for 
Hearing, Respondents deny the Petitioner sustained any injuries as a result of a chemical 
exposure on or about September 7, 1991 while employed at Oakridge Country Club. 
2. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Application for Hearing, 
Respondents are without sufficient information to admit or deny this allegation. 
3. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Application for Hearing, 
Respondents would indicate all the medical evidence submitted by the Petitioner has been 
reviewed in full by the parties and is no longer relevant to the proceedings. 
4. With regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 of the Application for Hearing, 
Respondents have no knowledge other than the employment with Oakridge Country Club 
of the Petitioner's prior employers. 
At this time, Workers Compensation Fund on behalf of the employer, Oakridge Country Club, 
would request they be dismissed from this action. Petitioner has had many opportunities to 
provide evidence concerning her alleged exposure. The exposure was thoroughly explored by a 
medical panel in 1993 and the Petitioner's case was resoundingly dismissed. 
Workers Compensation Fund • 392 East 6400 South • Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 • 800-446-COMP • vvvwv.vvct-utah.com 
Subsequent to the dismissal by the administrative law judge, the Petitioner sought appellate 
review of her claim. Prior to the actual appellate review, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement which was a full and final release of any claims resulting from her exposure at 
Oakridge Country Club. That settlement agreement was approved by the Labor Commission on 
March 8,1995. The Petitioner was paid substantial amounts of money in consideration for her 
release of all claims. At the time of the release, the Petitioner was also represented by legal 
counsel. It is our belief Petitioner must be bound by her agreement in 1995. We have attached a 
copy of that agreement to substantiate our request for a dismissal. 
We have no knowledge of what Petitioner's claims consist of as it relates to her other employers 
and will not comment on those. It is, however, our belief the claim against Workers 
Compensation Fund and Oakridge Country Club should be promptly dismissed. 
Very truly yours, 
WORKERS-COMPENSATION FUND 
JLM:kj 
cc: Glenda W. Giles, P. O. Box 354, Eureka, Montana 59917 (w/enc.) 
Oakridge Country Club, 1492 West Shepherd Lane, Farmington, Utah 84025 
Mike Baker - Section C-8 
Mike Bowman - Section CC 
oi n 
SECTION B 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GLENDA W. GILES, } * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
v. 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Glenda W. Giles asks the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's 
denial of Ms. Giles' request for appointment of an ALJ from outside the Commission to preside over 
the adjudication of Ms. Giles' claim for benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the 
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Have sufficient grounds been shown to warrant appointment of an ALJ from outside the 
Commission to preside over the adjudication of Ms. Giles' claim? 
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION 
On approximately December 20, 2000, Ms. Giles filed a claim for occupational disease 
benefits against Oakridge Country Club and its workers' compensation carrier, the Workers 
Compensation Fund. In an accompanying letter, Ms. Giles asked that her claim be assigned to an 
ALJ from outside the Labor Commission "because of the treatment I have received form the 
Industrial Commission and its agencies in the past." On February 22, 2001, Judge LaJeunesse 
denied Ms. Giles' request for an independent ALJ. On March 16, 2001, Ms. Giles sought 
Commission review of Judge LaJeunesse's decision. 
In her motion for review to the Commission, Ms. Giles gives the following explanation of 
her request for an independent ALJ: 
Given the many illegal actions previously committed against me by 
employees of the Industrial/Labor Commission; the fact that my Application for 
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Hearing was lost' for a two month time period by the Adjudication Division: 
together with the arbitrary and capricious decision rendered by (Judge) LaJenuesse, 
I renew my contention that I cannot receive a fair hearing before the Labor 
Commission or any of its ALJs. I also renew my official written request that my case 
be assigned to an ALJ with absolutely no ties to the Labor Commission. 
As a matter of constitutional and statutory law, as well as Commission practice, Ms. Giles 
is entitled to a fair hearing before an impartial ALJ, free of bias, prejudice or conflict of interest. The 
Commission would, if necessary, appoint an independent ALJ in any case where the Commission's 
ALJs could not meet the foregoing standards of impartiality. 
However, a party's unfounded, subjective opinion regarding bias, prejudice or conflict of 
interest is not sufficient to disqualify an ALJ. In this case, Ms. Giles has not submitted any objective 
support for her motion for an independent ALJ, nor is the Commission aware of any basis for such 
action. The Commission therefore declines to appoint an independent ALJ to preside over Ms. 
Giles' occupational disease claim. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Ms. Giles' motion for review. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated th is j /*day of April, 2001. ^-—p 
R. t& Ellertsorf 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Glenda W. Giles, Case No. 20001228, was mailed first class postage prepaid this j £ / a a y of April, 
2001, to the following: 
GLENDA W. GILES 
P O BOX 354 
EUREKA MT 59917 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB 
1492 WEST SHEPHERD LANE 
FARMINGTON UT 84025 
JAN MOFFITT 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
P O BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84157 
ti/L S^n^ 
>ara Jensort 
Support Specialist 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GLENDA W. GILES, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * RECONSIDERATION 
v. 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Glenda W. Giles asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision upholding 
the Administrative Law Judge's denial of Ms. Giles' request for appointment of an ALJ from outside 
the Commission to preside over the adjudication of Ms. Giles' claim for benefits under the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-13 and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.O. 
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION 
Ms. Giles has asked that her claim for occupational disease benefits against Oakridge Country 
Club and its workers' compensation carrier, the Workers Compensation Fund, be assigned to an ALJ 
from outside the Labor Commission "because of the treatment I have received from the Industrial 
Commission and its agencies in the past." The AU denied Ms. Giles' request. Ms. Giles then asked 
the Commission to review the ALJ's decision. The Commission considered Ms. Giles' proffered basis 
for appointment of an AU from outside the Commission, but ultimately agreed with the ALJ's 
determination that no such action was warranted. 
Ms. Giles now asks the Commission to reconsider its decision. But as the Commission noted 
in its previous decision, "a party's unfounded, subjective opinion regarding bias, prejudice or conflict 
of interest is not suflBcient to disqualify an ALJ. In this case, Ms. Giles has not submitted any 
objective support for her motion for an independent ALJ, nor is the Commission aware of any basis 
for such action." 
There is nothing in Ms. Giles' most recent submissions that convinces the Commission that 
its prior decision was in error. The Commission therefore reaffirms its decision not to appoint an 
independent AU to preside over Ms. Giles' occupational disease claim. 
• 
* 
* 
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In passing, the Commission notes it advised the parties that its decision regarding Ms. Giles' 
request for reconsideration would be issued by June 8, 2001. However, because the Utah 
Labor Commissioner was out-of-state from June 2 through June 9,2001, the Commission was unable 
to issue its decision in this matter until June 11, 2001. 
ORDER 
The Commission hereby denies Ms. Giles' request for reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this 11* day of June, 2001. 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MADLING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
Glenda W. Giles, Case No. 20001228, was mailed first class postage prepaid this 11* day of June, 
2001, to the following: 
GLENDA W.GILES 
P O BOX 354 
EUREKA MT 59917 
OAKRJDGE COUNTRY CLUB 
1492 WEST SHEPHERD LANE 
FARMINGTON UT 84025 
JANMOFFITT 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
P O BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84157 
L3A 2JO^. 
Sara Jensor 
Support Specialist 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Case No. 20001228 
GLENDA W. GILES, * RULING ON MOTIONS FOR 
* 
Petitioner, * SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
* 
vs. * MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB and/or * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND * 
OF UTAH and/or WASATCH CREST * 
MUTUAL INS., and EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND; * Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
TAD RESOURCES nka ADECCO and/or* 
CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE CO.* 
and/or ACE USA/PACIFIC * 
EMPLOYERS INS. CO. and/or * 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.; * 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, * 
it 
Respondents, * 
it icicic-kicizk-kicicicic'bicic'kicic'kicieic'kie 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner, Glenda Giles, filed an "Occupational Disease Claim" with the Utah Labor 
Commission on December 27, 2000, and claimed entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation. Ms. Giles1 claim for workers' compensation benefits arose out of her alleged 
contraction of "chemically induced porphyria" as a result of exposure to "numerous toxic fiimes 
and materials" during the course of her employment with Oakridge Country Club (Oakridge), 
TAD Resources nka Adecco (Adecco), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
The respondents denied that Ms. Giles' employment with respondents exposed her to substances • 
which medically caused porphyria. The respondents argued that Ms. Giles7 alleged porphyria 
resulted from causes other than her employment conditions. 
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Employers' Reinsurance Fund (ERF), Oakridge, Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah (WCF), 
Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co. (Wasatch Crest), all contended that Ms. Giles* released them 
from further workers' compensation liability as to her employment with Oakridge when on 
March 8, 1995 she entered into a "Settlement Agreement/' 
Adecco claimed that Ms. Giles' failed to meet certain statutes of limitations with respect to the 
filing of her claim, ACE USA/Pacific Employers' Mutual Ins. Co. (ACE) and Constitution State 
Sen-ice Co. (Constitution) both denied that they provided insurance coverage for Adecco during 
the periods of Ms. Giles' employment. Finally, a question existed in my mind as to whether the 
Labor Commission exercised any Jurisdiction over the IRS, a federal agency. 
II. ISSUES. 
1. Did Glenda Giles' employment with any or all of the respondents expose her to "toxic 
fumes and materials" that caused her to suffer porphyria? 
2. Is Glenda Giles' Occupational Disease Claim against any or all of the respondents 
precluded by the March 8, 1995 Settlement Agreement? 
3. Did Glenda Giles' fail to file her workers' compensation claims against Adecco within 
the applicable statutes of limitations?1 
4. Should the respondents, Wasatch Crest, ACE, and Constitution, be dismissed from the 
present action because they never provided insurance coverage for any of the respondent 
employers during the times relevant to this case? 
5. Does the Labor Commission have jurisdiction to adjudicate the workers' compensation 
liability of the Internal Revenue Service? 
III. PROCEEDINGS. 
On December 27,2000 Ms. Giles filed the present Occupational Disease claim based on her 
alleged exposure to cctoxic fumes and materials" during the course of her employment with 
Oakridge from May 1991, through December 1991. On March 5,2001 Wasatch Crest filed a 
Request for Dismissal from the present claim based on the assertion that Wasatch Crest never 
insured Oakridge during the period May 1991, through December 1991. Wasatch Crest filed a 
number of subsequent motions to dismiss along the same lines. 
!
 I never reached this issue, because I found resolution of the other issues dispositive. 
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On March 23, 2001 WCF filed an answer to Ms. Giles' Occupational Disease Claim. WCF 
denied the existence of any evidence that demonstrated a causal connection between Ms. Giles' 
porphyria and her employment with Oakridge. WCF also claimed that the Settlement Agreement 
of March 8, 1995 released Oakridge and WCF. 
On April 4, 2001 Constitution filed a response that Constitution provided no coverage for 
Adecco during the relevant time periods at issue in this case. On May 24,2001 ACE also filed a 
response that ACE provided no coverage for Adecco during the relevant time periods at issue in 
this case. 
Adecco and Liberty Mutual filed an answer to Ms. Giles' Occupational Disease Claim. Adecco 
denied the existence of any evidence that demonstrated a causal connection between Ms. Giles' 
porphyria and her employment with Adecco. On the same day Liberty Mutual and Adecco filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment. Adecco argued that Ms. Giles' claims failed for untimeliness 
under applicable statutes of limitations. 
On July 11,2001 ERF filed a Motion to Dismiss ERF from the present action. ERF raised the 
same legal defenses advanced by WCF. 
Ms. Giles filed her own assorted dispositive motions on April 4, 2001. Additionally, Ms. Giles 
filed at various times motions to default each of the respondents for untimely answers.2 
In the meantime, Ms. Giles requested the appointment of an Administrative Law Judge outside 
the Labor Commission. Ms. Giles pursued her request all the way to the Utah Supreme Court, 
which ultimately denied her Petition for Writ of Certiorari on April 8, 2002. The Utah Court of 
Appeals remitted the case back to the Labor Commission on May 9,2002. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. The Respondents, Oakridge Country Club, Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah, and Employers' Reinsurance Fund, 
On March 8? 1995 Judge Timothy C. Allen of the Industrial Commission of Utah nka Labor 
Commission issued an Order that adopted a Settlement Agreement entered into by Glenda Giles, 
Oakridge, WCF and ERF. Ms. Giles and her attorney Phillip Shell both executed the Settlement 
Agreement. 
2
 IRS was the only respondent that failed to file an answer in this case. 
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The Settlement Agreement between Ms. Giles, WCF and ERF stated in relevant part: 
2. The applicant (Glenda Giles) has filed a claim for workers' compensation 
insurance benefits in connection with allegations that she was exposed to 
chlorine gas in the course of her employment with the Oakridge Country 
Club on September 7,1991. She submits that she is permanently and 
totally disabled from further employment as a direct: result of the physical 
and mental injuries alleged!}', including organic brain damage, sustained 
via the exposure. 
3. [tjhe employer denies any causal relationship between this incident and the 
applicant's health difficulties. 
4. In light of this dispute, and in light of the varying odds for success for the 
claims of the parties, it is the desire of the parties to reach a compromise 
settlement of a claim of disputed validity. The parties are willing, as set 
forth below to stipulate that the claimant is permanently and totally 
disabled, but that any benefits paid shall be as set forth and limited by the 
terms of this agreement. 
5. For the purpose of this compromise of this disputed claim, the defendants 
agree to pay the applicant compensation for permanent total disability at 
the rate of $135.00 per week. 
7. The applicant's commencement date for permanent total disability is 
agreed to be December 1,1991. In light of her age and physical 
limitations, she is not considered to be a candidate for successful 
vocational rehabilitation. She qualified for Social Security Disability 
beginning December 1,1991. 
8. Based on the forgoing, the employer/carrier shall pay the applicant the 
lump sum amount of $21,060.00 in compensation in full settlement of 
their portion of her workers' compensation claim of September 7, 1991. 
This represents $135.00 per week for 156 weeks beginning December 1, 
1991. The defendants shall not be responsible for any medical or health 
care benefits, except that the Defendants shall reimburse the applicant in 
the sum of $12,000.00 for past medical bills and expenses incurred in 
connection with her alleged September 7, 1991 injury. Of this amount, 
$6,000.00....The total lump sum payment of $33,060.00, less attorneys 
fees set forth below, shall be paid upon approval of this agreement by the 
Industrial Commission. 
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9. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund agrees to place the applicant on it's permanent total 
disability roles beginning December 1, 1994 at the rate of $135.00 per week. Applicant 
shall remain on the Fund's payroll for so long as she shall live, or until further order of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah, subject to any offsets afforded by the terms of §35-1-
67(5) U.C.A. Upon the applicant reaching the age of 65 years (June 17, 2004), her 
weekly compensation rate shall convert to the then prevailing minimum amount based on 
36% of the state average weekly wage, as adjusted yearly. 
Ms. Giles based her original claim for permanent total disability benefits against the respondents 
on a diagnosis of porphyria by Dr. Gordon Baker M.D. dated January 5,1995. [see: letter of Dr. 
Gordon Baker M.D. attached to Ms. Giles' Application for Hearing]. Ms. Giles also based her 
present claim for permanent total disability benefits against the respondents on the same 
diagnosis of porphyria by Dr. Baker only couched as an occupational disease, rather than an 
industrial accident claim, [id.]. 
B. The Respondents Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co., Constitution State Service 
Co., and AC USA/Pacific Employers Ins. Co. 
The respondents Wasatch Crest, Constitution, and ACE all denied that they as insurance 
companies provided workers' compensation insurance coverage for any of Ms. Giles' employers 
during the relevant time periods at issue. None of the other parties contradicted the assertions of 
the respondents Wasatch Crest, Constitution, and ACE. None of the parties alleged the existence 
of insurance policies provided by Wasatch Crest, Constitution, or ACE that covered any of Ms. 
Giles1 employers during the relevant time periods at issue. 
C. The Respondents TAD Resources nka Adecco and Liberty Mutual Ins, Co. 
Ms. Giles' "Occupational Disease Claim" filed on December 27, 2000 originally named only 
Oakridge and WCF as respondents. Ms. Giles' initially claimed that her porphyria resulted from 
exposure to "numerous toxic fumes and materials in the course of her employment with Oakridge 
C.C.the period May 1991 to December 1991." [see: "Occupational Disease Claim" filed 
December 27, 2000 page 1]. 
On March 14, 2001 Ms. Giles filed a letter that obliquely requested the joinder of Adecco and its 
insurance carrier Liberty to her Occupational Disease Claim as respondents. On March 30, 2001 
Ms. Giles provided to the Labor Commission the address of Adecco. 
On May 14, 2001 the Labor Commission sent an "Amended Request for Answer" to Adecco and 
Liberty. On June 8, 2001 Adecco and Liberty filed an "Answer" and "Motion for Summary 
Judgment." Adecco claimed inter alia that Ms. Giles presented no evidence that linked her 
employment at Adecco with her porphyria. 
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Dr. Baker's letters dated January 5, 1995, and May 3,1995, constituted the only medical 
evidence provided by Ms. Giles in support of her Occupational Disease Claim and her multiple 
responses to the various motions filed in this case. Dr. Baker's January 5,1995 letter stated in 
pertinent part that: 
Glenda Giles is a 5 5-year-old woman who was in good health until she was 
working at a country club in Utah. At that time, extensive remodeling was going 
on. Chlorine was used for a junior Olympic swimming pool in the basement. She 
was exposed to chlorine gas, which has been previously documented. 
She has extensive documentation of her initial exposure arid there is no need to 
repeat this. 
This (tests) would indicate that she has an intoxication or chemically acquired or 
chemically induced porphyria. 
Porphyria is considered to be a rare hereditary disease; however, porphyria may be 
acquired by exposure to a group of porphyric drugs and chemicals. The acquired 
porphyria may be considered to be the result of an environmental insult or poison 
on either 1. A genetically predisposed individual, or 2. a previously normal 
individual with no familial history or predisposition to this disease. 
The causes of acquired porphyria are: 
1. Drugs. Over 20 drugs are known to induce or cause porphyria including 
barbituates, chloriphenical, Danazol, Ergot alkaloids, glutethamide, Griseufulvin, 
imipramine, Meprobamate, Metho-Dopa, Fenton, Sulfonamides, Albutamide, 
birth control pills with estrogens, and many others. 
2. Chemicals. Many, at least 50 environmental porphyrogenic substances include 
lead, .paints, metal fumes, arsenic, vinyl chloride, alcohols, glycols and their 
derivatives, polychlorinated biphenals (PCB), Dioxin, Chlorobenzina, possibly all 
chlorinated hydrocarbons or any chemical the (sic) mimics estrogen. One large 
outbreak was caused by grain contaminated with the fungacided 
hexachlorabenzine. 
3. Infectious Hepatitis C is a major cause of porphyria. 
4. Malnutrition can bring on a hereditary form. 
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In summary, then. Glenda Giles has developed porphyria as a result of exposure to 
toxic materials.at work at a country club. In addition to be (sic) exposed to 
chlorine, she was exposed to extensive materials in remodeling including 
carpeting. She did notice illness in this area and she was consistently better away 
from this area. 
Tests at the Mayo Clinic do indicate that she does have porphyria. It is highly 
unlikely that she had this previously as she does have a triple enzyme defect, and 
the hereditary forms of porphyria usually will have one enzyme defect, [emphasis 
added]. 
On May 3,1995 Dr. Baker added: 
She has had multiple exposures. She was not only exposed to chlorine gas in a 
one-time exposure, which could be significant, she also was chronically exposed 
to chemical fumes used in extensive remodeling. So she would have been 
exposed to the different building materials and als.o office machinery. She was 
exposed to copiers, fax machines, and carbonless copy paper, which may release 
many toxic substances. She was also exposed to new electronic equipment 
including computers. There could have been other materials used at the country 
club. Golf courses are well-known for having large amounts of pesticides being 
constantly sprayed. 
In sum, Dr. Baker listed a host of potential environmental factors as possible contributing causes 
of Ms. Giles' porphyria. However, Dr. Baker specifically opined that Ms. Giles' "developed 
porphyria as a result of exposure to toxic materials at" Oakridge. Dr. Baker emphasized the 
unlikelihood that Ms. Giles developed porphyria prior to her employment at Oakridge. 
Ms. Giles acknowledged that Dr. Baker directed his opinion concerning the medical causation of 
her porphyria exclusively toward her exposure to chemicals at Oakridge. [see: Petitioner's 
Response to "Answer' Filed by Respondents Oakridge Country Club and Workers Compensation 
Fund page 4 filed April 4, 2001]. Ms. Giles observed: 
The doctor who diagnosed Petitioner's occupational disease has stated that her 
exposure to the many chemicals involved in the re-modeling and new construction 
of the club house; the many chemicals used in and around the club house, and on 
the golf course grounds; together with the office supplies and equipment were 
sufficient to produce the chemically induced poiphyrinopathy. [id.]. 
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Ms. Giles confirmed that: 
Petitioner's case is primarily directed at Oakridge Country Club, and Workers 
Compen-sation (sic) Fund. All other parties have been joined in this case because 
Petitioner did not work for Oakridge for twelve consecutive months, and therefore 
apportionment is required by law. There can be no doubt that Petitioner became 
permanently and totally disabled while in Oakridge Country Club's employ. 
However, there are substantial questions concerning the causal contribution of her 
prior employers. The extent of these Respondents' liability is a question of fact 
for the Labor Commission to determine through these proceedings, [see: 
"Petitioner's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Respondents'; 
Adecco f/k/a Tad Technical Services Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company" at pages 4-5, filed June 18, 2001]. 
Ms. Giles alleged that she worked for Adecco from September 1985, to October 1990. [see: 
Occupational Disease Claim Sec. J.]. In her response to Adecco's "Motion for Summary 
Judgment," Ms. Giles admitted that: "The extent of these Respondents' causal contribution to 
Petitioner's chemically induced porphyriiiopathy has yet to be determined." [see: Petitioner's 
Response to these Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment p. 1 numbered paragraph 2 filed 
June 18, 2001]. Ms. Giles further stated: 
Petitioner submits that when she filed her notice of occupational disease with the 
Industrial Commission of Utah on May 19, 1985, she stated therein: 'I also 
worked for McDonnell Aircraft (a subsidiary of McDonnell Douglas) In the office 
located in the hangers at Hill Air Force Base. I worked there for five years (1985 
to October 1990). There were numerous fumes there.' In addition, Petitioner 
testified on 4 January 1993 at the hearing on her occupational injury claim: 'Itold 
the Workers Comp people that I worked at Hill Field for five years in the hangers; 
and that once a year during the winter when they closed the hangers up to keep it 
warm, I would develop bronchitis.' (Citation omitted). Petitioner does not know 
all of the chemicals and fiimes she was exposed to while in TAD's employ; but 
she does know that she was exposed to these hazards on a daily basis while 
working for TAD. 
Petitioner admits she knew on 5 January 1995 that her occupational disease was 
work related; but she did not know then, and still does not know, to what extent 
the exposure she endured while working for TAD may have aggravated, 
predisposed, or contributed to her diagnosed occupational disease, [id. at pp. 2-
3][emphasis added]. 
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On June 25, 2001 Ms. Giles filed "Petitioner's Response to 'Answer' filed by Respondents 
Adecco f/k/a TAD Technical Services Corporation and Liberty Mutual" wherein she reiterated: 
As stated in her Response to these Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Petitioner informed TAD in May 1995 that she was exposed to numerous fumes 
while in their employ. Petitioner does not know to what extent her exposures 
while employed bv TAD affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused her 
occupational disease. [Petitioner's Response to 'Answer' filed by Respondents 
Adecco f/k/a TAD Technical Services Corporation and Liberty Mutual p. 4 
Response to Sixth Defense filed June 25,2001][emphasis added]. 
In her "Response to Memorandum in Support of Respondents', Adecco f/k/a TAD Technical 
Services Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Motion for Summary 
Judgement" filed on July 28. 2001, Ms. Giles* offered a slightly more specific description of the 
substances she believed her employment at Adecco exposed her to: 
'Petitioner did notice strange odors which she believed to be solvents, cleaning 
materials, exhaust fumes, welding and soldering fumes, jet fuel, adhesives, paint 
fumes, carpet, and carpet glues.' (Ms. Giles quoting her own answer to 
respondents' interrogatory No. 21). Petitioner also mentioned a new computer 
system, a leased copy machine, a FAX machine, and working with newly printed 
documents.../Petitioner was evacuated from her office and the hanger on at least 
one occasion when the chemical alarms sounded.' Although Petitioner was not 
notified what chemical caused the alarm, or what effects the exposure might have, 
this is evidence of injurious exposure while employed by TAD at Hill Airforce 
Base. ["Response to Memorandum in Support of Respondents', Adecco f/k/a 
TAD Technical Services Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
Motion for Summary Judgement" at pages 3-4 filed on July 28,2001]. 
Nevertheless, earlier in her answer to interrogatory No. 21 Ms. Giles stated: 
These exposures occurred eleven to sixteen years ago, and it is impossible for 
Petitioner, at this late date, to compile a list of each exposure; on what date or 
dates they occurred; the length of time of exposure; the quantity of fume exposed 
to; the source or sources of each fume. Petitioner was exposed to toxic fumes on 
a daily basis, but has no way of knowing the identity of all the toxic materials she 
was exposed to. [see: "Reply Memorandum in Support of Respondents, Adecco 
f/k/a TAD Technical Service Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment" Exhibit "A" filed July 18,2001]. 
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The medical evidence produced by Ms. Giles to date in this case, and taken in the light most 
favorable to Ms. Giles, established that she developed porphyria as a result of exposure to toxic 
materials while at work for Oakridge and not from any prior industrial exposure. Accordingly, 
Ms. Giles7 own medical evidence excluded Adecco from any liability for Ms. Giles1 porphyria. 
Further, Ms. Giles admitted that the identity and nature of her exposure to any porphyric 
substances while employed at Adecco remained conjectural as to the nature, type, time and place 
of any such exposure. At best Ms. Giles could only express her belief as to the type of 
substances her employment at Adecco exposed her to, and admitted the impossibility of 
identifying with any certainty the presumed toxic materials or any details concerning the alleged 
exposures. Ms. Giles also conceded that she did not know to what extent her exposures while 
employed by Adecco affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused her porphyria. 
Ms. Giles admitted that her principal case was against Oakridge, but she joined Adecco as a 
hedge against apportionment under the Occupational Disease statute. With her case against 
Adecco mired in mere speculation, Ms. Giles essentially conceded that proof of the claim fell 
beyond her means and left it to the Labor Commission to deal with apportionment if relevant. 
Since any proof of a causal connection between Ms. Giles employment with Adecco and her 
porphyria is admittedly beyond her means, Ms. Giles' claim against Adecco must be dismissed. 
V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A, Standard for Motions for Summary Judgment 
Utah Code §63-46b-l(4) provides in pertinent part that: 
This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an 
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative 
proceeding from: 
(b) granting a timely motion ... for summary judgement if the requirements of... 
Rule 56 ... of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party.... 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states in relevant part that: 
(c) [T]he judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter of law. 
Giles v, Oakridge Country Club et al 
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss 
page 11 
B, The Respondents, Oakridge Country Club, Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah and Employers1 Reinsurance Fund. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-16 (1994) in effect at the time of the March 8,1995 Settlement agreement 
provided in relevant part: 
(1) The commission has the duty and full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law in this or any other title or chapter 
that it administers and to: 
(e) . promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of disputes 
between employers and employees. 
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld a decision by an Industrial Commission administrative law-
judge that a "Compromise and Settlement Agreement" executed by a claimant/employee, 
employer/respondent, and Second Injur}' Fund (now ERF), barred the claimant/employee's 
subsequent claim for permanent total disability compensation. Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 
P. 2d 582 (Utah App. 1988). In Wilburn the claimant/employee (Wilburn) received a 36% whole 
person impairment apportioned 10% to the industrial low back injury at issue, 15% to a 
preexisting low back problem, and 15% to a nonindustrial cervical spine pathology, [id. at 584]. 
The respohdents in Wilburn paid Mr. Wilburn some temporary total, and permanent partial, 
disability benefits, [id.]. Mr. Wilburn then notified the respondents that he intended to file for 
permanent total disability benefits, [id.]. The parties then entered into the "Compromise and 
Settlement Agreement" whereby the respondents paid Mr. Wilburn some additional permanent 
partial disability benefits, [id.]. 
After the "Compromise and Settlement Agreement" Mr. Wilburn filed a claim against 
respondents with the then Industrial Commission for permanent total disability compensation, 
[id,]. The administrative law judge ultimately ruled that: 
The Compromise and Settlement Agreement was therefore binding and barred 
plaintiffs claim for permanent and total disability compensation, [id.]. 
As noted above, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge. 
[id. at 588]. 
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The undisputed facts of the present claim verified that Ms. Giles entered into a "Settlement 
Agreement" with the respondents Oakridge, WCF, and ERF on March 8, 1995. The "Settlement 
Agreement" established that Ms. Giles became permanently and totally disabled as a result of 
porphyria she allegedly contracted from her employment with Oakridge. [see: paragraphs 2 and 7 
of the "Settlement Agreement"]. The respondents agreed to pay Ms. Giles a compromised, 
weekly benefit rate of $135.00 for her permanent total disability allegedly incurred while 
employed for Oakridge. [see: paragraphs 8 and 9 of the "Settlement Agreement"]. The 
"Settlement Agreement" specifically stated that the sum paid represented a compromise of a 
disputed claim, [see: paragraphs 4 and 5 of the "Settlement Agreement"]. 
Ms. Giles couched her present claim as an occupational disease rather than an industrial accident. 
Nevertheless,-Ms. Giles' present Occupational Disease Claim essentially constituted the same 
claim for permanent total disability benefits that she compromised in her "Settlement 
Agreement" approved on March 8,1995. Both Ms. Giles' claims consisted of claims for 
permanent total disability compensation derived from her diagnosis of porphyria allegedly caused 
by her employment at Oakridge. Accordingly, the March 8, 1995 "Settlement Agreement" 
barred Ms. Giles' present Occupational Disease Claim. Wilbum v. Interstate Electric, 748 P. 2d 
582. 
The mere fact that Ms. Giles' recast her claim for permanent total disability compensation as an 
occupational disease rather than an industrial accident failed to create a separate and distinct 
remedy from her first claim. Utah Code Ann. §35-2-110 (1991) in effect at the time of the March 
8, 1995 Settlement agreement stated: 
The compensation provided under this chapter (occupational disease chapter) is 
not in addition to compensation which may be payable under Title 35, Chapter 1 
(industrial accidents chapter), and in all cases where injury results by reason of an 
accident arising out of an in the course of employment and compensation is 
payable for the injury under Title 35, Chapter 1, no compensation under this 
chapter shall be payable. 
In short, Ms. Giles is not allowed double recovery for permanent total disability compensation 
from the same injury by the same employer under both the industrial accidents, and occupational 
disease, chapters of the Workers Compensation Act.3 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
[a]n employee is not entitled to compensation for wage loss for which the 
employer has already compensated him or her. Realistically, and in view of our 
workers' compensation plan, any other holding ignores the plain language of the 
m 
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Ms. Giles argued that Utah Code §35-1-90 prevented her from compromising her rights to further 
benefits via the March 8, 1995 "Settlement Agreement." [see: Petitioner's Response to Answer 
Filed by Respondents Oakridge Country Club and Workers Compensation Fund" filed April 4, 
2001 at page 8]. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-90 (1917) in effect at the time of the March 8,1995 
''Settlement Agreement" stated in part: 
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this title 
shall be valid. 
The Court in Wilburn specifically addressed this argument: 
Under this provision, settlements are appropriate only when the compensable 
nature of the worker's injury is disputed and the worker's right to recover is 
doubtful, (citation omitted). Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P. 2d at 586. 
The "Settlement Agreement" of March 8,1995 specifically stated that: "it is the desire of the 
parties to reach a compromise settlement of a claim of disputed validity." [see: paragraph 4 of the 
"Settlement Agreement"]. In such a case, the Court in Wilburn held "§ 35-1-90 is no bar to 
enforceability of the agreement." [id. at 587]. 
Cl The Respondents Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins. Co., Constitution State Service 
Co., and AC USA/Pacific Employers Ins. Co. 
The respondents Wasatch Crest, Constitution, and ACE all denied that they as insurance carriers 
provided workers' compensation insurance coverage for any of Ms. Giles' employers during the 
relevant time periods at issue. None of the other parties contradicted the assertions of the 
respondents Wasatch Crest, Constitution, and ACE. None of the parties alleged the existence of 
insurance policies provided by Wasatch Crest, Constitution, or ACE that covered any of Ms. 
Giles' employers during the relevant time periods at issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held that: 
[t]he Industrial Commission is without authority to apply the terms of an 
insurance policy to an individual or a corporation not named in the policy as the 
insured. State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 115 Utah 383, , 205 
P. 2d 245, (1949) 
workers' compensation statutes and would result in claimants' receiving duplicate 
payments for loss of earning capacity. Johnson v. Harsco/Heckett 737 P. 2d 986, 
988 (Utah 1987). 
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Absent any assertion that Wasatch Crest Constitution, or ACE issued workers5 compensation 
insurance policies for any of Ms. Giles' employers during the relevant time periods at issue, the 
Labor Commission lacks authority to keep them as respondents in the present case. 
D. The Respondents TAD Resources nka Adecco and Liberty Mutual Ins, Co. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-107 (1991) provided that: 
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational disease is defined as any 
disease or illness which arises out of and in the course of employment and is 
medically caused or aggravated by that employment. 
Ms. Giles as the petitioner in the present matter carried the burden to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that her porphyria arose out of and in the course of her employment with Adecco. 
[see gen: Ashcroft v. The Industrial Comm.?_n_of Utah, 855 P. 2d 267, 269 (Ut App. 1993) 
(petitioner's burden of proof by preponderance of the evidence)]. Ms. Giles also bore the burden 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her employment at Adecco medically caused 
her porphyria. 
The medical evidence produced by Ms. Giles to date in this case, and taken in the light most 
favorable to Ms. Giles, established that she developed porphyria as a result of exposure to toxic 
materials while at work for Oakridge and not from any prior industrial exposure. Accordingly, 
Ms. Giles' own medical evidence excluded Adecco from any liability for Ms. Giles' porphyria, 
[see gen: Stevenson v. The Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 641 P. 2d 117 (Utah 1982). 
Ms. Giles admitted that the identity and nature of her exposure to any porphyric substances while 
employed at Adecco remained conjectural as to the nature, type, time and place of any such 
exposure. At best Ms. Giles could only express her belief as to the type of substances her 
employment at Adecco exposed her to, and admitted the impossibility of identifying with any 
certainty the presumed toxic materials or any details concerning the alleged exposures. Ms. Giles 
also conceded that did not know to what extent her exposures while employed by Adecco 
affected, contributed, predisposed, and/or caused her porphyria. 
Ms. Giles admitted that her principal case was against Oakridge, but she joined Adecco as a 
hedge against apportionment under the Occupational Disease statute. Ms. Giles essentially 
conceded that proof of the claim fell beyond her means and left it: to the Labor Commission to 
deal with apportionment if relevant. Since Ms. Giles lacked the means to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that her porphyria arose out of and in the course of her 
employment with Adecco her claim must be dismissed. 
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E. The Respondent Internal Revenue Sen ice, 
Ms. Giles requested joinder of her former employer the Internal Revenue Service. However, a 
federal employee's remedy for a workers' compensation claim lies exclusively under the Federal 
Employees' Compensation Act 5 U.S.C § 8101-8152 (FECA). see: Miller v. V.A. Medical 
Center, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 7659 (10th Cir. 2001) and Hope v. Berrett 756 P. 2d 102,103 (Ut 
App 1988). Further, the Utah Court of Appeals noted in Hope a "[fjederal employee...is not 
actually an 'employee' as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 (1987)." i± at fn 1. 
Consequently, the Utah Labor Commission lacks jurisdiction to consider Ms. Giles' occupational 
disease claim against the IRS under the Utah Workers Compensation Act. Ms. Giles must 
pursue her claim against the IRS pursuant to FECA before the United States Secretary of Labor. 
VL ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Glenda Giles' Occupational Disease Claim against 
Oakridge Country Club, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, Wasatch Crest Mutual Ins., 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, TAD Resources nka Adecco, Constitution State Service Co., 
ACE USA/Pacific Employers' Ins. Co., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., and Internal Revenue Service, is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this 6th day of June 2002, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GLENDA W- GILES, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
v. * ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB; * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; * 
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL; * 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND; 
TAD RESOURCES, nka ADECCO; * 
CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE 
CO.; ACE USA/PACIFIC EMPLOYERS; * 
INC. CO.; LD3ERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.; * 
and INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. * Case No. 00-1228 
Defendants. * 
Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse summarily dismissed Glenda W. Giles' claim for 
benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Code Ann.). 
Mrs. Giles now asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Judge La Jeunesse* s decision. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1JM. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
On approximately May 30, 1992, Mrs. Giles filed an Application for Hearing seeking 
workers' compensation benefits from Oakridge Country Club and its insurance carrier, Workers 
Compensation Fund. Mrs. Giles' Application alleged injuries from exposure to chlorine gas at 
Oakridge on September 7,1991. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was later added as a defendant 
to Mrs. Giles' claim. On March 8,1995, the parties resolved this claim by settlement agreement. 
On December 27,2000, Mrs. Giles filed a second Application against Oakridge and Workers' 
Compensation Fund, this time for "porphyria" allegedly caused by exposure to toxic fiimes at 
Oakridge between May and December 1991. Thereafter, theEmployers' Reinsurance Fund, Wasatch 
Crest Mutual Insurance, TAD Resources, Constitution State Service Co., ACE USA/Pacific 
Employers Ins. Co., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., and the Internal Revenue Service were added as 
defendants to Mrs. Giles' second claim. 
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Wasatch Crest and ACE-USA/Pacific Employers Insurance Co. each moved for dismissal of 
Mrs. Giles' claim on the grounds neither company was an insurance carrier for Mrs. Giles5 employers 
during any time relevant to Mrs. Giles' claim. 
TAD and its insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual, moved for summary judgment on the grounds, 
among others, that there was no evidence establishing Mrs. Giles' work at TAD as a cause of her 
porphyria. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund, Oakridge and the Workers Compensation Fund moved for 
dismissal on the grounds Mrs. Giles* current occupational disease claim was subject to the parties' 
settlement of her original workers* compensation claim. 
The Internal Revenue Service did not appear or otherwise participate in this matter. 
On June 6, 2002, Judge La Jeunesse granted the defendants' various motions for dismissal 
and summary judgment Judge La Jeunesse also dismissed Mrs. Giles" claim against the I.R.S. for 
lack of jurisdiction over that federal agency. Mrs. Giles now seeks Commission review of Judge La 
Jeunesse's decision. 
The Commission has carefully reviewed Mrs. Giles' motion for review. Much of it deals with 
points that are legally irrelevant or factually unsupported. Ultimately, the Commission believes the 
following issues are determinative of Mrs. Giles* current claim for occupational disease benefits: 
1. Is there any basis to conclude that Wasatch Crest, ACE-USA/Pacific Employers Insurance 
Co., Constitution State Service Co., or other nominal defendants may be liable for Mrs. Giles' 
current claim? 
2. Is there a genuine issue of material facts regarding TAD and Liberty Mutual's possible liability 
for Mrs. Giles' current claim? 
3. Does the settlement agreement which resolved Mrs. Giles5 first claim against Oakridge, 
Workers Compensation Fund and ERF bar Mrs. Giles' current claim against those entities? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission finds there is no genuine dispute regarding the following facts which are 
material to resolution of Mrs. Giles' current claim. 
On May 30, 1992, Mrs. Giles filed an Application For Hearing with the Utah Industrial 
Commission claiming workers' compensation benefits for "seizures, memory loss, sinus, heart and 
lung injury" caused by work-related exposure to chlorine gas at Oakridge on September 7, 1991. 
Oakridge denied liability for the alleged injuries. 
Mrs. Giles' claim was eventually denied by the Commission. Mrs. Giles sought review by the 
A 1 n 
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Utah Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Mrs. Giles continued to seek medical diagnosis of her 
alleged injury. On January 5, 1995, Dr. Baker diagnosed the injury as "chemically acquired or 
chemically induced porphyria" from exposure to toxic fames at Oakridge. According to Dr. Baker: 
The porphyrias are a group of diseases of heme synthesis in which the over 
production of porphyrin compounds results from deficient enyzme activity in the 
biosynthetic pathway of heme 
Without attempting to separately describe each different porphyria, general symptoms 
of the acute attack may include abdominal pain . . . nausea, vomiting, . . . diarrhea. 
Neurological symptoms . . . may include peripheral neuropathy, weakness, . . . 
sensory disorder, possible respiratory problems, hallucinations, confusion, depression, 
sometimes even seizures. 
Although Oakridge continued to dispute Mrs. Giles' claim, the parties agreed to a 
compromise settlement. Their written agreement identified Mrs. Giles' claim as "physical and mental 
injuries allegedly, including organic brain damage, sustained via the exposure." The agreement 
provided for lump-sum and monthly payments to Mrs. Giles in lieu of any other benefits Mrs. Giles 
might be entitled to receive for her alleged injuries. The Commission approved the parties* 
agreement, the defendants paid the required compensation, and Mrs. Giles* claim was dismissed. 
On December 10, 2000, Mrs. Giles filed a second Application For Hearing with the Labor 
Commission, this time seeking benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease Act. This second claim 
was based on the same condition, porphyria, that had served as the basis for her first claim under the 
Workers' Compensation Act. In support of this second claim, Mrs. Giles submitted the same 
diagnosis from Dr. Baker that had been obtained in early 1995 to support her first claim. 
Mrs. Giles has presented no evidence that would establish the liability ofWasatch Crest, ACE-
US A/Pacific Employers Insurance Co., Constitution State Service Co., or Transportation Insurance 
Company with respect to her current occupational disease claim. 
Mrs. Giles has failed to submit any evidence of exposure to substances at TAD that caused 
or contributed to her porphyria. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In this case, the Commission must determine whether the various defendants are entitled to 
summaiy dismissal of Mrs. Giles' claim against them. Section 63-46b-l(4)(b) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act permits summary judgment if the requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure are satisfied. Rule 56 allows summary judgment only if the record shows 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." 
The parties seeking summary dismissal of Mrs. Giles* claim have the burden of establishing 
their right to judgment, even when all facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party . Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists v. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 844 P.2d 322, 324 n. 1 (Utah 1992). In Hill v. Grand Central 
Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970),the Utah Supreme Court observed; 
Summary judgment is never used to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain 
whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute. If there be any such disputed 
issues of fact, they cannot be resolved by summary judgment even when the parties 
properly bring the motion before the court. 
The Commission bears the foregoing principles in mind as it considers the propriety of 
summary dismissal of Mrs. Giles' claim. 
Liability of Wasatch Crest. ACE-USA/Pacific Employers Insurance Co., Constitution State 
Service Co.. Transportation Insurance Company and IRS. Neither Wasatch Crest nor ACE-
USA/Pacific were named by Mrs. Giles as defendants in this matter; Through some process that is 
not clear from the record, it appears that the Adjudication Division itself added these parties as 
defendants in the caption of this case. Likewise, from time to time, other insurance carriers such as 
"Constitution State" and "Transportation Insurance Company" have been listed as defendants in one 
or more pleading, motion or decision in this case. However, the Commission is unaware of any 
factual basis by which these companies would have any legal liability to pay Mrs. Giles' current claim. 
The Commission therefore concludes that Mrs. Giles has no cognizable claim against these parties. 
As to the I.R.S., Judge La Jeunesse correctly noted that the Utah Labor Commission has no 
jurisdiction over workers' compensation or occupational disease claims against an instrumentality of 
the federal government. Mrs. Giles' claim against the LR.S. must also be dismissed. 
Liability of TAD. The Commission now turns to Mrs. Giles7 claim against TAD and its 
workers* compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual TAD and Liberty Mutual were added as 
defendants to Mrs. Giles' claim on the grounds that the Occupational Disease Act's apportionment 
provisions might reach TAD, as Mrs. Giles' former employers. But for TAD and Liberty Mutual 
to incur any liability for Mrs. Giles' alleged occupational disease, Mrs. Giles must first establish that 
her work at TAD exposed her to chemicals that caused or contributed to her porphyria. 
Mrs. Giles acknowledges she is unable to produce any evidence establishing what, if any, 
chemicals she was exposed to at TAD, nor can she establish the extent of any such chemical 
03J 
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exposure. Her claims regarding the possibility of exposure to chemicals at TAD are entirely 
speculative. Under such circumstances, the Commission agrees with Judge La Jeunesse that the 
evidence, even when considered in the light most favorable to Mrs. Giles, fails to establish a genuine 
dispute of material fact regarding TAD's liability in this matter, and that TAD is therefore entitled to 
summary dismissal of Mrs. Giles' claim against TAD. 
Mrs. Giles' second claim against Oakridge. As already noted, Mrs. Giles' first claim for 
benefits was filed under Utah's Workers' Compensation Act. Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Act 
defines the coverage of the Act as follows: "An employee... injured . . . by accident arising out of 
and in the course of. . . employment, wherever such injury occurred . . . shall be paid . . . 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury...." Thus, it is the existence of a work-
related injury that is the basis for payment of benefits under the Worker' Compensation Act. 
When Mrs. Giles filed her first claim for benefits against Oakridge in 1992, she initially 
described her injury in terms of symptoms: "seizures, memory loss, sinus, heart and lung injury." As 
her claim progressed and additional medical evaluations were conducted, these descriptive symptoms 
were brought within a single over-arching diagnosis of porphyria. Thus, at the time Mrs. Giles settled 
her initial workers' compensation claim, that claim was for the injury of porphyria. 
Now, Mrs. Giles has recast her initial claim for workers' compensation benefits for the injury 
of porphyria into a claim for occupational disease benefits for the illness of porphyria. In attempting 
to obtain benefits under both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act for 
the single diagnosis of porphyria, Mrs. Giles runs afoul of the following limitation found in §34A-2-
311 of the Occupational Disease Act: 
The compensation provided under this chapter (the Occupational Disease Act) 
is not in addition to compensation that may be payable under Chapter (the Workers' 
Compensation Act), and in all cases when injury results by reason of an accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment and compensation is payable for the 
injury under Chapter 2, compensation under this chapter may not be payable. 
The 1995 settlement agreement between Mrs. Giles and Oakridge and ERF granted certain 
workers' compensation benefits to Mrs. Giles for her porphyria. Pursuant to §34A-2-311 of the 
Occupational Disease Act, additional compensation for that same condition may not be paid. In light 
of the foregoing, the Commission concludes, as did Judge La Jeunesse, that Mrs. Giles' claim against 
Oakridge and ERF under the Occupational Disease Act must be dismissed. 
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ORDER 
The Commission affirms the decision of Judge La Jeunesse im this matter and denies Mrs. 
Giles" motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this j [ day of May, 2003. 
R. Lee EUertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GLENDA W. GILES, * 
Applicant, * 
v. * ORDER DENYING 
* REQUEST FOR 
OAKRIDGE COUNTRY CLUB; * RECONSIDERATION 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND; * 
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL; * 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND; * 
TAD RESOURCES, nka ADECCO; * 
CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE * 
CO.; ACE USA/PACIFIC EMPLOYERS; * 
INC. CO.; LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.; * 
and INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. * Case No. 00-1228 
Defendants. * 
Glenda W. Giles asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision denying 
Ms. Giles' claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, 
Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-13. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
On March 8,1995, Mrs. Giles, Oakridge Country Club, the Workers Compensation Fund and 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund settled Mrs. Giles' claim for workers' compensation benefits for 
alleged injuries from exposure to chlorine gas at Oakridge on September 7, 1991. 
On December 27, 200Q, Mrs. Giles filed another claim against Oakridge and Workers' 
Compensation Fund, tins time for occupational disease benefits for the disease of "porphyria" 
allegedly caused by exposure to toxic fumes at Oakridge between May and December 1991. 
Various other parties were later added as defendants to Mrs. Giles' second claim. 
Oh June 6,2002, Judge La Jeunesse summarily dismissed Mrs. Giles' occupational disease 
claim. Mrs. Giles then asked the Commission to review Judge LaJeunesse's decision. After careful 
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review of the matter, the Commission concluded that three issues were determinative of Mrs. Giles' 
current claim for occupational disease benefits: 
• Is there any basis to conclude that Wasatch Crest, ACE-US A/Pacific Employers Insurance 
Co., Constitution State Service Co., or other nominal defendants may be liable for Mrs. 
Giles' current claim? 
Is there a genuine issue of material facts regarding TAD and Liberty Mutual's possible 
liability for Mrs. Giles' current claim? 
Does the settlement agreement which resolved Mrs. Giles1 first claim against Oakridge, 
Workers Compensation Fund and ERF bar Mrs. Giles' current claim against those entities? 
Answering the first two issues negatively and the third issue affirmatively, the Commission 
concurred with Judge LaJeunesse's dismissal of Mrs. Giles' occupational disease claim. 
Ms. Giles now asks the Commission to reconsider its prior decision. Specifically, Mrs. Giles 
raises a wide variety of issues that can be loosely categorized as follows: 
1. Effect of settlement of prior workers' compensation claim: Mrs. Giles argues that her 
initial workers' compensation injury was different than her current occupational disease, and 
that settlement of the injury claim should not prevent her from pursuing her occupational 
disease claim. 
2. Propriety of summary judgment: Mrs. Giles argues that genuine issues of material fact 
exist regarding legal and medical causation and other circumstances of her occupational 
disease, thereby precluding summary judgment. 
3. Procedural errors and other defects in the Commission's adjudicative process: Mrs* Giles 
alleges errors regarding proper notice, denial of right to conduct discovery, failure to appoint 
a medical panel, lack of good faith, and conflict of interest 
DISCUSSION 
Beginning with Mrs. Giles' arguments that her initial workers' compensation claim was for 
an "injury" that is different from her current "disease," the Commission has again reviewed the 
evidence on that point and remains convinced that both claims relate to the same medical condition, 
now diagnosed as "porphyria." Under such circumstances, Mrs. Giles may not receive compensation 
for that condition under both the Workers' Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act. 
Specifically, §34A-3-l 11 of the Occupational Disease Act provides as follows: 
0 4 < 
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The compensation provided under this chapter (the Occupational Disease 
Act) is not in addition to compensation that may be payable under Chapter 2 (the 
Workers' Compensation Act), and in all cases when injury results by reason of an 
accident arising out of and in the course of employment and compensation is payable 
for the injury under Chapter 2, compensation under this chapter may not be payable. 
The Commission therefore reaffirms its determination that the prior settlement by Mrs. Giles, 
Oakridge, Workers5 Compensation Fund, and ERF of Mrs. Giles' injury claim, and the payment of 
workers' compensation benefits to Mrs. Giles pursuant to that claim, precludes an additional award 
of occupational disease benefits to Mrs. Giles for the same medical condition. 
Ms. Giles's second category of arguments focus on the propriety of summary dismissal of 
her occupational disease claim. As noted above, Mrs. Giles is precluded as a matter of law from 
receiving occupational disease benefits for the same medical condition that is the basis for payment 
of her workers' compensation benefits. Furthermore, Mrs. Giles has failed to identify evidence that 
would support liability on the part of defendants Wasatch Crest, ACE-USA/Paciflc, Constitution 
State, Transportation Insurance Company, the I.R.S., TAD or Liberty Mutual. The Commission 
remains convinced that no genuine dispute exists regarding the facts that are material to the 
resolution of this matter, and that the defendants are entitled to dismissal of Mrs. Giles' occupational 
disease claim_as a matter of law. 
Finally, Mrs. Giles raises a host of issues regarding notice, discovery, failure to appoint a 
medical panel, lack of good faith, and conflict of interest. Mrs. Giles' arguments on these issues 
reflect some confusion over the facts, as well as a misunderstandings of Commission practice and 
applicable procedural standards. Furthermore, Mrs. Giles' request for reconsideration submits 
evidence that was not presented to Judge LaJeunesse or, even later, as part of Mrs. Giles' initial 
motion for review to the Commission. Likewise, Mrs. Giles' request for reconsideration raises 
allegations and procedural challenges that were not raised in her initial motion for review. 
Section 63-46b-12(l)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires that a motion 
for review ,f. . . shall: . . . (ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; . . . ." 
Furthermore, §34-46b-12(l)(a) establishes a 30-day jurisdictional time limit for filing motions for 
review. The foregoing provisions as essential to the fair and orderly conclusion of administrative 
adjudicative proceedings. The Commission has consistently declined to consider evidence or issues 
raised for the first time as part of a request for reconsideration, unless such matters could not 
reasonably have been raised earlier. 
In this case, the Commission finds no basis to conclude that Mrs. Giles' newly-presented 
evidence or arguments could not have been submitted to Judge LaJeunesse and also incorporated into 
Mrs. Giles' motion for review. The Commission therefore declines to accept or consider such 
evidence or argument now. 
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ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its prior decision in this matter and denies Mrs. Giles' request for 
reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
Dated this f(p day of July, 2003. 
llertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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*986 737 P 2d 986 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Kenneth JOHNSON, Plaintiff, 
v 
HARSCO/HECKETT and/or Insurance Company 
of North 
America/Aetna, and the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Defendants. 
No 860086 
May 14, 1987 
Employee sought review of Industrial 
Commission's order denying additional workers' 
compensation benefits The Supreme Court, Hall, C J , 
held that employee was not entitled to receive both 
temporary total disability benefits for statutory 
maximum of 312 weeks after it was determined that he 
suffered from permanent partial disability 
Affirmed 
West Headnotes 
Workers' Compensation <@^842 
413 — 
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413IX(B) Compensation for Disability 
413IX(B)1 In General 
413k842 Minimum and Maximum 
Compensation 
Employee was not entitled to receive both 
temporary total disability benefits for statutory 
maximum of 312 weeks as well as permanent partial 
disability benefits for another 312 weeks after it was 
determined that he suffered from permanent partial 
disability, employee was not entitled to compensation 
for wage loss for which he had already been 
compensated U C A 1953, 35-1-65, 35-1-66, 35-1-67 
*987 Mary C Corporon, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff 
Robert J Shaughnessy, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants 
HALL, Chief Justice 
Plaintiff Kenneth Johnson seeks review of an order 
of the Industrial Commission denying additional 
workers' compensation benefits 
The facts are not m dispute On Octobei 9, 1980, 
plaintiff was injured in an accident arising out of the 
course of his employment The accident occurred 
when a truck rolled backward and ran over him Since 
the accident, plaintiff has been under the treatment of 
several physicians, including Dr Douglas Schow A 
medical report prepared by Dr Schow dated December 
5, 1983, indicated that plaintiffs combined injuries 
resulted in 79 percent permanent impairment Plaintiff 
did not work from the date of injury until May 15, 
1985 
Defendant insurance company paid all medical bills 
resulting from the accident It also paid temporary 
total disability compensation commencing with the 
date of the accident until January 16, 1984, at the rate 
of $230 per week, for a total of $39,198 57 On 
January 16, 1984, the insurance carrier began paying 
plaintiff permanent total disability benefits at the rate 
of $196 per week, which represented 85 percent of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of plaintiffs 
injuries These latter payments were made on the 
assumption that plaintiff would be permanently and 
totally disabled, but in fact he was not 
An administrative law judge determined that since 
plaintiff had returned to work, he should be paid 
permanent partial disability benefits subject to the 
limitations set forth in the last paragraph of Utah Code 
Ann § 35-1-67 (Supp 1986) Accordingly, the 
insurance carrier was required to pay plaintiff 
compensation at the rate of $196 per week for a total 
amount of $61,152 (representing 85 percent of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of plaintiffs injury, 
payable over a single period of 312 weeks) Payments 
plaintiff had already received were deducted from this 
total amount Further, the administrative law judge 
ordered the employer and the insurance carrier to pay 
all medical expenses incurred as a result of the 
accident 
Plaintiff filed a motion for review with the 
Industrial Commission on December 31, 1985, which 
motion was denied on January 21, 1986 Thereafter, 
plaintiff petitioned this Court 
Plaintiff challenges the Industrial Commission's 
determination that he is not entitled to maximum 
compensation for both temporary total and permanent 
partial disability Specifically, plaintiff contends that 
as a matter of law he is entitled under Utah Code Ann 
§ 35-1-65 (Supp 1979) (amended 1981) to receive 
temporary total disability benefits for 312 weeks at 100 
percent of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
his accident and, in addition, under Utah Code Arm § 
35-1-66 (Supp 1979) (amended 1981 & 1983), he is 
entitled to receive benefits for permanent partial 
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disability at the appropriate level of compensation 
*988 for another 312 weeks. We disagree. 
Plaintiffs claim must be reviewed in light of the 
final paragraph of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(Supp.1986), (FN1) which limits the compensation to 
which claimants are entitled and provides as follows: 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance 
carrier be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind as provided 
in §§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including 
loss of function, in excess of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week for 312 weeks. 
This statutory provision indicates an intent to 
prevent double compensation by limiting a claimant's 
comprehensive benefits to one 312-week maximum 
period. Plaintiff, however, argues that section 35-1-67 
is in direct contradiction with sections 35-1-65 and 
35-1-66 and thus should not be applied. We are not 
persuaded. 
To accept plaintiffs argument would be to ignore 
the plain language of section 35-1-67, and plaintiff has 
demonstrated no convincing rationale for so doing. 
Moreover, the result plaintiff urges is inconsistent with 
the statutory structure which provides for both 
temporary and' permanent benefits. In this regard, 
under Utah's workers' compensation statutes, there are 
four categories of disability, each controlled by a 
separate statutory provision. (FN2) The common 
denominator for compensation under each category is 
the loss of employability resulting from injury. (FN3) 
Generally, temporary total disability benefits are 
awarded when an individual suffers a job-related injury 
that prevents him or her from returning to work. These 
benefits continue until the Commission determines that 
the disability fits into another classification or until 
benefits have been paid for the statutory maximum of 
312 weeks. (FN4) Determination of the temporary or 
permanent nature of a disability is typically made when 
the claimant reaches medical stabilization. (FN5) 
Once stabilization has occurred and the claimant moves 
from temporary to permanent status, "he is no longer 
eligible for temporary benefits." (FN6) Therefore, to 
award plaintiff temporary total disability compensation 
regardless of the permanent nature of his impairment 
contravenes the statutory structure which provides for 
both temporary and permanent benefits. (FN7) 
© 2004 West, a Thomson business. 
Furthermore, because in this case the statutory 
provisions for temporary total and permanent partial 
disability are parts of an integrated effort to 
compensate employees for wage loss suffered by 
reason of industrial injuries, they should be viewed and 
applied if possible as a whole, not in isolation. (FN8) 
So considered and applied, an employee is not entitled 
to compensation for wage loss for which the employer 
has already compensated him or her. (FN9) 
Realistically, and in view of our workers' compensation 
plan, any other holding ignores the plain language of 
the workers' comipensation statutes and would result in 
claimants' receiving duplicate payments for loss of 
earning capacity. 
Accordingly, the order of the Industrial 
Commission is affirmed. 
*989. STEWART, Associate C.J., and HOWE, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
(FN1.) The substance of the last paragraph of Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 has remained unchanged 
since 1975. 
(FN2.) Booms v. Rapp Const Co., 720 P.2d 1363, 
1366 n. 1 (Utah 1986). Categories of disability 
include: temporary total, Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-65 (Supp. 1986); temporary partial, Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-65.1 (Supp.1986); permanent 
partial, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-66 (Supp.1986); 
and permanent total, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(Supp.. 1986). 
(FN3.) Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208, 
211 (Utah 1984). 
(FN4.) Booms, 720 P.2d at 1366. "Every disability 
may be reclassified if the character of the disability 
changes from temporary to permanent and/or the 
character of the disability changes from total to 
partial." Id. (footnote omitted). 
(FN5.)W. 
(FN6.) Id. 
(FN7.) See id. at 1366-67. 
(FN8.) Hudson v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 662 P.2d 29, 30 
(Utah 1983). 
(FN9.) Hudson, 662 P.2d at 30-31. 
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439 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 2002 UT App 10 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
McKESSON CORPORATION and C.W. Reese 
Company, Petitioners, 
v. 
Labor Commission and Robert P. Lieberman, 
Respondents. 
No. 20000800-CA. 
Jan. 17,2002. 
Employer appealed from decision of the Labor 
Commission awarding claimant workers' compensation 
benefits. The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held that 
claimant's subsequent injury was natural result of his 
original compensable workplace neck injury, and 
circumstances surrounding claimant's subsequent injury 
did not relieve employer of financial responsibility for 
the injury. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[ 1 ] Workers' Compensation <§==> 1939.1 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of 
Department, 
Commission, Board, 
Officer, or Arbitrator 
413kl939.1 In General; Questions of Law 
or Fact. 
Employer's claim that Labor Commission relied 
upon incorrect legal standard in determining claimant's 
eligibility for additional workers' compensation 
benefits presented question of law which Court of 
Appeals would review for correctness. 
[2] Workers' Compensation <®=^  1939.3 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of 
Department, 
Commission, Board, 
Officer, or Arbitrator 
413kl939.3 Conclusiveness of 
Administrative Findings 
in General. 
Court of Appeals must uphold Labor Commission's 
workers' compensation determination unless 
determination exceeds bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality. 
[3] Workers' Compensation <®=> 1338 
413—-
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(L) Presumptions and Burden of Proof 
413XVI(L)1 In General 
413kl338 Presumptions in General. 
Court resolves all doubts regarding employee's 
right to workers' compensation in favor of employee. 
[4] Workers' Compensation <@^565 
413 -— 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k565 Further Disability. 
When workers' compensation claimant experiences 
subsequent aggravation to injury that arose out of and 
in course of employment, question of additional 
compensation will hinge on whether subsequent injury 
is natural result of accident underlying compensable 
primary injury. U.C.A.1953, 34a-2-401. 
[5] Workers' Compensation <£==> 1487 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of 
Evidence 
413XVI(N)7 Accident or Injury and 
Consequences Thereof 
413kl487 Injuries Arising Out of and in 
Course of Employment 
in General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Workers' Compensation <@^ 1490 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of 
Evidence 
413XVI(N)7 Accident or Injury and 
Consequences Thereof 
413kl490 Fact of Injury, and Accidental 
Nature in General. 
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Workers' compensation claimant must satisfy three 
elements by preponderance of evidence in order to 
qualify for workers' compensation benefits: (1) 
claimant must show that injury underlying claim 
occurred by accident; (2) claimant must establish that 
accident is legal cause of injury or, in other words, that 
injury arose out of and in course of exertions that were, 
at minimum, usual and ordinary for claimant's 
employment; and (3) claimant must show that the 
workplace accident was medical cause of injury. 
[6] Workers' Compensation (@^604 
413 — 
413 VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(C) Injuries Arising Out of and in 
Course of Employment 
in General 
413k604 In General. 
Once workers' compensation claimant has 
established that his injuries arose from accident and 
that sufficient causal connection exists between his 
disability and working conditions, claimant must be 
compensated for his workplace injuries. 
[7] Workers' Compensation <@^961 
413 — 
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413IX(E) Medical or Other Expenses 
413IX(E)1 In General 
413k961 In General. 
Once injury is determined to be compensable injury 
under workers' compensation law, employer is 
responsible for all medical costs resulting from the 
injury. 
[8] Workers' Compensation <®==?565 
413 — 
413 VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k565 Further Disability. 
To qualify for additional workers' compensation 
benefits after suffering subsequent aggravation to 
compensable workplace injury, claimant need only 
prove that his subsequent injury is natural result of his 
compensable primary injury, and claimant need not 
show that his original tragedy was sole cause of his 
subsequent injury; if claimant can show that initial 
work-related accident is merely contributing cause of 
subsequent injury, claimant has met his burden. 
[9] Workers' Compensation <®=>565 
413 — 
413 VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413V[II(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k565 Further Disability. 
To meet legal causation requirement, workers' 
compensation claimant with pre-existing condition 
implicated in claim must demonstrate that his 
workplace efforts exceeded exertion that average 
person undertakes in nonemployment life. 
[10] Workers' Compensation <@^961 
413 — 
413IX Amount and Period of Compensation 
413IX(E) Medical or Other Expenses 
413IX(E)1 In General 
413k961 In General. 
Whether or not workers' compensation claimant 
suffers from pre-existing condition, once benefits are 
properly awarded, employer is responsible for all 
medical costs resulting from compensable injury, 
including costs resulting from subsequent aggravations 
to compensable workplace injury. 
[11] Workers' Compensation ^^565 
413 — 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VI1I(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k565 Further Disability. 
Under workers' compensation law, it is 
inappropriate to examine subsequent aggravations of 
compensable work-related injuries by applying the 
same exacting standard that the court applies when 
determining compensability of primary workplace 
injuries involving pre-existing conditions. 
[12] Workers' Compensation 0^565 
413 — 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIH(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k565 Further Disability. 
If workers' compensation claimant successfully 
establishes that subsequent injury is natural result or 
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consequence of compensable workplace injury, 
claimant is eligible for additional workers' 
compensation benefits 
[13] Workers' Compensation <@=>1691 
413 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(P) Hearing or Trial 
413XVI(P)1 In General 
413k 1691 Scope and Extent, Matters and 
Evidence Considered 
Labor Commission pioperly analyzed claim for 
additional workers' compensation benefits when 
Commission, having accepting as undisputed the fact 
that the claimant had suffered compensable workplace 
injury to vertebra of his neck, analyzed facts 
surrounding claimant's subsequent injury and 
connection between subsequent injury and original 
compensable industrial injury to determine whether his 
subsequent injury was natural result of his 
compensable primary injury 
[14] *468 Workers' Compensation <@^1939 3 
413 — 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413k 1939 Review of Decision of 
Department, 
Commission, Board, 
Officer, or Arbitrator 
413kl939 3 Conclusiveness of 
Administrative Findings 
m General 
Court of Appeals will not overturn Labor 
Commission's factual findings in workers' 
compensation case unless they are arbitrary and 
capricious, or wholly without cause, or contrary to the 
one inevitable conclusion from evidence 
[15] Workers' Compensation <®^565 
413 — 
413 VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k565 Fuither Disability 
Workers' compensation claimant's subsequent 
injury, which occurred when he hit his head while 
pulling himself into his truck, thereby aggravating his 
original neck injury, was natural result of his 
compensable workplace neck injury, and circumstances 
surrounding claimant's subsequent injury did not 
relieve employer of financial responsibility, medical 
expert opinion suggested that claimant's compensable 
workplace neck injury never properly healed and that 
subsequent aggravation of that injury was not 
unexpected, and nothing suggested that claimant's 
subsequent injury resulted from unreasonable conduct 
*470 Henry K Chai, II, and Knsty L Bertelsen, 
Blackburn & Stoll LC, Salt Lake City, for Petitioners 
Alan Hennebold, Labor Comission, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent Labor Commission 
Robert P Lieberman, Salt Lake City, Respondent 
ProSe 
Before JACKSON, P J , DAVIS, and THORNE, JJ 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge 
U 1 Appellant McKesson Industries Corporation 
(McKesson) appeals from an order of the Utah Labor 
Commission (Commission) awarding Robert 
Lieberman workers' compensation benefits We affirm 
BACKGROUND 
11 2 In 1995, while working in a warehouse owned 
and operated by McKesson, Lieberman was struck in 
the head by a fourteen pound case that fell six or seven 
feet The impact caused Lieberman to suffer two 
herniated cervical disks In an attempt to repair the 
damage from the accident, Lieberman subsequently 
underwent a variety of surgical procedures, including 
both the installation of a plate, and disk fusion 
K 3 During a scheduled follow-up visit, Lieberman's 
doctor noted that 
Rob is now three and one-half months post-op 
ACD, allograft interbody fusion and plate fixation 
C5-6-7 He is working, but the company has 
basically put him back to regular duty with 
repetitive overhead reaching and lifting, contrary to 
my restrictions which said no overhead repetitious 
lifting In the past several days this has aggravated 
his neck pain 
1) 4 In September 1996, Lieberman entered into an 
agreement with McKesson through which McKesson 
agreed to pay Lieberman $13,965 35 m temporary total 
disability, $10,707 84 in total permanent partial 
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disability for a 12% whole person impairment, and 
$10,392 04 foi Liebeiman's medical expenses 
However, on April 21, 1997, McKesson's doctor noted 
that Lieberman still suffered "neck pain and stiffness 
when he has to look upward or when using his arms 
and hands above his head " 
f 5 In July 1997, Lieberman petitioned the 
Commission for a hearing seeking payment of 
additional medical expenses and further disability 
compensation The Commission granted the petition, 
and, following a hearing on the petition, an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Lieberman 
did suffer from ongoing symptoms resulting from the 
accident and ordered McKesson to pay Lieberman an 
additional $4,550 96 as compensation for his 
temporary total disability 
Tf 6 By February 1999, Lieberman's doctor 
suspected that the attempt to fuse the disks had failed, 
but opined that Lieberman's chronic pain was likely the 
result of soft-tissue fatigue caused by his new job 
K 7 On May 22, 1999, while pulling himself into his 
pickup truck, Lieberman hit his head on the truck's 
door frame aggravating his neck injury Lieberman 
was subsequently reexamined by Dr Hood, who 
determined that Lieberman had exacerbated his earlier 
injury and recommended additional surgery 
McKesson denied responsibility for any costs *471 
associated with the aggiavation to Lieberman's neck 
injury 
% 8 Lieberman petitioned the Commission for 
another hearing, seeking an order requiring McKesson 
to pay medical expenses resulting from treatment of the 
subsequent injury, other necessary medical care, and 
additional temporary total disability compensation 
Following a hearing, the ALJ determined that "the 
incident of May 22, 1999 failed to constitute an event 
that would relieve McKesson of liability for Mr 
Lieberman's current disability and medical needs " 
% 9 The ALJ ordered McKesson to pay Lieberman's 
medical costs, and awarded Lieberman temporary total 
disability compensation McKesson sought review of 
the ALJ's decision through the Labor Commission's 
Appeals Board However, after reviewing McKesson's 
claims, the Board affirmed the ALJ's order McKesson 
now appeals 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] % 10 McKesson argues that the Commission 
relied upon an incorrect legal standard m determining 
Lieberman's eligibility for additional workers' 
compensation benefits This argument presents a 
question of law, which we review for correctness See 
Esquivel v Laboi Comm'n 2000 UT 66,H 13, 7 P 3d 
777 
[2][3] U 11 McKesson also argues that the 
Commission erred in concluding that Lieberman's 
September 25, 1995 accident was the cause of his May 
22, 1999 injuries "[T]he Legislature has granted the 
Commission discretion to determine the facts and apply 
the law to the facts in all cases coming before it As 
such, we must uphold the Commission's determination 
unless the determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality " AE Clevite, Inc v 
Labor Comm'n 2000 UT App 35,K 7, 996 P 2d 1072 
(citation and footnote omitted), see also Utah Code 
Ann § 34A-1-301 (1997) ("The commission has the 
duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to 
determine the facts and apply the law m this chapter or 
any other title or chapter it administers ") Further, we 
resolve all doubts regarding an employee's right to 
compensation m favor of the employee See AE 
Clevite, 2000 UT App 35 at % 7 
ANALYSIS 
K 12 McKesson first argues that the Commission 
failed to apply the causation analysis mandated by 
Allen v Industrial Commission, 729 P 2d 15 (Utah 
1986), when it reviewed Lieberman's petition We 
disagree 
[4] % 13 When an individual experiences a 
subsequent aggravation to an injury that arose "out of 
and in the course of employment," Utah Code Ann § 
34A-2-401 (1997), the question of additional 
compensation will hinge on whether the " 'subsequent 
injury is a natural result of [the accident underlying 
the] compensable primary injury' " Intermountain 
Health Care v Board of Rev, 839 P 2d 841, 845 (Utah 
Ct App 1992) (quoting Mountain States Casing Servs 
v McKean, 706 P 2d 601, 602 (Utah 1985)) 
^ 14 McKesson argues that Allen supersedes the 
standard articulated above, however, McKesson 
misconstrues both the holding of Allen and the thrust of 
Intermountain 
[5] H 15 In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court set out to 
clarify the requirements of Utah's workers' 
compensation law See Allen, 729 P 2d at 18 After 
thoroughly examining available case law, the court 
articulated three elements that a claimant must satisfy 
by a preponderance of the evidence to qualify for 
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workers' compensation benefits See id at 18-25 
First, the claimant must show that the injury underlying 
the claim occurred by accident See id at 18, 22 
Second, assuming the claimant has established a 
connection between the injury and an accident, the 
claimant must then establish that the accident is the 
legal cause of the injury (FN1) See id at 25 In 
other words, the claimant must show that the injury 
arose out of and in the course of exertions that were, at 
a minimum, *472 usual and ordinary for the 
claimant's employment See id Finally, should the 
claimant demonstrate that the exertion underlying his 
accident was "sufficient to support compensation," I e 
the exertion was "usual or ordinary" for the job, id at 
25-26, the claimant must show that the workplace 
accident was the medical cause of the injury See id 
[6][7] K 16 Once the claimant has established that 
his injuries arose from an accident, and that "a 
sufficient causal connection [exists] between [his] 
disability and the working conditions," id at 25, the 
claimant has met the Allen requirements, and thus must 
be compensated for his workplace injuries Moreover, 
once the injury is determined to be a compensable 
injury, the employer is responsible for "all medical[ 
costs] resulting from that injury " McKean, 706 P 2d at 
602 
U 17 Here, there is no dispute concerning the 
compensability of Lieberman's workplace injury, 
rather, the dispute centers on his subsequent 
aggravation of the compensable workplace injury 
When a claimant suffers a subsequent aggravation to a 
compensable workplace injury, the question of whether 
the subsequent injury is compensable turns upon the 
standard articulated in Intermountain See 
Intermountain, 839 P 2d at 845 
[8] U 18 To qualify for additional benefits after 
suffering a subsequent aggravation to a compensable 
workplace injury, a claimant need only prove that his 
"subsequent injury [is] a natural result of [his] 
compensable primary injury " (FN2) Id Furthermore, 
a claimant need not " 'show that his original tragedy 
was the sole cause of [his] subsequent injury' " Id at 
845 (quoting McKean, 706 P 2d at 602) (emphasis 
added) Indeed, if the claimant can show that " 'the 
initial work-related accident [is merely] ^contributing 
cause' of the subsequent injury," id at 845 (quoting 
McKean, 706 P 2d at 602), the claimant has met his 
burden 
H 19 McKesson asserts, however, that Allen 
demands the application of a substantively different 
standard to determine whether a claimant is eligible for 
additional workers' compensation benefits to cover the 
costs of a subsequent aggravation to a compensable 
workplace injury McKesson argues that Lieberman's 
compensable primary injury created a preexisting 
condition, and, as stated by the supreme court, "where 
the claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which 
contributes to the injury, an unusual o) exti aoi dinary 
exertion is required to prove legal causation " Allen, 
729 P 2d at 26 (emphasis added) McKesson's reliance 
upon this distinction is misplaced 
[9] H 20 In Allen, a claimant who suffered from 
non-compensable preexisting back problems was 
denied workers' compensation benefits for injuries to 
his back that he claimed resulted from a workplace 
accident See id at 17 On appeal, the supreme court 
reversed the Commission's decision, stating that 
"emphasis on prior injuries is not determinative of 
whether an accident occurred " Id at 27 Rather, the 
court continued, preexisting conditions are more 
appropriately analyzed for their impact on the question 
of legal causation See id at 27-28 To meet the legal 
causation requirement, a claimant with a preexisting 
condition implicated in the claim must demonstrate that 
his workplace efforts "exceeded the exertion that the 
average person undertakes in nonemployment life " Id 
[10] K 21 However, whether or not a claimant 
suffers from a preexisting condition, once benefits are 
properly awarded, the employer is responsible for "all 
medical[ costs] resulting from [the compensable] 
injury," including costs resulting from subsequent 
aggravations to the compensable workplace injury 
(FN3) McKean, 706 P 2d at 602 
*473 [11] H 22 We conclude that it would be 
inappropriate to examine subsequent aggravations of 
compensable work-related injuries by applying the 
same exacting standard that we apply when 
determining the compensability of primary workplace 
injuries involving preexisting conditions 
[12] 1) 23 Accordingly, if the claimant successfully 
establishes that the subsequent injury is the "natural 
result" or consequence of a compensable workplace 
injury, the claimant is eligible for additional workers' 
compensation benefits McKean, 706 P 2d at 602 
[13] 1) 24 In the instant case, the Commission 
accepted as undisputed the fact that Lieberman had 
suffered a compensable workplace injury to the 
vertebra of his neck in 1995 The Commission then 
analyzed "the facts surrounding [Lieberman's] 
subsequent injury and the connection between the 
subsequent injury and the original compensable 
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industrial injury," Intermountain, 839 P 2d at 846, to 
determine whether his subsequent injury was the 
"natural result" of his compensable primary injury Id 
Therefore, we conclude the Commission properly 
analyzed Lieberman's claim under the standard set 
forth in Inter mountain Health Care v Boaid of 
Review, 839 P 2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
[14] H 25 McKesson next argues that 1he 
Commission erred in concluding that Lieberman's 
compensable woikplace injury was the cause of his 
subsequent aggravating injury This court will not 
overturn the Commission's factual findings "unless they 
are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly without cause, 
or contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the 
evidence " Large v Industrial Comm'n, 758 P 2d 954, 
956 (Utah Ct App 1988), 758 P 2d at 956 (alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations omitted) 
Additionally, we grant the Commission a measure of 
discretion when applying the legal standard to a given 
set of facts See Drake v Industrial Comm'n, 939 P 2d 
177, 182 (Utah 1997), see also AE Clevite, 996 P 2d 
1072, 2000 UT App 35 at \ 6 (stating, "we must 
uphold the Commission's determination unless the 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality") 
[15] K 26 Here, the Commission accepted as 
undisputed the existence of Lieberman's compensable 
workplace injury (FN4) The Commission then 
determined that the available medical evidence pointed 
to Lieberman's compensable workplace injury as the 
medical cause of his subsequent aggravating injury 
Finally, after examining the facts surrounding 
Lieberman's subsequent injury, as well as "the 
connection between [his] subsequent injury and [his] 
original compensable industrial injury," Intermountain, 
839 P 2d at 846, the Commission determined that 
Lieberman's subsequent injury occurred after a "simple 
accident brought on by ordinary error and unintentional 
miscalculation" Thus, the Commission effectively 
concluded that Lieberman's subsequent injury was the 
"natural result" of his compensable workplace injury, 
and that the circumstances surrounding Lieberman's 
subsequent injury did not relieve McKesson of the 
financial responsibility for the injury 
1J 27 We have reviewed the record and conclude 
that the evidence supports the Commission's findings 
Lieberman clearly suffered a grave compensable 
workplace injury to his neck in 1995 Additionally, 
medical expert opinion proffered by both sides 
suggested that Lieberman's injury never properly 
healed, and that a subsequent aggravation of that injury 
was not unexpected Finally, nothing m the record 
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suggests that Lieberman's subsequent injury resulted 
from unreasonable conduct, therefore, we cannot say 
that the Commission's findings were "wholly without 
cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion 
from the evidenc e " Latge, 758 P 2d at 956 (alteration 
in original) (quotations and citations omitted) 
11 28 We also conclude that the Commission had an 
adequate factual basis upon which to determine that 
Lieberman's subsequent re-mjury was the "natural 
result" of his compensable workplace injury 
Therefore, the Commission pioperly determined that 
McKesson was responsible for the costs associated 
with the re-injury 
*474. CONCLUSION 
K 29 Th2 Commission properly examined 
Lieberman's petition for additional workers' 
compensation benefits under the standard set forth in 
Intermountain Health Care v Board of Review, 839 
P 2d 841, 845-46 (Utah Ct App 1992) Additionally, 
the Commission acted within the scope of its discretion 
m determining that Lieberman's subsequent injury was 
the natural result of his earlier compensable primary 
injury 
K 30 Accordingly, we affirm the Commission's 
findings and conclusions 
K 31 WE CONCUR NORMAN H JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge, and JAMES Z DAVIS, Judge 
(FN1 ) In most cases, "a usual or ordinary" exertion is 
sufficient to meet the legal causation requirement, 
however, "a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced m everyday life because of his condition " 
Allen v Industrial Comm'n, 729 P 2d 15, 25 (Utah 
1986) 
(FN2) Stated more precisely, the claimant must 
establish that the subsequent aggravation is causally 
linked to the primary compensable injury See 
Intermountain Health Caie v Board of Rev, 839 
P 2d 841, 346 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
(FN3 ) Of course, responsibility for costs resulting 
from subsequent aggravations to compensable 
workplace injuries is not automatic The claimant 
must first demonstrate that the subsequent 
aggravation is the "natural result" of the primary 
workplace injury or accident Mountain States 
Casing Servs v McKean, 706 P 2d 601, 602 (Utah 
claim to onginal U S Govt works 
n r o 
41 P.3d 468, McKesson Corp. v. Labor Com'n, (Utah App. 2002) Page 7 
1985). 
(FN4.) The Commission adopted the findings of the 
ALJ. 
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v 
PARK-CRAIG-OLSON, INC.; J. Samuel Park; 
and Ellis Edward 
Craig, Defendants and Appellants. 
No 900545-CA 
Aug 14, 1991 
Minority shareholder brought action against 
corporation and other shareholders for indemnity and 
contribution for amounts he had paid in satisfaction of 
corporation debts Controlling shareholder filed 
counterclaim in quantum meruit for unreimbursed 
expenses The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Richard H Moffat, J , dismissed controlling 
shareholder's counterclaim and awarded summary 
judgment to minority shareholder Controlling 
shareholder and corporation appealed The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J , held that (1) summary judgment 
on minority shareholder's complaint was appropriate 
given arguments made and state of record, and (2) trial 
court's dismissal of controlling shareholder's 
counterclaim constituted error 
Affirmed in part, reversed m part, and remanded 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error <£^>934(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k934 Judgment 
30k934(l) In General 
In reviewing whether summary judgment was 
properly granted, Court of Appeals examines facts m 
light most favorable to losing party 
[2] Appeal and Error <&* 169 
30 
30V Presentation and Reservation in Lower Court 
of Grounds of Review 
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court 
30kl69 Necessity of Presentation in General 
Court of Appeals will not consider arguments on 
appeal which were not raised before trial court 
[3] Courts <®^111 
106—-
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure 
106II(M) Records 
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106kl 11 Necessity 
District courts are courts of record, and record of 
all official proceedings should be made Const Art 8, 
§1 
[4] Appeal and Error <£^>499( 1) 
30 — 
30X Record 
30X(A) Matters to Be Shown 
30k498 Presentation and Reservation of 
Grounds of Review 
30k499 Questions and Objections in 
General 
30k499(l) In General 
Although role of appellate court is to sift parties' 
arguments in light of facts found by trial court and 
square those arguments with law, appellate court may 
weigh only those facts and legal arguments preserved 
in trial court record 
[5] Appeal and Error ^^654 
30 — 
30X Record 
30X(J) Defects, Objections, Amendments, and 
Corrections 
30k652 Amendment in Appellate Court 
30k654 Supplying Omissions 
Motion, under rule establishing procedure for 
supplementing record when necessary, is appropriate 
only when record must be augmented because of 
omission or exclusion or dispute as to accuracy of 
reporting, and not to introduce new material into 
record, when record appropriately needs 
supplementation, this rule is method to be 
implemented Rules App Proc , Rule 11(h) 
[6] Appeal and Error <@ >^499( 1) 
30 — 
30X Record 
30X(A) Matters to Be Shown 
30k498 Presentation and Reservation of 
Grounds of Review 
30k499 Questions and Objections in 
General 
30k499(l) In General 
Controlling shareholder had not preserved 
arguments which he advanced on appeal where he had 
not sought leave to supplement record in accordance 
with rule establishing proper procedure for 
supplementing record, and sole source of information 
as to whether any issues raised on appeal were 
considered by trial court was affidavit of controlling 
shareholder's trial counsel discussing dialogue held in 
chambers, without court reporter, concerning those 
arguments Rules App Proc , Rule 11(h) 
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[7] Pretrial Procedure <®:::=>624 
307A ~ -
307AIII Dismissal 
307AIII(B) Involuntary Dismissal 
307AIII(B)4 Pleading, Defects In, in General 
307Ak623 Clear and Certain Nature of 
Insufficiency 
307Ak624 Availability of Relief Under Any State 
of Facts Provable. 
Dismissal of claim for failure to state claim upon 
which relief can be granted is severe measure, given 
liberality of notice pleading, and must be granted only 
when it is apparent that under no set of facts proven in 
support of claim as pleaded would party be entitled to 
relief. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(b)(6). 
[8] Appeal and Error <®==>919 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k915 Pleading 
30k919 Striking Out or Dismissal. 
When challenging dismissal for failure to state a 
claim, appellant is entitled to generous standard of 
review; Court of Appeals construes pleading in light 
most favorable to appellant and indulges all reasonable 
inferences in appellant's favor. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
12(b)(6). 
[9] Implied and Constructive Contracts <@^30 
205H 
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(C) Services Rendered 
205Hk30 Work and Labor in General; 
Quantum Meruit. 
In order to succeed on claim of quantum meruit, or 
contract implied in law, claimant must show that other 
party received benefit from claimant's efforts, that 
other party had appreciation or knowledge of benefit, 
and that circumstances make it unjust for other party to 
retain benefit without reimbursing claimant for it; if 
claimant succeeds in establishing these elements, he 
can recover reasonable value of his services inuring to 
other party's benefit. 
[10] Implied and Constructive Contracts <@^30 
205H —-
205HI Nature and Grounds of Obligation 
205HI(C) Services Rendered 
205Hk30 Work and Labor in General; 
Quantum Meruit. 
Controlling shareholder stated claim for quantum 
meruit where minority shareholder conceded that 
controlling shareholder's successful efforts to release 
minority shareholder from several obligations were 
beneficial to minority shareholder, record contained 
evidence that minority shareholder knew that 
controlling shareholder had conferred benefit upon 
him, and controlling shareholder personally negotiated 
agreements which released minority shareholder from 
liability, while leaving controlling shareholder 
assuming even greater potential short-term liability. 
*1357 Brent R. Armstrong, Jeffrey Weston Shields 
(argued), Paul M. Simmons, Suitter, Axland, 
Armstrong & Hanson, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
and appellants. 
Reed L. Martineau, Bryce D. Panzer, (argued), 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
H. Glenn Olson (Olson) brought an action against 
Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., (PCO), J. Samuel Park (Park), 
and Ellis E. Craig (Craig) for indemnity and 
contribution for amounts paid on certain loans. Park 
filed a counterclaim for unreimbursed expenses. The 
trial court dismissed Park's counterclaim and awarded 
summary judgment to Olson. Park and PCO appeal the 
dismissal of the counterclaim and the grant of summary 
judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand. 
FACTS 
Park, Craig, and Olson were shareholders in PCO, a 
corporation which owned and operated six Marie 
Callender restaurants in Utah and California. Park was 
the majority shareholder; he held 54.33 percent of the 
outstanding shaies. Craig owned 29 percent, and 
Olson owned the remaining 16.67 percent of the 
outstanding shares. 
PCO incurred obligations to First Security Bank 
(the bank), which were in turn personally guaranteed 
by Park, Craig, and Olson. The first note was in the 
principal amount of $215,000, and the second was in 
the principal amount of $225,000. Park, Craig, and 
Olson also acted as guarantors on other obligations, 
including several real estate leases for the restaurant 
locations, and a franchise contract with the Marie 
Callender franchisor. Park, however, was not a 
guarantor on the lease for the California restaurant. 
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In Januaiy 1985, Park sold his interest in PCO to 
the Maish Gioup, an investment *1358 partnership 
A little moie than two years later, the Marsh Group 
defaulted on its payments to Park, and Park took steps 
to repossess his shares in PCO He regained 
possession of the shares m September 1987 Park 
learned PCO was in severe financial distress and that 
the value of the PCO shares was m serious jeopardy 
The bank sued PCO in June 1987, after PCO defaulted 
on both notes Park resumed an active role m PCO 
management and vigorously sought refinancing and 
negotiated with ci editors Park's efforts resulted in 
Olson's release from his guaranties of several of the 
real estate leases, including one significant lease, 
namely for the California restaurant on which Park was 
himself not a guarantor Park was required to remain 
as a guarantor on the lease for the West Valley City 
restaurant, although Olson was released from liability 
Park also successfully negotiated the forgiveness of 
substantial past due franchise fees 
Park reached a settlement with the bank in which 
Park, Craig, and PCO, were released from the notes m 
exchange for a payment of $235,000 After the sale of 
PCO's remaining assets to the Marie Callender 
franchisor, Park was fully reimbursed for his payment 
to the bank As part of the settlement, the bank 
reserved its rights to seek an additional $80,000 
payment from Olson Ultimately the bank obtained a 
judgment against Olson and he paid over $84,000 to 
the bank 
Olson sued Park, Craig, and PCO, seeking 
indemnity from PCO and contribution from Craig and 
Park for the amounts he paid on the judgment arising 
from the bank notes Park counterclaimed against 
Olson for reimbursement for personal services and 
expenditures m his efforts to avoid financial disaster 
for PCO and its shareholders and for managing PCO 
during its final year of operation The trial court 
granted summary judgment m favor of Olson and 
dismissed Park's counterclaim Olson was also 
awarded attorney fees against PCO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate "only when 
no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law " 
Projects Unlimited v Copper State Thrift, 798 P 2d 
738, 743 (Utah 1990) (quoting Transamenca Cash 
Reserve Inc v Dixie Power & Water, Inc, 789 P 2d 
24, 25 (Utah 1990)), Utah RCivP 56(c) In our 
review of whether summary judgment was properly 
granted, we examine the facts in the light most 
favorable to the losing party Donahue v Durfee 780 
P 2d 1275, 1276 (Utah App 1989) "[W]e review the 
trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and give 
no particular deference to that court's view of the law " 
Projects Unlimited, 798 P 2d at 743 
Park argues that Olson was not entitled to summary 
judgment because the court erred in its conclusion that 
Olson was owed contribution from Park Park claims 
he was not liable for contribution because he paid more 
than his proportionate share of PCO's debt on the bank 
notes, while Olson did not pay more than his fair share 
Park also alleges that the court erred in its method of 
calculating the amount of Park's liability, and he 
additionally contests the award of attorney fees Olson 
counters that none of these arguments were raised 
before the trial court, and asks that we not consider 
them on appeal Olson's argument appears well-taken 
In his memorandum in opposition to Olson's renewed 
summary judgment motion, Park only argued that (1) 
the motion was premature since it was filed prior to the 
date scheduled for the closing of discovery, (2) the 
motion suggested that Park failed to file a counterclaim 
as ordered by the court, when the court had not so 
ordered, and (3) the motion was not ripe Park does 
not pursue any of these arguments in this appeal 
[2] We normally will not consider arguments on 
appeal which were not raised before the trial court 
See, eg, James v Preston, 746 P 2d 799, 801 (Utah 
App 1987) Park urges us to consider his arguments, 
stating that they were "broadly speaking raised 
below" and suggesting that the trial court "implicitly 
considered" the arguments now raised on appeal Park 
*1359 refers us to a number of cases establishing an 
exception to the general rule, all of which suggest that 
standing issues may be raised for the first time on 
appeal (FN1) See, eg, Blodgett v Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 752 P 2d 901, 904 (Utah App 1988) (court or 
parties may raise standing concerns for the first time on 
appeal) But see State v Marshall, 791 P 2d 880, 885 
(Utah App) (Fourth Amendment standing cannot be 
raised for first time on appeal), cert denied, 800 P 2d 
1105 (Utah 1990) Park suggests we voraciously 
expand the bite of the standing exception, urging that 
the expanded exception be applied to him. He posits 
that issues of standing affect substantive rights to 
maintain an action, and since maintenance of his action 
is in peril if we do not consider his arguments, we must 
proceed as if the arguments concerned standing and 
reach their merits We do not regard Park's arguments 
on appeal as touching upon standing in any meaningful 
sense We decline to enlarge the standing exception to 
our long-standing rule as argued by Park Such an 
expansion of the exception would essentially gut the 
© 2004 West, a Thomson business No claim to original U S Govt works 
815 P 2d 1356, Olson v Park-Craig-Olson, Inc , (Utah App 1991) Page 4 
rule requiring that arguments raised on appeal have 
first been raised below 
Park also supports his position that the arguments 
were raised below by submission of an affidavit of his 
trial counsel discussing an "active dialogue" that was 
held m chambers and without a court reportei, 
concerning these arguments However, we are 
constrained to disregard the affidavit as it has not been 
made part of the record before us The affidavit 
presents but one account of an unrecorded conversation 
in which critical issues were allegedly addressed 
[3][4] The district courts of this state are courts of 
record, Utah Const, art VIII, § 1, Utah Code Ann § 
78-1-2 (1987), and a record of all its official 
proceedings should be made See, e g State v Suarez 
793 P 2d 934, 936 n 3 (Utah App 1990), Birch v 
Birch, 771 P 2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App 1989), Briggs 
v Holcomb, 740 P 2d 281, 282-83 (Utah App 1987) 
This precept "applies to conferences m chambers as 
well as courtroom proceedings " Onyeabor v Pro 
Roofing, Inc, 787 P 2d 525, 527 (Utah App 1990) 
"The burden is on the parties to make certain that the 
record they compile will adequately preserve their 
arguments for review " Franklin Fin v New 
Empire Dev Co, 659 P 2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) 
The role of the appellate court is to sift the parties' 
arguments m light of "the facts found by the trial court 
and square them with the law" State v Vigil 815 
P 2d 1296, 1299 We may, however, weigh only those 
facts and legal arguments preserved for us in the trial 
court record Ringwood v Foreign Auto Works Inc , 
786 P 2d 1350, 1358-59 (Utah App 1990) Counsel's 
recollection of the course of proceedings is no 
substitute for a record of those proceedings 
[5] Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure establishes a procedure for supplementing 
the record when necessary Utah R App P 11(h) But 
a motion under Rule 11(h) is appropriate only when the 
record must be augmented because of an omission or 
exclusion, or a dispute as to the accuracy of reporting, 
State v Moosman, 794 P 2d 474, 478-79 & n 17 (Utah 
1990), and not to introduce new material into the 
record Id at 478 n 17 The rule provides a reliable 
method for the reconstruction of events when the 
record has failed in some limited respect See also 
Jeschke v Willis, 793 P 2d 428, 428-29 (Utah 
App 1990) (m considering a Rule 11(h) motion, court 
may examine prior opportunity to introduce material, 
necessity of supplemental material, and potential 
delay) When the record appropriately needs 
supplementation, Rule 11(h) is the method to be 
implemented 
[6] Park has not sought leave to supplement the 
record in accordance with Rule 11(h), and we cannot 
consider his counsel's affidavit, which appears as an 
unsolicited addendum to Park's brief A careful review 
of the record on appeal persuades us *1360 that Park 
has not preserved the arguments advanced m 
opposition to the judgment in Olson's favor and we 
decline to consider them On the record properly 
before us, and given the issues raised on appeal, we 
find no error in the grant of summary judgment to 
Olson 
RULE 12(b)(6) 
DISMISSAL OF PARK'S COUNTERCLAIM 
[7][8] Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a 
severe measure given the liberality of notice pleading, 
and must be granted only when it is apparent that under 
no set of facts proven m support of the claim as 
pleaded would a party be entitled to relief Colman v 
Utah State Land Bd, 795 P 2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) 
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a pleading may be 
dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted' Utah RCivP 12(b)(6) When 
challenging a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) the 
appellant is entitled to a generous standard of review 
We "construe the [pleading] in the light most favorable 
to the [claimant] and indulge all reasonable inferences 
in [the claimant's] favor " Mounteer v Utah Power & 
Light Co, 773 P 2d 405, 406 (Utah App 1989) See 
also Arrow Indus v Zwns First Natl Bank 767 P 2d 
935, 936 (Utah 1988) (Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
appropriate only "where it appears to a certainty that 
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of facts which could be proved m support of its 
claim") 
[9] Each party relies on Danes v Olson, 746 P 2d 
264 (Utah App 1987), in which this court distinguished 
the variants of quantum meruit and diagrammed the 
elements of each Park's counterclaim alleges a 
contract implied m law, also referred to as unjust 
enrichment or quasi-contract In order to succeed on 
this claim, Park must show Olson received a benefit 
from Park's efforts, Olson's appreciation or knowledge 
of the benefit, and that the circumstances make it unjust 
for Olson to retain the benefit without reimbursing 
Park for it Id at 269 If Park succeeded m 
establishing these elements, he could recover the 
reasonable value of his services muring to Olson's 
benefit Id 
Olson asserls that, even generously indulging all 
reasonable inferences, no set of facts proved in support 
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of the counterclaim could sustain Park's theory of 
unjust enrichment Tempering our review with a 
liberal construction of the counterclaim, as we must, 
we disagree We need not dwell on the fust element, 
l e , that a benefit be conferred on Olson, as Olson 
conceded in his own deposition that Park's successful 
efforts to release Olson from several obligations was 
beneficial to Olson The remaining issues concern 
Olson's appreciation or knowledge of the benefit, and 
whether the circumstances make it unjust for Olson to 
retain that benefit gratis Support for these elements of 
the claim can be reasonably inferred from the record 
[10] Olson relies on the subtle distinction of 
whether he knew that Park in his individual capacity, 
as opposed to Park acting as operating officer of PCO, 
conferred a benefit upon him Olson proclaims that it 
would be "an unjustified leap of faith, and not a 
reasonable inference" for us to interpret the record in 
Park's favor While the record does show that Olson 
did not entirely countenance Park's actions, we find a 
far wider chasm between references in the record and 
Olson's claim of ignorance of Park's actions as an 
individual shareholder m contradistinction to his 
actions as an operating officer We agree with Olson 
that this unique situation does not neatly conform to 
"textbook examples of contract implied in law" 
However, our task is not to pass on the ultimate merits 
of Park's claim-we conduct our inquiry only far 
enough to discern some set of "facts which could be 
proved in support of [his] claim" Arrow Indus 767 
P 2d at 936 The record amply supports a reasonable 
inference that Olson knew of the benefit conferred by 
Park acting as a fellow shareholder On remand, the 
parties will have their opportunity to introduce 
evidence to prove whether that reasonable inference 
can be adequately supported or refuted 
Park must also prevail on the issue of whether it 
would be unjust for Olson to retain the benefit of Park's 
services without payment Olson claims that Park's 
efforts *1361. to save PCO from financial ruin were 
motivated by Park's understandable desire to salvage 
his own investment, and argues that any benefit to him 
is merely incidental Yet Park personally negotiated 
agreements which released Olson from liability, while 
leaving Park assuming even greater potential liability, 
at least in the short term (FN2) Although there may 
be other factors which would counter this apparent 
inequity, viewing the record in the light most favorable 
to Park, it is clear he has a reasonable prospect of 
success on this aspect of his claim 
Olson may yet prevail against Park's counterclaim 
for reimbursement Nonetheless, the record does not 
persuade us that there is no set of facts under which 
Park might succeed, and we must reverse dismissal of 
his counterclaim and remand for further proceedings 
addressed to the merits of his claim 
CONCLUSION 
The assertions contained m Park's counsel's 
affidavit are not properly before us Accordingly, we 
cannot consider them in our decision Park's arguments 
challenging the award of summary judgment on the 
question of contribution owed to Olson are raised for 
the first time on appeal and we will not entertain them 
The summary judgment on Olson's complaint is beyond 
reproach given the arguments made and the state of the 
record 
The dismissal of Park's counterclaim is reversed 
and the case remanded for a trial on the merits of the 
counterclaim or such other proceedings as may be 
proper 
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ , concur 
(FN1 ) Park enumerates additional grounds for 
considering his arguments for the first time on 
appeal, none of which we find persuasive 
(FN2 ) Park successfully obtained a release of Olson's 
liability on the lease for the West Valley City 
restaurant Park was required to remain liable 
While Park and Olson were formerly each liable for 
the full amount of the lease, Olson's release 
effectively terminated any right that Park would 
have had against Olson for liability 'if Park were 
required to pay on his guaranty 
© 2004 West, a Thomson business No claim to original U S Govt works 
922 P 2d 769, Sheppick v Albertson's, Inc , (Utah 1996) 
*769 922 P 2d 769 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Lesa D. SHEPPICK, as personal representative of 
the Estate 
of David A. Sheppick, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v 
ALBERTSON'S, INC., and Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No 940364 
Aug 13, 1996 
Employee brought action against his employer and 
its workers' compensation administrator, alleging bad 
faith refusal to pay his claim for medical and travel 
expenses The Fifth District Court, Iron County, J 
Philip Eves, J , dismissed complaint, and appeal was 
taken The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate C J , 
held that district court lacked jurisdiction over 
employee's claim alleging bad faith refusal to pay 
medical expenses which were allegedly required by 
Industrial Commission's orders because whether those 
orders could be construed to require employer and 
administrator to pay medical expenses for employee's 
injury depended on whether injury was caused by 
industrial accident and that determination was within 
exclusive jurisdiction of Industrial Commission 
Affirmed 
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STEWART, Associate Chief Justice 
This case is here on appeal from an order of the 
trial court dismissing David A Sheppick's claims 
against his former employer, Albertson's, Inc , and 
Scott Wetzel Services, Inc, Albertson's workers' 
compensation administrator, for bad faith and unfair 
dealing m refusing to pay Sheppick's claim for medical 
expense reimbursement under the Workers' 
Compensation Act 
I FACTS 
The events that give rise to this case occurred over 
a seven-year period While employed by Albertson's, 
which was self-insured under the Workers* 
Compensation \ct, David Sheppick suffered a work-
related back injury on or about July 4, 1986, and did 
not work at Albertson's after that time On February 
23, 1990, the Industrial Commission awarded him 
permanent total disability benefits and medical benefits 
for treatment of the work-related injury Since that 
time, the Commission has retained jurisdiction over 
this matter 
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In 1992, Sheppick applied to the Commission for 
an awaid of medical expenses for treatment of the Ll-2 
and L2-3 areas of his spine In response to Sheppick's 
application, Albertson's asserted that this injury did not 
arise from Sheppick's July 4, 1986, industrial accident 
The issue was submitted to a medical panel, and it 
found that the injury to the Ll-2 and L2-3 areas was 
related to the industrial accident The Commission 
ruled on the basis of the medical panel's report that 
Sheppick was entitled to receive payment for the 
medical treatment necessary "to treat his problems at 
Ll-2 and L2-3 and that the cost of the treatment was to 
be assumed by Albertson's " This supplemental order 
was entered May 17, 1993 
Subsequently, Sheppick claimed that he had 
suffered an injury to a different part of his spine, the 
L3-4 level, and sought additional medical and travel 
reimbursement from Albertson's Albertson's refused 
to pay, asserting that the injury was not related to the 
industrial accident but had been caused by activities 
occurring subsequent thereto In response, Sheppick 
filed an application m September 1993 with the 
Commission for a hearing to determine whether he was 
entitled to medical and travel expenses related to that 
injury In October 1993, Albertson's answered 
Sheppick's application, alleging that his injury was 
caused by events subsequent to the industrial accident 
and raising the issue of his permanent total disability 
status Before a hearing could be held, Sheppick 
withdrew his application, and the Commission issued 
an order of dismissal 
Sheppick then filed a complaint in district court on 
February 14, 1994, against Albertson's and Scott 
Wetzel Services, alleging bad faith refusal to pay his 
claim for medical and travel expenses and for 
"enforcement" of the Commission's May 1993 order 
The trial court dismissed Sheppick's complaint against 
both defendants for lack of jurisdiction and failure to 
state a claim 
On this appeal, Sheppick argues that (1) the 
complaint asserted a valid claim for relief for "bad 
faith" against defendants, irrespective of privity of 
contract with them, (2) the dismissal of plaintiffs bad 
faith claims was unconstitutional under the Utah open 
courts provision, Article I, section 11, (3) the district 
court had jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann § 35-1-59 
to enforce the stipulation and order and supplemental 
order as an "award" made by the Commission, (4) the 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
determine *773 the dispute between the parties under 
the declaratory judgment act, and (5) plaintiffs claims 
were not barred under the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann § 
35-1-60 Following David Sheppick's unrelated death 
in June 1995, we granted an order substituting his wife, 
Lesa D Sheppick, as plaintiff 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the 
district court had jurisdiction to determine the issues in 
dispute or whether those issues either fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission or were 
dependent on Commission action as an essential 
prerequisite to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction 
II THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF 
THE WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION ACT AND THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION'S 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD 
BENEFITS 
UNDER THE ACT 
[1] Whether the Commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine entitlement to workers' 
compensation benefits is an issue of law subject to a 
correctness standard of review See State Dep't of 
Social Servs v Vijil, 784 P 2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) 
Sheppick's basic argument is that the district court 
had jurisdiction to decide his eligibility under the Act 
for medical and travel benefits for the injury to the 
L3-4 area of his spine and to award him damages for 
defendants' bad faith refusal to settle his claim for those 
expenses Specifically, he argues that the district court 
had jurisdiction to do so because Utah Code Ann § 
35-1-59 permits a worker to enforce a Commission 
order by docketing the award in a district court so that 
it can be enforced as a judgment Sheppick concludes 
from this that the Act recognizes the jurisdiction of the 
district court to make compensation awards 
Plaintiffs argument is founded on a 
misunderstanding of the jurisdiction of the Commission 
and the district courts with respect to the award of 
benefits under the Act 
[2][3] The Workers' Compensation Act is a 
comprehensive scheme enacted to provide speedy 
compensation to workers who are injured as a result of 
an accident occurring m the course and scope of their 
employment, irrespective of negligence on the part of 
employers or employees The Act basically creates a 
no-fault type insurance protection scheme for work-
related injuries m lieu of traditional common law tort 
remedies Although in some cases, the amount of 
compensation a worker can receive under the Act is 
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more limited than the workei might receive in common 
law damages, compensation is available without regard 
to fault, is more flexible in piovidmg for physical 
disabilities and loss of wages, medical benefits, and 
benefits for dependents and suivivors, and is provided 
more speedily and generally with less expense 
[4] The remedies provided by the Act for injuries to 
workers are exclusive of common law remedies 
Section 35-1-60 of the Utah Code provides that 
compensation awarded under the Act is "exclusive" 
and the "liabilities of the employer imposed by the Act 
shall be in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise " That 
section further provides that "no action at law may be 
maintained against an employer or against any officei, 
agent, or employee of the employer based upon any 
accident, injury, or death of an employee " 
[5][6][7] Although the Act does not specifically 
state that no court may award benefits provided by the 
Act, that is its clear import District courts have no 
jurisdiction whatsoever over cases that fall within the 
purview of the Workers' Compensation Act See 
Morrill v J &M Constr Co, 635 P 2d 88, 89 (Utah 
1981), Bryan v Utah Int'l, 533 P 2d 892 (Utah 1975), 
Ortega v Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1,5, 
156 P2d 885 (1945), Mwray v Wasatch Grading 
Co, 73 Utah 430, 435, 274 P 940 (1929) They may 
enforce an award only if it is properly docketed Utah 
Code Ann § 35-1-59 The court of appeals has power 
only to exercise appellate review of Commission 
awards, not to make awards itself Utah Code Ann § 
35-1-86 
[8] The Act allows for only two instances m which 
resort to a district court may be had for a judicial 
common law remedy but not for a compensation award 
First, an employee *774 injured by a willful or 
intentional tortious act of an employer or a fellow 
employee may sue m a district court for a common law 
remedy Mounteer v Utah Power & Light Co , 823 
P 2d 1055 (Utah 1991), Bryan v Utah Int'l, 533 P 2d 
892 (1975), see Lantz v National Semiconductor 
Corp, 775 P2d 937 (Utah CtApp 1989), see also 
Eric Hollowell, Annotation, Willful, Wanton, or 
Reckless Conduct of Coemployee as Ground of 
Liability Despite Bar of Workers' Compensation Law, 
57ALR4th888(1987) 
[9] Second, if an employer fails to comply with the 
insurance requirements stated in Utah Code Ann § 
35-1-46, which requires employers either to provide 
workers' compensation insurance or to be self-insured 
if the Commission finds that certain requirements aire 
met, an employee may sue in district court foi personal 
injuries "arising out of or in the course of employment 
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the 
employer or any of the employer's officers, agents or 
employees " Utah Code Ann § 35-1-57 In such an 
action, an employer may not defend on the ground of 
the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, or 
contributory negligence Proof of the worker's injury 
constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence on the 
part of the employer, and the burden is on the employer 
to show freedom from negligence resulting in the 
employee's injury (FN1) 
[10][11] Plaintiff argues that the district court had 
jurisdiction under § 35-1-59 to adjudicate its claim for 
medical benefits That section provides "An abstract 
of any award may be filed in the office of the clerk of 
the district court Execution may be issued thereon 
within the same time and in the same manner and with 
the same effect as if said award were a judgment of the 
district court" The purpose of this provision is to 
provide an employee with a judicial remedy for 
enforcing compensation awards in cases the Industrial 
Commission has adjudicated The Commission itself 
has no authority to issue a judgment that can be 
enforced against the property of an employer or an 
insurance company that fails to pay an award Thus, § 
35-1-59 does not confer jurisdiction on a court to make 
a workers' compensation award, it only authorizes 
courts to enforce judgments on awards made by the 
Commission 11 defendants had failed to pay the 
compensation ordered by the Commission, Sheppick 
could have docketed the orders in a district court and 
proceeded to enforce a judgment based thereon 
Defendants did, however, comply with the awards 
made by the Commission 
[12] The instant dispute arose subsequent to those 
awards when Sheppick claimed for the first time that he 
was entitled to compensation for an injury to a 
somewhat different area of his back, the L3-4 area 
Defendants contended that this injury was not caused 
by the industrial accident but was incurred after 
Sheppick's employment was terminated Rather than 
submitting the issue of whether that injury was prior-
work-related to the Commission for adjudication as 
Sheppick had done m the supplemental proceeding, he 
withdrew his petition for an award of additional 
medical benefits before the Commission could decide 
whether the L3-4 injury was caused by the industrial 
accident The Commission, therefore, had no option 
but to dismiss the petition Because the Commission 
issued no order lespecting the alleged L3-4 injury and 
the district courl had no order on which a judgment 
could be entered, it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate 
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plaintiffs claim, and the Commission had exclusive 
jurisdiction thereof Cj United States Smelting, 
Refining & Mining Co v Evans 35 F 2d 459 (8th 
Cir 1929) 
[13] Thus, although Utah Code Ann § 35-1-60 
explicitly speaks only in terms of an "exclusive 
remedy" and although an exclusive remedy does not 
necessarily mean exclusive jurisdiction, it is clear from 
the context of that provision and other provisions that 
the exclusive remedy piovided in § 35-1-60 and the 
means for adjudicating the right to such a remedy rests 
with the Commission, *775 and only the Commission 
See also Utah Code Ann §§ 35-1-16, 35-1-27 
[14] Plaintiff argues that the district court could and 
should have enforced the Commission's supplemental 
order of May 17, 1993, which m effect provided 
lifetime medical benefits for treatment of the injuries 
arising out of the industrial accident Plaintiff asserts 
that on that basis, the district court should have granted 
him medical benefits for the L3-4 injury The 
argument assumes that the district court could have 
made the factual and legal determinations necessary for 
such an award, l e , that the L3-4 injury was related to 
the industrial accident That determination, however, 
lies squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Industrial Commission The whole scheme of the 
Workers' Compensation Act contemplates that only the 
Commission can make awards of benefits under the 
Act and the necessary factual and legal conclusions in 
support thereof Not only do the terms of the Act refer 
exclusively to the Commission m those sections 
dealing with the adjudication of claims and the award 
of benefits, but the Commission itself is intended to 
develop and apply the kind of expertise that grows out 
of the special situations to which the Act applies and to 
give full force to the remedial provisions of the Act 
[15][16][17] In contrast to like actions at common 
law, under the Workers' Compensation Act, the 
Commission has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
awards to injured employees Utah Code Ann § 
35-1-78 This continuing jurisdiction includes the 
authority to modify an award for medical benefits, and 
the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the 
Commission from making such a modification 
Mannes-Vale, Inc v Vale 111 P 2d 709, 712 (Utah 
1986) This Court has specifically held that the 
continuing jurisdiction extends to modification of 
medical expense awards Id see also Spencer v 
Industrial Comm'n, 733 P 2d 158 (Utah 1987) See 
generally Morrill v J & M Constr Co, 635 P 2d 88 
(Utah 1981), Onega v Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 
108 Utah 1, 156 P 2d 885 (1945), Murray v Wasatch 
Grading Co 73 Utah 430, 274 P 940 (1929) (FN2) 
[18][19] Sheppick's complaint for a declaratory 
judgment does not give the district court jurisdiction to 
rule on a matter committed to the authority of another 
adjudicatory body District courts are authorized "to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations " Utah 
Code Ann § 78-33-1 However, not only may a court 
decline to exercise this authority, but it must do so 
when it has no subject matter jurisdiction The Utah 
Code provides, "The court may refuse to render or 
enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such 
judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not 
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to 
the proceeding " Utah Code Ann § 78-33-6 If the 
court had entered a judgment, it would have been a 
nullity 
[20] [21] Having decided that the Commission has 
exclusive jurisdiction not only to issue compensation 
awards authorized by the Act, but also to make the 
necessary factual findings upon which such awards 
may be made, we turn now to Sheppick's contention 
that he was entitled under the open courts provision of 
the Utah Constitution, Article I, section 11, to have his 
claim for a bad faith refusal to deal on the part of 
defendants adjudicated in the district court Such a 
claim, if cognizable, could be adjudicated only m the 
district court Such a claim is a common law cause of 
action, which the Commission *776. has neither the 
authority nor the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
In this case, plaintiff asserts that he has had great 
difficulty in obtaining payment of medical expenses, 
that defendants have violated the Commission's order 
in not making prompt payment, and that they have 
acted m bad faith in "providing information 
regarding plaintiff to persons who are not authorized to 
receive same, by refusing to authorizing [sic] treatment 
prescribed by Plaintiffs physicians and otherwise using 
threats, intimidation, coercion and other unlawful 
means to violate Plaintiffs rights" under the 
Commission's original and supplemental orders 
[22] Assuming, but not deciding, that a plaintiff 
might under certain circumstances have a common law 
action against a self-insured employer for refusal to pay 
a workers' compensation award made by the 
Commission, the facts plaintiff alleges still fail to 
establish district court jurisdiction to adjudicate such a 
claim The premise of plaintiffs theory of bad faith is 
that the claim for additional medical expenses was 
required by the Commission's original order of 
February 13, 1990, and its supplemental order of May 
17, 1993 Whether those orders could be construed to 
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require defendants to pay medical expenses for 
plaintiffs L3-4 injury depends on whether that injury 
was caused by plaintiffs 1986 industrial accident or by 
some subsequent event. As stated above, that 
determination lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Commission. For that reason, the district court had 
no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. Plaintiff had 
every opportunity to seek a Commission ruling on the 
causation issue. Not only did he fail to obtain such a 
ruling, he apparently intended to preclude the 
Commission from making such a determination by 
withdrawing his petition before the Commission for 
such an adjudication. (FN3) 
Affirmed. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and HOWE, DURHAM, and 
RUSSON, JJ., concur in Associate Chief Justice 
STEWART'S opinion. 
(FN1.) Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-55 provides that 
certain employees and their employers are exempt 
from the provision of the Act under certain 
conditions. In addition, employers engaged in 
certain kinds of work activities are exempt from the 
provisions of the Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
35-1-42,-43. 
(FN2.) The provision granting the Commission 
continuing jurisdiction emphasizes the exclusivity 
of the Commission's jurisdiction over workers' 
compensation claims. Under general common law 
doctrine, the entry of a judgment for damages based 
on personal injuries would bar subsequent actions 
based on the same injury. Such is not the case 
under the Act. The Commission is empowered to 
adjust the award in accordance with changes in 
circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78. 
Such changes could include a deterioration of the 
former employee's condition or the discovery of a 
previously unnoticed injury. See, e.g., Stoker v. 
Workers' Compensation Fund, 889 P.2d 409, 412 
(Utah 1994) (commission can reopen case if 
previously used conservative method of treatment 
proved ineffective); Barber Asphalt Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 
(1943) (commission may reconsider case if there 
has been some new development that suggests 
award may have been excessive or inadequate); 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 
Utah 553, 210 P. 611 (1922) (commission 
authorized to alter award when amputated leg failed 
to heal sufficiently to use prosthesis). 
(FN3.) We note that this Court has held that a cause of 
action for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing under an insurance policy may 
be maintained only if there is privity of contract 
between the insured and the insurer. Beck v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
Recently in Savage v. Educators Insurance Co, 
908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995), we held that an 
employee had no common law cause of action 
against an employer's workers' compensation 
insurance canier for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing because the worker 
had no contractual relationship with the insurer. In 
note 4 of that opinion, however, the Court stated: 
In holding that no duty of good faith and fair 
dealing is imposed upon an insurer running to a 
third-party claimant such as Savage, we do not 
foreclose the possibility that such a claimant could 
state a cause of action for an independent tort. For 
example, the law of this state recognizes a duty to 
refrain from intentionally causing severe emotional 
distress to others. Thus, intentional and outrageous 
conduct by an insurer against a third-party claimant 
could conceivably result in separate tort liability. 
As we indicated earlier, however, because Savage 
did not raise this issue in her petition for a writ of 
certiorari, we will not consider it here. 
Id. at 866 n. 4 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, Albertson's is self-insured, and 
therefore, no insurance company is involved in this 
case. Whether it could be said that plaintiff stands 
in privity with his employer for purposes of a claim 
for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is an issue that we need not decide for 
the reasons stated above, nor need we decide 
whether plaintiff would have a tort action for the 
conduct of a recalcitrant self-insured employer. 
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OPINION: 
[*459] Before VAN VALKENBURGH and 
COTTERAL, Circuit Judges, and SCOTT, District 
Judge. 
COTTERAL, Circuit Judge. The appellant, plaintiff 
in the District Court, filed an amended bill against the 
appellee to obtain a decree enjoining the enforcement by 
him of an award of compensation by the Utah Industrial 
Commission. On motion of the defendant the bill was 
dismissed; and this appeal challenges that decree. 
The bill alleges that the plaintiff was incorporated in 
and a citizen of Maine and the defendant was a citizen of 
Utah, and that the amount in controversy exceeded $ 
3,000, exclusive of interest and costs. The proceedings 
of the commission are set out [*460] at length, 
including the findings made, as well as the decision and 
award, and it was complained that the latter were 
contrary to and without authority of law, in excess of the 
jurisdiction of the commission, and would, if enforced, 
deprive the plaintiff of its property without due process 
of law; that plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing with 
the commission and it was denied; and [**2] that the 
plaintiff is without adequate remedy except by 
injunction, as prayed. 
We note those proceedings as detailed in the bill. 
The appellee applied to the commission for 
compensation on account of an injury to his eyes while 
employed in appellant's mill. After a hearing, at which 
the parties appeared and filed an agreed statement of 
facts, the commission made a finding of those facts and 
rendered a decision, allowing appellee compensation for 
permanent and total disability. Added to this were 
necessary hospital and surgical charges, which have been 
paid. It was agreed and it was found as an ultimate fact 
that he had permanently lost the sight of his left eye, that 
without the aid of glasses he had less than 10 per cent, of 
vision in his right eye, but with glases his distant vision 
in that eye was limited and his near vision was normal, 
enabling him to read the finest print. The commission 
concluded that as a result of the injury he was 
"permanently industrially blind" in both eyes, and ence, 
permanently and totally disabled, as defined in sectiion 
3139 of the State Industrial Act (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, 
§ § 3061-3165), and awarded compensation therefor. 
It is sufficient [**3] to state, without noticing the 
statutory schedule, that it allows and there was awarded 
in this case a greater rate of compensation that is 
authorized for a partial disability. 
The act also provides the award of the commission 
is subject to certiorari or review in the state Supreme 
Court applied for within 30 days after an adverse 
decision or denial of petition for rehearing solely upon 
the certified proceedings and evidence before the 
commission, the scope of the review being to determine 
whether (1) the commission acted without or in excess of 
Page 2 
35 F 2d 459, *, 1929 U S App LEXIS 2987, ** 
its powers, (2) the findings support the award It is 
further provided by the act that the findings and 
conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall 
be conclusive and final and the court shall enter 
judgment, either affirming or setting aside the awaid, 
that the state Code of Civil Procedure is applicable, but 
only the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, 
reverse, or annul any award or to sustain or delay the 
operation or execution thereof Provision is also made 
for docketing an abstract of the award in the District 
Court and the collection thereof by execution as upon a 
judgment 
The grounds of the motion to [**4] dismiss the bill 
were (1) The court had no jurisdiction of the subject-
matter or of the defendant (2) The suit is against the 
state, in violation of the Eleventh Amendment (3) Want 
of equity (4) Existence of a plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy at law (5) The suit is contrary to the laws of 
Utah (3) It is a proceeding for review of the findings of 
the commission without any statutory jurisdiction 
therefor (7) The suit is violative of section 720 of the 
Revised Statutes of the United States (8) No junsdicl ion 
exists in this court to award relief to plaintiff, as the 
defendant is not authorized to enforce an order of the 
commission 
We may assume, and it is our opinion, from the 
cases cited that if the case before the commission might 
be reviewed on the merits m the federal courts, appellee, 
having only a partial loss of vision which was subject to 
correction by the use of glasses, did not sustain a total 
disability See 40 C J 98, Cline v Studebaker Coip , 
189 Mich 514, 155 N W 519, L R A 1916C, 1139 
The test of such disability is whether it prevents the 
employee from doing work for which he is adapted, and 
not that in which he was injured Rockwell [**5] v 
Lewis, 168 App Div 674, 154 N Y S 893 Our inquiry, 
however, is whether the award of the commission was 
illegal m that it was beyond its jurisdiction and if 
enforced will constitute a taking of appellant's properly 
without due process of law 
We may notice at this point some objections to the 
suit in respect of procedure One is that it is violative of 
section 379, title 28, U S Code, 28 USCA § 379 
(section 720, Rev St), forbidding a stay of proceedings 
m a state court The section is inapplicable, as the 
commission is not a court Industrial Commission v 
Evans 52 Utah 394, 174 P 825, 832, Continental 
Casualty Co v Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 16, 210 
P 127 Besides the commission is not a party Also, the 
suit is not premature, as was the case in Prentis v 
Atlantic Coast Line Co ,211 U S 210, 29 S Ct 67 J3 
L Ed 150 There the legislative rates had not been 
brought to a finality by appeal Here the award of the 
commission was final, and, if the appellant has any cause 
of action at all, the judicial stage was reached Bacon v 
Rutland R Co 23? U S 134 34 S Ct [*461] 283 58 
L Ed 538 And appellant had no other remedy except by 
[**6] injunction to prevent the collection of the award 
Conceding these propositions, did appellant have a 
right in equity to have the award set aside by the District 
Court9 If so, on what ground9 Are the contentions 
sound the commission as alleged acted illegally and 
beyond its jurisdiction and the collection of the award 
would take appellant's property without due process of 
law9 
The commission undoubtedly had exclusive 
jurisdiction under the Industrial Act to entertain, hear, 
and decide the complaint of appellee, and the act was 
valid legislation Cudahy Packing Co v Parramore, 
263 U S 418, 44 S Ct 153 68 L Ed 366, 30 A L R 
532 The hearing was had on notice and appearance of 
the parties, conformably to the state law In these 
respects there was due process of law 
In ascertaining the powers of the commission, we 
are bound by the decisions of the state courts which 
interpret them Supreme Lodge v Meyer, 265 U S 30, 
44 S Ct 432, 68 L Ed 885 The commission is an 
administrative body, and the Supreme Court of the state 
will review the record of the cases at least to determine 
whether its findings are supported by the evidence Utah 
Copper Co v Industrial [**7] Commission, 57 Utah, 
118, 193 P 24, 13ALR 1367 Continental Casualty 
Co v Industrial Commission 61 Utah, 16 210 P 127 
128. In the latter case, it is said that "Some of its acts, in 
fact many of its acts, are quasi judicial, but it is m no 
sense a judicial body * * *" In Industrial Commission 
of Utah v Evans, supra, the powers of the commission 
were considered, and it appears that several of its 
functions partake of a judicial character In that case, 
after quotmg from a decision of the Illinois Supreme 
Court to the effect that court review may not be denied to 
the extent of determining whether a board had acted 
illegally or without jurisdiction, it was held "The term 
'illegally' does not refer to a mere error of judgment in a 
matter where jurisdiction is clear, but it refers to an act 
not sanctioned by law in any event" 
The commission had the power and the duty to 
decide the controversy between the parties to this suit, 
and m doing that to apply the law to the stipulated facts 
They were held to make out a case of permanent and 
total disability The ruling was upon a matter of law, and 
it is supported by some authority, although, as we have 
said, not m our [** 8] opinion by the weight of authority 
This was a plain e tercise of its jurisdiction, not an action 
beyond or outside of it The award was clearly within 
the scope of the power of the commission 
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The jurisdiction of the District Court rests primarily 
on the diverse citizenship of the parties and the requisite 
amount in dispute It had jurisdiction to inquire into the 
complaint made of the commission's action But whether 
a cause of action was alleged in equity was a different 
matter We feel clear it was not otherwise awards of this 
commission may be constantly involved in litigation over 
mere errors of an administrative character, where no real 
contest appears as to its fundamental authority to dispose 
of the claims of the parties Certainly, we must conclude 
the commission m this case acted although mistakenly 
yet legally and within but not beyond its jurisdiction 
Counsel for appellant cites many cases where the 
federal courts have enjoined administrative or legislative 
commissions from enforcing orders that are unreasonable 
in respect of regulation or requirements, or such as fix 
rates for public utilities that do not permit a fair return on 
capital, and therefore effectuate [**9] a taking of 
property without due process of law But those decisions 
are inapplicable There is no such contention or 
controversy in this case No authority is pointed out to 
sustain a complaint in equity predicated on a mere error 
of an administrative tribunal, when acting within the 
bounds of its jurisdiction, and when the most that can be 
said of its action is it erroneously exercised its 
jurisdiction 
The appellant had to abide this award, or choose to 
obtain a review in the state Supreme Court Having 
waived that remedy, it is not entitled to collaterally 
invoke the equity powers of a federal court for relief 
The bill was properly dismissed by the District Court for 
want of equity, and its decree is accordingly affirmed 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
V-1 OIL COMPANY, aka V-1 Propane, 
Respondent, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, Division of Solid and 
Hazardous Waste; Diane R. Nielsen, in her 
Capacity as 
Executive Director; Dennis R. Downs, in his 
Capacity as 
Director; Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board; 
Kent P. Gray, in his Capacity as Executive 
Secretary (UST); 
and David O. McKnight, in his Capacity as Hearing 
Officer, 
Petitioners. 
No. 950244. 
May 20, 1997. 
Division of Environmental Response and 
Remediation (DERR) issued notice of violation and 
order to comply based on alleged petroleum release 
from underground storage facility. Following written 
request for formal agency action, petitioner moved for 
recusal of presiding officer, and motion was denied. 
Petitioner subsequently filed petition for extraordinary 
writ, seeking to compel recusal. The Court of Appeals, 
893 P.2d 1093, granted petition with directions. 
Granting petition for writ of certiorari to review that 
decision, the Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate Chief 
Judge, held that Solid and Hazardous Waste Control 
Board did not violate due process by appointing 
presiding officer who also worked as part-time staff 
attorney within DERR, a division charged with 
investigating and prosecuting violations. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Mandamus <@^7 
250 — 
2501 Nature and Grounds in General 
250k7 Discretion as to Grant of Writ. 
Court's decision to grant or deny petition for 
extraordinary relief in nature of mandamus is 
discretionary with court to which petition is brought, in 
sense that it is never matter of right on behalf of 
applicant. 
[2] Certiorari <£==>64(1) 
73 — 
73II Proceedings and Determination 
73k63 Review 
73k64 Scope and Extent in General 
73k64(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] Mandamus <®^ > 187.9(1) 
250 
250III Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief 
250kl87 Appeal and Error 
250kl87.9 Review 
250kl 87.9(1) Scope and Extent in General. 
On certiorari or appeal from grant of extraordinary 
relief, legal reasoning of court granting writ is 
reviewed for correctness. 
[3] Constitutional Law <®^278.1 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k278.1 Health and Environmental 
Regulations. 
[See headnote text below] 
[3] Health and Environment <@^>25.5(9) 
199 
199II Regulations and Offenses 
199k25.5 Environmental Protection in General 
199k25.5(9) Administrative Boards and 
Proceedings. 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board did not 
violate due process by appointing agency employee to 
preside at formal hearing to decide whether petitioner 
failed to remediate leakage from one of its 
underground storage tanks, even though appointed 
employee also worked as part-time staff attorney within 
division charged with investigating and prosecuting 
such violations; appropriate and sufficient separation of 
functions at individual level was accomplished by 
segregating employee from contact with investigative 
and prosecutorial activities. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
14; Utah Admin. Code R315-12-10; Code of 
Jud.Conduct, Canon 3. 
[4] Constitutional Law <®^251.1 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k251.1 Flexibility; Balancing Interests. 
Requirements of due process depend upon specific 
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context in which they are applied, as due process, 
unlike some legal rules, is not technical conception 
with fixed content unrelated to time, place, and 
circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[5] Constitutional Law <@^>251.1 
92 —-
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k251.1 Flexibility; Balancing Interests. 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Constitutional Law <®^>251.5 
92 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k251.5 Procedural Due Process in General. 
Determining requirements of due process in any 
given context involves balancing of three factors: 
private interests that will be affected by official 
actions; risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through procedures used and probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
government's interest, including functions involved and 
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or 
substitute procedural requirements would entail. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[6] Administrative Law and Procedure <®=:>382.1 
15A— -
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and 
Agents 
15AIV(C) Rules and Regulations 
15Ak382 Nature and Scope 
15Ak382.1 In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[6] Administrative Law and Procedure ^ ^ 4 4 1 
15A — 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and 
Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak441 In General. 
Generally, "legislative" decisions of administrative 
agency involve development of policies, principles, or 
rules that typically apply prospectively to large number 
of parties, whereas "adjudicative" decision attaches 
legal or other consequences to individualized past 
conduct. 
[7] Constitutional Law <®^251.5 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k251.5 Procedural Due Process in General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[7] Constitutional Law <£=>318(1) 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k318 Administrative Proceedings 
92k318(l) In General. 
Requirements of due process tend to vary in 
proportion to degree to which administrative decision 
is adjudicative in nature, as opposed to legislative; 
generally, procedural due process applies to 
adjudicative government decisions and not to 
legislative ones. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[8] Constitutional Law <® =^>318(1) 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k318 Administrative Proceedings 
92k318(l) In General. 
Stricter and more specific due process requirements 
apply to adversarial, adjudicative decision-making by 
administrative agency than to legislative activities, the 
most fundamental requirement being opportunity to be 
heard at meaningful time and in meaningful manner, 
and necessary corollary to that opportunity is that 
affected parties must receive adequate notice and must 
be assured that their concerns will be heard by 
impartial decision maker. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[9] Constitutional Law <§^=> 318(1) 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k318 Administrative Proceedings 
92k318(l) In General. 
Clear demonstration of partiality apparent on face 
of record or showing of direct, pecuniary interest 
automatically requires disqualification of decision 
maker on due process grounds. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
[10] Constitutional Law <®^ 318(1) 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k318 Administrative Proceedings 
92k318(l) In General. 
For purposes of determining whether due process 
requires disqualification of adjudicator in 
administrative proceeding, presence of clear, 
substantial pecuniary benefit is one of most evident 
causes of either conscious or subconscious bias, and is 
type of temptation that inevitably compromises public 
confidence in process itself, undennining legitimacy of 
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any decisions so tainted U S C A Const Amend 14 
[11] Constitutional Law <®^ 318(1) 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k318 Administrative Proceedings 
92k318(l) In General 
For purposes of determining whether due process 
requires disqualification of adjudicator in 
administrative proceeding, presumed bias is not limited 
to cases where personal pecuniary benefit is present, 
but rather, such presumption *1192 may also be 
applied in other circumstances where risk of bias is so 
great as to offend principles of due process U S C A 
Const Amend 14 
[12] Administrative Law and Procedure <®==>314 
15A — 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrative 
Agencies, Officers and 
Agents 
15AIV(A) In General 
15Ak314 Bias, Prejudice or Other 
Disqualification to 
Exercise Powers 
[See headnote text below] 
[12] Constitutional Law <®=*318(1) 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k318 Administrative Proceedings 
92k318(l) In General 
Biasing influences on adjudicator m administrative 
proceeding, which are unacceptable under due process 
analysis, may arise from adjudicator's preconceived 
attitudes on disputed points of law or policy, though it 
is rare that such attitudes are sufficiently severe to 
justify disqualification U S C A Const Amend 14 
[13] Constitutional Law <®=*318(1) 
92 — 
92X11 Due Process of Law 
92k318 Administrative Proceedings 
92k318(l) In General 
Adequate separation of functions to satisfy due 
process concerns in administrative context can be 
accomplished internally, at individual, rather than at 
institutional, level U S C A Const Amend 14 
*1193 Peter Stirba, Benson L Hathaway, Salt 
Lake City, for respondent 
Jan Graham, Atty Gen, Carol Clawson, Solicitor 
Gen, Laura J Lockhart, Asst Atty Gen, Salt Lake 
City, for petitioners 
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice 
The issue before us is whether an administrative 
agency, in this case the Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Control Board (the "Board"), can appoint an agency 
employee to preside at a formal hearing to decide 
whether a party before that agency, in this case V-1 Oil 
Company, failed to remediate leakage from one of its 
underground storage tanks The officer appointed by 
the Board to conduct the hearing, David O McKnight, 
also worked as a part-time staff attorney withm the 
division that was charged with investigating and 
prosecuting such violations Although his duties as 
staff attorney were structurally segregated from the 
branch of the division conducting investigations and 
prosecutions of underground storage leaks, *1194 
V-1 asserted that McKnight was biased and challenged 
his appointment The Board refused to order 
McKnight's recusal V-1 then petitioned the Utah 
Court of Appeals for an extraordinary writ That Court 
held that McKnight could not sit V-1 Oil Co v 
Department of Envtl Quality 893 P 2d 1093, 1097 
(UtahCt App 1995) ('T-7 Oil Co 1 ") We granted a 
petition for a writ of certiorari to review that decision 
910 P 2d 425 (Utah 1995) We reverse 
I BACKGROUND 
The dispute m this case arose out of a report of 
contamination by a contractor performing a tank 
tightness test at one of V-l's service stations in Salt 
Lake County A number of administrative entities 
within the Department of Environmental Quality 
("DEQ") became involved in the investigation of the 
contamination report As it is important to an 
understanding of our holding, we will briefly detail the 
nature of these entities and their relationship to each 
other 
The Board is the agency head within DEQ for 
purposes of the Underground Storage Tank Act 
("USTA"), Utah Code Ann §§ 19-6-401 to-427, Utah 
Admin Code R311-210-6(a) The Division of 
Environmental Response and Remediation ("DERR"), 
also withm DEQ, has a variety of responsibilities 
relating to compliance issues detailed in the Hazardous 
Substances Mitigation Act, Utah Code Ann §§ 
19-6-301 to -325, and the USTA See id § 
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19-l-105(l)(c) DERR is subdivided into branches, 
with the Underground Storage Tank Branch being 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting violations 
oftheUSTA 
Any party subject to a USTA enforcement action 
may petition the Board for a formal adjudication Utah 
Code Ann § 63-46b-3, Utah Admin Code 
R311-210-4, -7 The Board may appoint a presiding 
officer, Utah Admin Code R311-210-6(2), and that 
officer is empowered to conduct a full formal hearing 
Utah Code Ann §§ 63-46b-6 to -11 The presiding 
officer makes findings of fact and conclusions of law 
but is not authorized to make a final, substantive 
decision Utah Admin Code R311-210-6(b), -17(a) 
Rather, the presiding officer's recommendations are 
referred to the Board, which may adopt or reject them 
in whole or m part, may make an independent 
determination based on the record, or may remand the 
matter for evaluation of further evidence Id 
R311-210-17 
In this case, a contractor performing a tank 
tightness test reported contamination from an 
underground storage tank at one of V-1 Oil's service 
stations Following subsequent inspections, the agency 
sent compliance and reporting schedules to V-] 
According to DERR, V-1 did not respond DERR 
issued a notice of violation and order to comply, and 
V-1 requested a formal adjudicative proceeding The 
Board granted this request and appointed David O 
McKnight as the presiding officer (FN1) 
McKnight had previously been hired as a part-time 
staff attorney for DERR His responsibilities in that 
capacity did not involve any of the investigative or 
prosecutorial work conducted by the Underground 
Storage Tank Branch In fact, his work was confined 
exclusively to a separate branch within DERR He was 
thus effectively "walled off from the investigative and 
prosecutorial activities related to underground storage 
tank enforcement conducted by the agency 
Nevertheless, on the basis of McKnight's status as a 
part-time attorney for DERR, V-1 moved for 
McKnight's recusal, alleging that his employment 
within DERR created a risk of bias in his role as an 
adjudicatory officer At the hearing on the motion, the 
nature of McKnight's employment by DERR was 
explained 
McKnight indicated that he was hired by DERR 
with the anticipation that he would act as a 
presiding officer and as a staff attorney He stated 
that DERR "hired me with the understanding that 
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I'd be a presiding officer, and then I would help the 
Agency on matters that would not risk me being m 
the loop of [underground storage *1195 tanks] 
and [leaking underground storage tanks]" 
V-1 Oil Co I, 893 P 2d at 1094 (alterations in 
original) He further indicated that "in his work as staff 
attorney he [did] 'not involve [himself] m areas that 
would risk [his] being exposed to investigations and 
anything that would lead up to an issuance of an order 
m underground storage tank matters ' " Id McKnight 
concluded that V-l's objections to his multiple duties 
within the agency did not warrant his recusal On 
review, the Boaid declined to disqualify McKnight, 
stating that "V-1 ha[d] presented no evidence or 
suggestion of actual bias on the part of the Presiding 
Officer, either through his relationship to the Board or 
his status as an employee of the Division " 
V-1 petitioned for an extraordinary writ from the 
Utah Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals stated 
that V-1 had alleged two grounds for McKnight's 
recusal (1) actual bias or prejudice, and (2) presumed 
bias due to his association with DERR as a staff 
attorney V-1 Oil Co I, 893 P 2d at 1096 The Court 
first held, "Petitioner has not demonstrated actual bias 
or prejudice " (FN2) Id The Court thus limited its 
treatment to the question of whether "McKnight should 
be disqualified based upon his employment as a staff 
attorney by DERR" Id The Court concluded that 
McKnight's appointment violated "[b]asic 
considerations of fairness and impartiality m agency 
proceedings " Id 
II STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2] A courl's decision to grant or deny a petition 
for extraordinary relief m the nature of mandamus is 
discretionary with the court to which the petition is 
brought, and it is discretionary in the sense that it is 
"never a matter of right on behalf of the applicant" 
Renn v Board of Pardons, 904 P 2d 677, 683 (Utah 
1995) However, on certiorari or appeal from a grant 
of extraordinary i ehef, the legal reasoning of the court 
granting the writ is reviewed for correctness Id at 
683-85. 
III. BIAS AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUASI-
JUDICIAL OFFICERS 
[3] We begin by examining the foundation of the 
Court of Appeals' decision The proper starting point 
for any analysis of an asserted ethical conflict in an 
adjudicatory proceeding is by reference to the ethical 
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rules governing that proceeding In this case, the Utah 
Administrative Code and the State Officers and 
Employees Ethics Act provide rules that are directly 
applicable to administrative adjudicative officers 
Chapter 16 of title 67 of the Utah Code imposes ethical 
constraints on all public officers and is primarily 
concerned with personal conflicts of interest relating to 
financial transactions Neither V-l nor the Court of 
Appeals has asserted that any provision of this chapter 
has been violated 
Rule 315 of the Utah Administrative Code-
specifically pertaining to the operation of agencies 
charged with regulating solid and hazardous waste-
speaks more directly to the circumstances of this case 
It reads m pertinent part 
A member of the Board or other Presiding Officer 
shall disqualify him/herself from performing the 
functions of the Presiding Officer regarding any 
matter m which 
(a) He/she [or a closely related] person 
(2) Has acted as an attorney in the 
proceeding or served as an attorney for, or 
otherwise represented a Party concerning the 
matter m controversy, 
(b) The Presiding Officer is subject to 
disqualification under principles of due process 
and administrative law 
Utah Admin Code R315-12-10 
McKnight has not "acted as an attorney" m this 
proceeding, nor has he "represented a Party concerning 
the matter in controversy " He is, however, subject to 
disqualification if the principles of due process 
applicable to the particular administrative context of 
this case require it Because McKnight acted in *1196 
an administrative adjudicatory role, ethical rules 
governing other administrative adjudicative 
proceedings are relevant to the due process and 
fairness requirements in this case The Court of 
Appeals held that McKnight should be disqualified 
because bias had to be presumed under the Utah Code 
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, which states, "A judge 
shall enter a disqualification m a proceeding in which 
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned" (FN3) Even though the Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that administrative decision makers are 
not "held to th[e] fall standard of the canons," (FN4) it 
apparently construed the language in Canon 3 as a rigid 
principle of due process that was fully applicable in 
administrative proceedings Consequently, the Court 
held that "McKnight's own characterization of his dual 
role as presiding officer and DERR staff attorney 
creates the appearance of impropriety that erodes 
confidence m the basic fairness of the hearing process 
and must be avoided in quasi-judicial proceedings as 
diligently as m judicial proceedings " V-l Oil Co I 
893 P 2d at 1097 
[4] [5] In our view, the Court of Appeals' analysis 
fails to account for relevant distinctions between 
administrative and judicial proceedings The 
requirements of due process depend upon the specific 
context in which they are applied because "unlike some 
legal rules due process is not a technical conception 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and 
circumstances " Cafeteria Workers Union v McElroy, 
367 U S 886, 895, 81 S Ct 1743, 1748, 6 L Ed 2d 
1230 (1961) Determining the requirements of due 
process in any given context involves a balancing of 
three factors 
first, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official action, second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards, and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the functions 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail 
Mathews v Eldndge 424 U S 319, 335, 96 S Ct 
893, 903, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976) 
Administrative agencies engage in a variety of 
functions Certain administrative decisions are of a 
policy-making nature, such as the establishment of 
regulations pursuant to statutory authority, others 
resemble judicial decision making, such as the 
determination of whether a party or an entity has 
violated a regulation Commentators tend to categorize 
administrative decision making as either "legislative" 
or "adjudicative" in nature John R Allison, 
Combinations of Decision-Making Functions, Ex Parte 
Communications and Related Biasing Influences A 
Process-Value Analysis 1993 Utah L Rev 1135, 1160 
[hereinafter Allison, Piocess-Value Analysis ] Not all 
agency actions are easily pigeonholed as either purely 
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legislative or purely adjudicative, however Id at 
1161 Rather, they may fall anywhere along a 
continuum between the two forms Id 
[6][7] As a general rule, "[legislative decisions 
involve the development of policies, principles, or 
rules that typically apply prospectively to a laige 
number of parties," whereas "an adjudicative decision 
attaches legal or other consequences to individuals ed 
past conduct " Id at 1160 The requirements of due 
process tend to vary in proportion to the degree to 
which an administrative decision is adjudicative in 
nature as opposed to legislative Id at 1160-62 "[A]s 
a general proposition procedural due process applies 
to adjudicative government decisions and not to 
legislative ones " (FN5) Id at 1162 
*1197 In this case, McKnight's decisions were 
made as presiding officer m V-l's case Although 
those decisions are not final decisions, they are clearly 
adjudicative in nature The hearing concerned 
allegations that V-1 failed to investigate reports of 
leaking storage tanks and to submit a corrective action 
plan If proven, such failures could constitute 
violations of state and federal regulations and could 
ultimately result m sanctions 
[8][9] Commentators have noted that accusatory 
proceedings, due to their similarity in both form and 
consequence to formal criminal proceedings, require 
particular attentionto due process concerns Allison, 
Process-Value at 1180 Therefore, stricter due 
process requirements apply to adversarial, adjudicative 
decision making than to legislative-type decision 
making The most fundamental requirement in this 
context is "the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner' " Mathews, 424 
U S at 333, 96 S Ct at 902 (quoting Armstrong v 
Manzo, 380 U S 545, 552, 85 S Ct 1187, 1191, 14 
LEd2d 62 (1965)) As a necessary corollary to this 
opportunity, affected parties must receive adequate 
notice, and they must also be assured that their 
concerns will be heard by an impartial decision maker 
Mathews, 424 U S at 325 n 4, 332-35, 96 S Ct at 898 
n 4, 901-03 "Scholars and judges consistently 
characterize provision of a neutral decisionmaker as 
one of the three or four core requirements of a system 
of fair adjudicatory decision making " Kenneth C 
Davis, Richard J Pierce, Jr, Administrative Law 
Treatise § 9 8, at 67 (3d ed 1994) Where a party to 
an adversarial proceeding can demonstrate actual 
impermissible bias or an unacceptable risk of an 
impermissible bias on the part of a decision maker, the 
decision maker must be disqualified 
The latter principle concerns us here The Court of 
Appeals' holding was premised on the principle that 
McKnight's employment with DERR presented an 
impermissible bias in his role as an adjudicator, 
thereby violating the due process right of a party to a 
fair adjudicative proceeding 
There are many different types of bias, however 
The Court of Appeals did not address the issue of 
which types of bias are so harmful as to necessitate 
disqualification in the administrative context (FN6) A 
clear demonstration of partiality apparent on the face of 
the record, see Bunnell v Industrial Comm'n, 740 P 2d 
1331, 1333-34 (Utah 1987), or a showing of direct, 
pecuniary interest, see Gibson v Berryhill, 411 U S 
564, 579, 93 S Ct 1689, 1698, 36 L Ed 2d 488 (1973), 
automatically requires disqualification of the decision 
maker In Bunnell, the rec *1198 ord indicated that in 
numerous instances the administrative law judge had 
demonstrated active hostility toward the claimant in an 
employment disability benefits proceeding, while at the 
same time exhibiting favoritism toward the employer 
and the employer's counsel 740 P 2d at 1333-34 We 
ruled that such an atmosphere of partiality violated 
fundamental principles of due process Id at 1334, 
see also Local No 3 v NLRB, 210 F 2d 325, 329-30 
(8th Cir 1954) (disqualifying examiner who uniformly 
rejected evidence offered to support company's point of 
view, while accepting evidence supporting union) But 
see NLRB v Pittsburgh SS Co , 337 U S 656, 659, 69 
SCt 1283, 1285, 93 L Ed 1602 (1949) (holding "total 
rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself impugn 
the integrity or c ompetence of a trier of fact") 
[10] In Berryhill, the United States Supreme Court 
disqualified a state licensing board of optometrists in 
Alabama, which was composed entirely of independent 
practitioners, from reviewing the licenses of 
optometrists who were employed by corporations The 
licensing board had interpreted a statute to preclude the 
practice of optometry by corporate employees The 
board commenced administrative proceedings for the 
purpose of revoking the licenses of corporate-
employed optometrists and had also filed a civil suit 
against them Because nearly half of the practicing 
optometrists in Alabama were employed by 
corporations, it was obvious that the independent 
optometrists on the licensing board would receive more 
business, thereby reaping a substantial pecuniary gam, 
if the corporate- -employed optometrists' licenses were 
revoked Berryhill 411 U S at 578, 93 SCt at 
1607-98 The presence of a clear, substantial 
pecuniary benefit is one of the most evident causes of 
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either conscious or subconscious bias, and perhaps 
more important, it is the type of temptation that 
inevitably compromises public confidence in the 
process itself, undermining the legitimacy of any 
decision so tainted Thus, the Supieme Court 
concluded that disqualifying bias will be presumed 
whenever the decision maker has a substantial 
pecuniary interest m the outcome (FN7) Id at 
579-80, 93 S Ct at 1698-99, see also Tumey v Ohio, 
273 U S 510, 531-35, 47 S Ct 437, 444-45, 71 L Ed 
749 (1927) (ju^ge received portion of fines and fees 
assessed m addition to his salary), cf Waid v Village 
ofMonroeville, 409 U S 57, 57-59, 61-62, 93 S Ct 80, 
81-83, 83-84, 34 L Ed 2d 267 (1972) (where mayor 
had obligation to maintain village finances, a major 
portion of which were derived from the fines levied by 
the mayor's court, mayor was disqualified from acting 
as judge) (FN8) 
[11][12] Presumed bias is not limited to cases 
where a personal pecuniary benefit is present Such a 
presumption may also be applied in other 
circumstances where the risk of bias is so great as to 
offend principles of due process For instance, 
disqualifying bias may be presumed from a prior 
manifested prejudice against a person or group of 
persons See Beiger v United States, 255 US 22, 41 
5 Ct 230, 65 L Ed 481 (1921) (judge disqualified for 
comments demonstrating prejudice against German-
Americans) Unacceptable biasing influences may also 
arise from an adjudicator's preconceived attitudes on 
points of law or policy that are topics of dispute before 
an adjudicator, although such attitudes are rarely severe 
enough to justify disqualification See generally Davis 
6 Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 9 8, at 76-81 
*1199 In this case, V-l objects specifically to the 
agency practice of allowing an attorney to act as an 
adjudicator where other persons within the 
administrative division for which that attorney works 
have the responsibility for prosecuting the matter at 
which the adjudicator presides Although McKnight is 
not personally involved in investigating or prosecuting 
any of the cases which he adjudicates, he is employed 
by the same administrative agency which conducts 
those activities This raises a due process issue related 
to institutional combination of prosecutorial and 
adjudicative functions 
In a typical adversarial administrative proceeding, 
agencies perform several different functions 
Generally, commentators divide those functions into 
three categories investigative, advocatory (or 
prosecutorial), and adjudicative Although there is 
little potential for bias when the investigative and 
advocatory functions are combined, the potential for 
impermissible bias when either the investigative or the 
advocatory function is combined with the adjudicative 
function is more readily apparent, see Allison, Piocess-
Value Analysis at 1167-68, particularly as the case 
becomes more accusatory m nature Id at 1180 The 
natural suspicion is that adjudicators may be disposed 
to act favorably toward their employers In a formal 
criminal context, for instance, it would be 
inappropriate for an adjudicator to be employed as a 
part-time prosecutor Cf State v Brown, 853 P 2d 
851, 856-57 (Utah 1992) (holding part-time prosecutor 
barred from acting as defense counsel) 
Nevertheless, examining the question in the 
criminal context does not answer the question m the 
administrative context, where "any form of function 
combination occurring alone, without other 
exacerbating biasing influences, is very unlikely to 
violate procedural due process " Allison, Process 
Value Analysis at 1145 (citing Marcello v Bonds, 349 
U S 302, 311, 75 SCt 757, 762-63, 99 LEd 1107 
(1955)) In this respect, the analogy to the criminal 
context cannot be strictly applied As noted by 
Professors Davis and Pierce 
Critics of the U S system of administrative 
justice have long used the strict separation of 
functions among agencies in our criminal justice 
system as a paradigm for criticism of the fairness of 
administrative adjudication conducted by typical 
multi-function agencies The criticism is usually 
followed by a demand that the legislature assign the 
functions of investigation, prosecution, and 
adjudication to separate agencies, or that the courts 
hold unconstitutional any system of adjudication 
implemented by a multi-function agency 
Generally, both legislatures and courts have 
declined to accept these arguments for good 
reason—the analogy on which they are premised is 
weak at many points First, the strict agency-based 
separation of functions approach we have chosen in 
the criminal justice context is extremely expensive 
and inefficient It may be justified m that context 
because of the extraordinarily high value we place 
on avoiding the risk of erroneously incarcerating 
people It by no means follows, however, that we 
should select the least efficient and most costly 
institutional structure for adjudicating disputes 
concerning social security benefits, personnel 
decisions, utility prices, environmental regulation, 
etc 
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Davis & Pierce, Admimsti ative Law Treatise § 9 9, 
at 92 (citations omitted), see also Michael Asimow, 
When the Curtain Falls Separation of Functions m 
the Fedeial Admimsti ative Agencies, 81 Colum 
LRev 759, 768 (1981) [hereinafter Asimow, 
Separation of Functions ] ("Separation of functions in 
administrative agencies is, of necessity, far from the 
pristine system characteristic of criminal-law 
enforcement") 
This more lenient treatment of administrative 
decision making is primarily an acknowledgment of the 
third factor in the due process analysis set forth by 
Mathews v Eldudge "the Government's interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that additional or substitute 
procedural requirements] would entail " 424 U S at 
335, 96 S Ct at 903 Administrative agencies are 
typically burdened with numerous duties and limited 
funding Moreover, to carry out their statutorily *1200 
mandated responsibilities with any semblance of unity 
of purpose, they must be allowed to combine 
essentially all their functions under the umbrella of a 
single, or group of, related entities (FN9) "In the 
context of an administrative agency or other 
multifunction decision-making organization we must 
permit certain combinations of functions or else 
dispense with these organizations altogether We 
cannot have it both ways" Allison, Process-Value 
Analysis at 1171 It would be literally impossible for 
many administrative agencies to function if all their 
adjudicative activities had to be given the same due 
process protections as in a criminal trial in terms of a 
rigid scheme providing for total structural 
independence of the adjudicator For example, agency 
decisions not to issue drivers' licenses, provide 
unemployment compensation benefits, etc , combine 
adjudicative and administrative functions in the same 
person The paralysis of basic governmental functions 
and the overwhelming expense caused by imposition of 
an uncompromising judicial model of complete 
structured independence of the adjudicator would have 
disastrous consequences for many essential 
governmental programs and functions 
In fact, institutional combinations of functions 
afford certain benefits In performing multiple 
functions, an agency's rule-making activities inform its 
adjudicative actions and vice versa See SEC v 
Chenery Corp , 332 U S 194, 201-02, 67 S Ct 1575, 
1579-80, 91 LEd 1995 (1947) The ability of 
agencies to draw on specialized knowledge gained in a 
wide spectrum of activities, from rule-making to formal 
and informal adjudication, allows those agencies to 
develop an efficient and consistent manner of 
addressing and lesolving the concerns and problems 
they are charged with administering Policy is 
developed and farthered on a relatively unified front 
rather than through the sometimes arbitrary and 
conflicting paths often pursued by organizations that 
are subject to formal separation of legislative, 
adjudicative, and other functions Further, the resulting 
increased efficiency and uniformity can enhance the 
respect an agencv earns from the parties regulated by it 
and from the general public at large 
[13] This does not mean that the due process 
concerns arising out of combinations of functions 
cannot be addressed in the administrative context 
Rather, it merely means that adequate separation of 
functions can be accomplished internally In particular, 
the separation takes place at the individual rather than 
the institutional level This is essentially the path that 
has been chosen by Congress in adopting the federal 
Administrative Procedures Act 
Early m the administrative era, some observers 
understandably took a monolithic view of agencies 
as decision makers, a view necessarily leading to 
the conclusion that the same decision-making agent 
is performing all functions This view generally did 
not prevail, however From its inception in 1946, 
the [Federal Administrative Procedures Act] has 
clearly recognized the individual as the decision-
making agent, at *1201 least at the staff level, and 
the statute takes the intermediate approach of 
limiting certain combinations among these 
individual functionaries 
Allison, Piocess-Value Analysis at 1172 n 89 
(citation omitted), see also Asimow, Separation of 
Functions at 761 ("Congress decided that internal 
separation of an agency's decisionmaking from its 
investigative and prosecutorial functions would achieve 
impartiality without incurring the costs of complete 
separation") (FN 10) 
In the context of administrative agencies, internal 
separation of functions allows agencies the flexibility 
to perform the multitude of duties assigned to them 
while at the same time adequately protecting due 
process interests On this question, Professor Allison 
observes 
Despite the psychological effects of participating m 
an organization, the individual is still intellectually, 
emotionally, and morally autonomous to a 
meaningful degree Moreover, to view the 
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decision-making unit as the organization 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the same 
entity investigates, advocates, and judges If one is 
the least bit sensitive to process values, the 
orgamzation-as-decision maker premise necessarily 
causes one to condemn the procedure as the worst 
kind of prejudgment This view is not only 
unrealistic in a modern world demanding complex 
government, but also is unnecessary Process 
concerns may be addressed by viewing the 
individual, or perhaps the small group (such as an 
advocatory staff), as the decision-making entity and 
then proceeding to optimize process values from 
that premise 
Allison, Process-Value Analysis at 1171-72 
(footnote omitted) 
Echoing this sentiment, Professors Davis and 
Pierce comment 
Separation of functions can be implemented at the 
level of individuals rather than at the agency level 
To the extent that combining functions creates a 
conflict of interest, that conflict is largely a function 
of psychology and human emotions No one would 
want the district attorney who prosecutes him to 
decide whether he is guilty, because district 
attorneys prefer to "win" rather than to "lose" cases 
It is difficult for anyone who has worked long and 
hard to prove a proposition, e g , the defendant is 
guilty, to make the kind of dramatic change in 
psychological perspective necessary to assess that 
proposition objectively, e g , to decide whether the 
defendant is guilty That potentially powerful 
psychological conflict of interest is internal to an 
individual, however The potential for conflicts of 
interest to infect adjudicatory decisionmaking 
diminishes greatly if functions are separated at the 
individual level, I e , an individual cannot both 
prosecute a case and decide the case Separating 
functions withm an agency is likely to cause the 
individuals in the agency to identify more by 
function than by agency, e g , "I am an agency 
prosecutor, or I am an agency adjudicatory 
decisionmaker " 
Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 9 9, 
at 93-94 
Similarly, in Vah Convalescent & Care Institution 
v Industrial Commission, 649 P 2d 33, 37 (Utah 1982) 
, we endorsed the practice of internal separation of 
functions as a means of balancing due process concerns 
within the administrative agency context "In 
administrative proceedings, the practice of an agency 
acting as prosecutor and judge is not unconstitutional, 
at least if those functions, with respect to discretionary 
matters, are kept separate withm the agency '[M]any 
agencies have functioned for years, with the approval 
of the courts, which combine these roles' " Id 
(quoting Brinkley v Hassig, 83 F 2d 351, 357 (10th 
Cir 1936)) Thus, at least *1202 at the lower levels of 
an agency's hierarchy, (FN11) internal or individual 
separation of functions adequately addresses most due 
process concerns that arise 
Withm some agencies, separation of functions is 
achieved by creating essentially a separate adjudicatory 
department within the agency These departments are 
typically composed of administrative law judges who 
enjoy a degree of autonomy withm the agency 
somewhat comparable to that enjoyed by judges within 
the regular judicial branch of a traditional tripartite 
governmental system The Court of Appeals' opinion 
appears to treat such a system as the minimum due 
process requirement for all administrative adjudication 
(FN12) V-1 Oil Co I 893 P 2d at 1097 n 3 
However, such inflexibility fails to account for 
legitimate efficiency concerns which various 
administrative agencies confront and does not balance 
those concerns against the purported harm resulting 
from a failure to structure an agency in a manner 
designed to segregate adjudicatory employees 
completely from all other responsibilities 
The record reflects that McKnight was hired to 
function as both an adjudicative officer and a staff 
attorney because "there may not be a heavy enough 
case load for a full time presiding officer " Evidently, 
the purpose behind assigning him multiple functions 
within the agency was an effort to maximize limited 
resources Although we do not have a sufficient record 
before us to make an independent judgment of the level 
of efficiency so achieved, the administrative officials 
who must actually run and staff their organizations are 
in a far better position to do so than is an appellate 
court which is largely unfamiliar with the agency's day-
to-day operations 
This is not to say that we are not concerned with, or 
that due process does not demand, serious attention to 
procedures designed to eliminate bias in accusatory 
administrative adjudications Instead, the various 
procedures designed to address due process concerns 
must be weighed, along with their costs, against the 
purported benefits and detriments that then 
implementation would engender 
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In this case, there was no strict segregation of all 
personnel with adjudicatory responsibilities from all 
other duties withm the division DERR required 
McKnight to participate m certain staff attorney 
functions but took care to ensure that all his staff 
attorney *1203 duties related to activities outside the 
branch of the division responsible for investigating and 
prosecuting underground storage tank violations In 
this regard, the Board determined that McKnight's 
position was implemented m a manner to insure 
that any staff attorney functions [he] performed 
would be completely independent of matters that 
could result m UST [underground storage tank] 
adjudications Accordingly, [he] has functioned as 
a staff attorney on matters such as procurement 
issues, drafting and reviewing legal documents such 
as CERCLA cooperative agreements and consent 
orders, drafting UST administrative adjudicative 
procedures, and working on standard forms for cost 
recovery [He] is kept completely detached from 
any DERR matters that could result in an UST 
order on owner/operators of USTs 
V-1 argues that this degree of separation is 
insufficient, asserting that McKnight 
is paid by the Agency to represent their interests 
By assuming the role as the Agency's attorney, Mr 
McKnight assumed certain fiduciary duties towards 
the Agency and his conduct towards his client or 
employer is governed by strict rules of professional 
responsibility Among those duties is the 
requirement that Mr McKnight maintain a high 
degree of loyalty towards the Agency 
This argument misconstrues the nature of 
McKnight's duties In fact, the converse is true His 
duty of loyalty toward his employer requires him to 
function as an impartial adjudicator According to the 
record, McKnight has no duty of partiality toward the 
Underground Storage Tank Branch of DERR-from 
which his activities as an attorney have been 
specifically segregated, whereas, when the merits of a 
case require McKnight to make findings and 
recommendations that are unfavorable to the 
Underground Storage Tank Branch's position, his 
failure to do so would constitute a serious breach of 
loyalty 
If McKnight had actually served as an investigator 
or advocate in this particular case, V-l's argument 
would very likely have merit Where individuals have 
previously taken on an adversarial role with regard to a 
particular case, they tend to become psychologically 
committed to a particular view of contested issues 
One commentator has described this as "the will to 
win" (FN 13) See Asimow, Separation of Functions 
at 770, 788 Where, on the other hand, an individual 
has not undertaken such a commitment, the risk of a 
similar bias is minimal Id at 770 V-1 nevertheless 
asserts that McKnight's status as a lawyer, as opposed 
to agency employees who are not lawyers, imposes on 
him a duty, born of the attorney-client relationship 
between him and his employer, to act m favor of all the 
branches and divisions of his employing agency We 
find no merit in this argument (FN 14) We do not 
accept the proposition that the employing agency is a 
client or that McKnight owes the same duty of loyalty 
to that agency that he would owe to a client 
We therefore hold that DERR accomplished an 
appropriate and sufficient separation of functions at the 
individual level by segregating McKnight from contact 
with the investigative and prosecutorial arm of DERR 
In this case, a workable scheme is created within the 
agency to prevent McKnight from engaging m multiple 
functions likely to bias his work as an adjudicator Due 
process is not violated by allowing *1204. McKnight 
to adjudicate V l's hearing We accordingly reverse 
the Court of Appeals' decision 
ZIMMERMAN, C J , and HOWE, DURHAM, and 
RUSSON, JJ, concur m Associate Chief Justice 
STEWART'S opinion 
(FN1 ) Apparently, McKnight subsequently received a 
general appointment to "act as presiding officer on 
all contested orders issued by the DERR's 
Executive Secretary" 
(FN2 ) V-1 conceded as much m its hearing before 
McKnight and does not now contest this holding on 
appeal 
(FN3 ) Canon 3E continues 
including but not limited to instances where (b) 
the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in 
controversy, had practiced law with a lawyer who 
had served in the matter at the time of their 
association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a 
material witness concerning it 
(Emphasis added) 
(FN4) For instance, the canons specifically prohibit 
judges from practicing law, see Code of Judicial 
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Conduct Canon 4G, whereas the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act carries no such 
prohibition 
(FN5 ) Various commentators have offered a number 
of rationales to support this distinction For 
instance, legislative decision making tends to affect 
large groups of people or entities in a similar 
fashion, thus lessening the likelihood of 
"individualized oppression" and simultaneously 
increasing the publicity attending the decision and 
the likelihood that the affected groups may be able 
to exercise their collective power to reverse an 
unjust decision Allison, Process-Value Analysis at 
1162 It is also less feasible m a legislative context 
to provide notice to all affected parties and invite 
their participation, parties are more inclined to 
expect rigid adherence to due process protections m 
an adjudicative context than m a legislative one, 
and the parties to an adjudicative proceeding are 
more likely to be privy to, and aware of, the facts 
relevant to that proceeding than are parties affected 
by a legislative-type proceeding Id at 1163 
Kenneth C Davis & Richard J Pierce, Jr, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 9 5, at 55 (3d ed 
1994) 
(FN6) Professors Davis and Pierce have summarized 
the categories of biasing influences and their 
consequences as follows 
(1) A prejudgment or point of view about a 
question of law or policy, even if so tenaciously 
held as to suggest a closed mind, is not, without 
more, a disqualification (2) Similarly, a 
prejudgment about legislative facts that help answer 
a question of law or policy is not, without more, a 
disqualification (3) Advance knowledge of 
adjudicative facts that are in issue is not alone a 
disqualification for finding those facts, but a prior 
commitment may be (4) A personal bias or 
personal prejudice, that is an attitude toward a 
person, as distinguished from an attitude about an 
issue, is a disqualification when it is strong enough 
and when the bias has an unofficial source, such 
partiality may be either animosity or favoritism (5) 
One who stands to gain or lose by a decision either 
way has an interest that may disqualify if the gain 
or loss to the decisionmaker flows fairly directly 
from her decision 
Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 9 8, 
at 68 
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(FN7) This holding, however, does not create a 
blanket rule prohibiting any personal interest m the 
outcome of a decision "Many members of agency 
boards and commissions have some degree of 
economic interest in the subject they regulate 
General economic interest in the subject matter is 
[by itself] insufficient to disqualify a 
decisionmaker " Davis & Pierce, Administrative 
Law Treatise § 9 8, at 73 (citing Friedman v 
Rogeis, 440 U S 1, 17-19, 99 S Ct 887, 898-99, 
59 L Ed 2d 100 (1979)) 
(FN8) This case demonstrates that a pecuniary 
interest need not be personal to justify 
disqualification, but a nonpersonal pecuniary 
interest must clearly taint the decision-making 
process before it will result in disqualification In 
Dugan v Ohio, 277 U S 61, 63-65, 48 S Ct 439, 
439-40, 72 LEd 784 (1928), the mayor was only 
one member of a commission that exercised 
legislative power and did not participate when the 
commission exercised executive power In that 
case, the mayor was not disqualified from levying 
fines as a judge 
(FN9) Davis and Pierce are of the opinion that 
whenever Congress has sought to segregate various 
functions under wholly separate administrative 
entities, the result has been disastrous For 
example, the 
trio of agencies [charged with resolving 
occupational safety and health disputes] have 
performed their mission poorly The inefficient 
multi-agency structure Congress chose to 
implement this regime ranks high on the list of the 
many explanations for this poor performance 
OSHA and OSHRC frequently disagree on issues 
of law and policyf,] consequently, they expend a 
considerable portion of their limited resources 
litigating inter-agency disputes in the federal courts 
Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 9 9, 
at 100, see also George Robert Johnson, Jr, The 
Split Enforcement Model Some Conclusions from 
the OSHA and MSHA Experience, 39 Admin 
LRev 315 (1987) Furthermore, the legislative 
choice to externally separate functions often has 
more to do with the political environment m which 
the agency is constructed than with due process 
concerns "If political support for the program is 
weak and opposition is strong, the opposition can 
render the program ineffective by building high 
costs, delay, and inefficiency into the statutorily 
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mandated decisionmaking process " Davis & 
Pierce, Administiative Law Treatise § 9 9, at 
100-01 
*1204_ (FN 10 ) In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
that statutory provisions such as the APA are 
typically moie stringent than constitutional 
requirements As Davis and Pierce note 
The Supreme Court's constitutional floor is well 
below the APA approach to separation of functions 
Indeed, the Court has never held an adjudicatory 
regime unconstitutional on the basis that the 
functions were insufficiently separated As a result, 
Congress has considerable discretion to depart from 
the APA in either direction [l e , to require more 
stringent or less stringent separation of functions 
within a given agency scheme] 
Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 9 9, 
at 98 
(FN 11 ) Numerous cases have made clear that full 
separation of functions is not required at the highest 
level of an agency "[AJgencies perform many 
interrelated functions and are organizationally 
complex, it is thus impossible and highly 
undesirable to insulate adversaries and 
decisionmakers, particularly agency heads, from 
one another for all purposes" Asimow, 
Separation of Functions at 765 Under the Federal 
APA, separation of functions is not required 
at the highest level of the agency, l e , the cabinet 
officer, administrator, or collegial body that has 
overall responsibility for the agency The APA 
permits the agency head to decide, for instance, 
whether to investigate a case, how much of the 
agency's resources to devote to an investigation, 
whether to prosecute a case, and how much of the 
agency's resources to devote to prosecution of a 
case Agency heads also decide cases APA [5 
U S C ] § 557(b) provides "On appeal from or 
review of the initial decision, the agency has all the 
power which it would have in making the initial 
decision except as it may limit the issues on notice 
or by rule " The effect of this provision is to allow 
agencies to treat ALJ initial decisions as 
recommendations, with all ultimate decisionmaking 
power held by the agency head Most agencies 
operate in this manner The agency adopts an 
ALJ's decision only if, and to the extent that, it 
agrees with the decision 
Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 9 9, 
at 97 A substantially similar process governs the 
manner in which DERR and the Board conduct 
hearings in underground storage tank matters 
(FN 12 ) The Court of Appeals' holding on this matter 
is not entirely clear On petition for an 
extraordinary writ, it simply held that McKnight 
must recuse himself In dicta, however, the Court 
opined that the present system (which allows 
agencies with investigatory and advocatory duties 
to employ ALJs or other adjudicatory officers) is 
problematic According to the Court of Appeals, 
those problems are "alleviated somewhat when 
administrative law judges have exclusively 
adjudicative functions and do not also undertake 
work as legal counsel for their employing agency " 
V-l Oil Co I 893 P 2d at 1097 n 3 But the clear 
implication was that the Court of Appeals believed 
that even that degree of separation would be 
inadequate The Court then proceeded to endorse a 
central panel system of ALJs which would 
presumably provide thoroughly independent and 
neutral ALJs to all, or a large group of, 
administrative agencies Id 
(FN13) In the criminal context, for instance, 
prosecutors are likely to be biased because they 
have a 
personal and professional stake m a particular 
result, a will to win If a prosecutor thought that a 
charge lacked probable cause or that a miscarriage 
of justice was likely, professional duty would 
require abandonment of the prosecution Having 
committed himself intellectually and 
psychologically, as well as having committed 
institutional resources to the prosecution, a 
prosecutor may perceive the issues through a lens 
that distorts his perceptions m the state's favor 
Asimow, Separation of Functions at 788-89 
(FN 14 ) Arguably, McKnight's status as an attorney is 
actually less likely to engender concerns about bias 
At least one commentator has asserted, "Attorneys 
and others whose training, experience, and job 
description require them to present and support 
positions m a decision-making process undoubtedly 
may develop a facility for performing the task 
zealously while remaining personally detached" 
Allison, Piocess-Value Analysis at 1179 
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Court of Appeals of Utah 
Gilbert R. WILBURN, Plaintiff, 
v 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, National Union Fire 
Insurance Company 
of Pittsburgh and Second Injury Fund, Defendants. 
No 860292-CA 
Jan 19,1988 
Claimant appealed from a decision of the Industrial 
Commission that a compromise and settlement 
agreement barred a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits The Court of Appeals, Orme, J , held that 
(1) the agreement was ambiguous with respect to 
whether it released only claims for temporary total 
disability and permanent partial disability benefits, or 
whether it also released permanent total disability 
claims, (2) extrinsic evidence supported the 
conclusion that the claim for permanent total disability 
benefits was barred, (3) evidence supported the 
administrative law judge's finding that the parties had a 
good-faith dispute about the compensability of the 
claim, so that the agreement was enforceable, and (4) 
the Commission should adopt a regularized procedure 
for the appioval of settlement agreements, but the 
Commission's failure to do so did not warrant reversal 
Order affirmed 
West Headnotes 
[ 1 ] Workers' Compensation <@^ 1156 
413 
413XV Agreements as to Compensation, 
Compromise, Settlement, 
and Release 
413XV(C) Review, Modification, and 
Cancellation 
413kl 156 Admissibility of Evidence 
Compromise and settlement agreement was 
ambiguous as to whether it was release of claim for 
permanent total disability benefits, or just of claims for 
temporary total disability and permanent partial 
disability benefits, justifying consideration of extrinsic 
evidence U C A 1953, 35-1-1 et seq 
[2] Contracts <£^ 155 
95 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules of Construction 
95kl51 Language of Instrument 
95kl55 Construction Against Party Using 
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Words 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] Workers' Compensation <£=> 1128 
413 —-
413XV Agreements as to Compensation, 
Compromise, Settlement, 
and Release 
413XV(B) Construction, Operation, and 
Enforcement 
413kl 128 Construction 
Doctrine that contract should be construed against 
drafter did not operate in dispositive fashion upon 
finding that compromise and settlement agreement was 
ambiguous with respect to whether parties intended to 
release only claims for temporary total disability and 
permanent partial disability benefits or whether 
agreement was intended to release claim for permanent 
total disability, doctrine of construing ambiguities m 
contract against drafter functioned only after 
consideration of all pertinent extrinsic evidence 
[3] Workers' Compensation <&==> 1158 
413 — 
413XV Agreements as to Compensation, 
Compromise, Settlement, 
and Release 
413XV(C) Review, Modification, and 
Cancellation 
413kll57 Weight and Sufficiency of 
Evidence 
413kl 158 In General 
Extrinsic evidence supported administrative law 
judge's finding that compromise and settlement 
agreement was intended to release claims for 
permanent total disability benefits, not just claims for 
temporary total and permanent partial disability 
benefits U C A 1953, 35-1-1 et seq 
[4] Workers' Compensation <S^ 1115 
413 — 
413XV Agreements as to Compensation, 
Compromise, Settlement, 
and Release 
413XV(A) Requisites and Validity 
413kl 115 In General 
Settlements of workers' compensation claims are 
appropriate only when compensable nature of worker's 
injury is disputed and worker's right to recover is 
doubtful, when compensability of claim is not 
disputed, worker cannot waive his claim by agreement 
U C A 1953,35-1-90 
[5] Workers' Compensation <S^ 1158 
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413 — 
413XV Agreements as to Compensation, 
Compromise, Settlement, 
and Release 
413XV(C) Review, Modification, and 
Cancellation 
413kl 157 Weight and Sufficiency of 
Evidence 
413kl 158 In General 
(Formerly 413kl 157) 
Sufficient evidence supported administrative law 
judge's finding that parties had good-faith dispute as to 
compensability of workers' compensation claim and, 
therefore, compromise and settlement agreement was 
enforceable U C A 1953, 35-1-90 
[6] Workers' Compensation <§:=:> 1124 
413 
413XV Agreements as to Compensation, 
Compromise, Settlement, 
and Release 
413XV(A) Requisites and Validity 
413kl 122 Approval by Court, Board, or 
Commission 
413kll24 Power and Duty of Court, Board, 
or Commission 
Industrial Commission should implement 
regulations governing settlement of claims to safeguard 
against abuses that might otherwise occur if 
unscrupulous employer or carrier attempts to take 
advantage of unsophisticated worker seeking to settle 
claim without advice of counsel UCA1953, 
35-1-10, 35-1-16, 35-l-16(l)(e), 35-1-90 
[7] Workers' Compensation <®=^  1138 
413 — 
413XV Agreements as to Compensation, 
Compromise, Settlement, 
and Release 
413XV(B) Construction, Operation, and 
Enforcement 
413kl 134 Operation and Effect as to 
Particular Subject-
Matters 
413kl 138 Extent of Disability and Amount 
of Compensation 
Industrial Commission's failure to adopt regular 
process for review and approval of settlements was not 
so arbitrary and capricious as to warrant reversal of 
decision that compromise and settlement agreement 
barred application for permanent total disability 
benefits U C A 1953, 35-1-10, 35-1-16, 35-l-16(l)(e) 
, 35-1-90 
*583 Michael E Dyer, Stephanie A Mallory 
(argued), Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake 
City, foi plamtifi 
Stuart L Poelman (argued), Snow, Christensen & 
Martmeau, Salt Lake City, for Interstate Elec & Nafl 
Union 
Erie V Boorman (argued), Second Injury Fund, 
Salt Lake City 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and ORME, JJ 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge 
Plaintiff Wilburn appeals from an Industrial 
Commission order denying his application for 
permanent total disability benefits under Utah's 
Workers' Compensation laws The Commission's 
decision was premised on the ground that plaintiff had 
previously compromised and settled his claim 
Plaintiff seeks i eversal of the Commission's order and 
an award of permanent total disability benefits We 
affirm 
*584 FACTS 
Plaintiff worked at Interstate Electric as a heavy 
duty mechanic repairing and overhauling portable 
power plants, water pumps, and hydraulic telephone 
pullers On April 14, 1980, plaintiff injured his back 
while trying to lift a portable powerplant from the floor 
to his work bench Plaintiff continued working the 
remainder of the day as well as the two following days 
When the pain did not subside, he consulted a doctor 
After missing a few days of work, he continued 
working for the rest of the year with no other medical 
treatment 
On February 2, 1981, Interstate Electric's insurance 
carrier, defendant National Union, had plaintiff submit 
to an independent physical examination, which resulted 
in a permanent partial impairment rating of 20% 
Fifteen percent of the impairment was attributable to 
preexisting causes, paid by the Second Injury Fund, 
and 5% attributable to aggravation of the preexisting 
condition by the industrial accident, paid by Interstate 
Electric Plaintiff continued working until he was laid 
off on July 31, 1981 Following another examination, 
he was placed on temporary total disability on August 
18, 1981 On June 20, 1983, plaintiff was reexamined 
and received a permanent partial impairment rating of 
36%, with 10% attributable to the industrial accident, 
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15% to preexisting problems in his lumbar and 
lumbosacral spine, and 15% to a non-industrial cervical 
spine condition 
In late 1983, plaintiff consulted an administrative 
law judge who advised him to make a claim for 
permanent total disability Plaintiff contacted 
Interstate Electnc's carrier, asserted his claim, and was 
referred to the carrier's attorney The attorney told 
plaintiff that if he claimed permanent total disability, 
Interstate Electric would raise several defenses, 
including the "no accident" defense, and if it prevailed, 
plaintiff would lose his claim for all additional 
compensation Plaintiff then agreed to settle for an 
additional 10% permanent partial disability Upon 
receiving a written Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement, plaintiff consulted with an Industrial 
Commission attorney, and as a result, asked that the 
agreement contain an additional $1,590 00 for 
temporary total disability benefits during the fall of 
1983 The agreement was revised as requested, signed 
by both parties, and approved by the Industrial 
Commission in November 1984 Defendants then paid 
plaintiff as required m the agreement 
Despite the agreement, m early 1986 plaintiff filed 
an application with the Industrial Commission seeking 
permanent total disability compensation from 
defendants A hearing was held on the application and 
the administrative law judge issued his "Interim 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" on 
May 28, 1986, in which he expressed "no doubt" as to 
the compensability of plaintiffs claim, found him to be 
permanently and totally disabled, and imposed liability 
for permanent total disability upon defendants 
Defendants filed a "Motion for Review and 
Clarification" and the administrative law judge then 
issued his "Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order," vacating his prior order 
Specifically, the judge found that, while he would have 
held that Wilburn sustained a "compensable accident," 
there was a bona fide dispute as to defendants1 liability 
for plaintiffs alleged industrial injury The 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement was therefore 
binding and barred plaintiffs claim for permanent total 
disability compensation 
On appeal, plaintiff argues that he did not release 
his claim for permanent total disability benefits upon 
signing the Compromise and Settlement Agreement 
and, if his claim was released by the agreement, that 
the settlement was void as against public policy and in 
violation of Utah Code Ann § 35-1 90 (1974) 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
We first address the issue of whether the agreement 
between the parties settled plaintiffs claim for 
permanent total disability benefits When a contract is 
unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of law 
See eg Kimball v Campbell 699 P 2d 714, 716 
(Utah 1985), Seashoies Inc v Hancey 738 P 2d 645 
(Utah Ct App 1987) *585 If it is ambiguous,--and 
the determination of whether or not a contract is 
ambiguous is itself a question of law-extrmsic 
evidence as to the parties' intent must be received and 
considered m an effort to glean what the parties 
actually agreed to Seashores Inc v Hancey 738 
P 2d at 647 If a trial court interprets a contract as a 
matter of law, on appeal the trial court's resolution is 
afforded no particular deference Id On the other 
hand, if the contract is ambiguous and the trial forum 
finds facts respecting the intention of the parties based 
on extrinsic evidence, then appellate review is strictly 
limited and the findings and judgment of the trier will 
not be disturbed if based on substantial, competent, 
admissible evidence Id Utah R Civ P 52 
[1] Accordingly, we must first determine, as a 
matter of law, whether the contract is ambiguous 
Plaintiff argues that the Compromise and Settlement 
Agreement is unambiguous m its release of only his 
claim for temporary total disability and permanent 
partial disability benefits since it does not specifically 
mention permanent total disability The difficulty with 
this position is that the contract does not refer 
specifically even to the claims defendant concedes 
were released by the document Thus, while it is clear 
the parties meant to settle something, it is unclear what 
claim or claims they meant to settle 
Since the contract is ambiguous, it was appropriate 
for the administrative law judge to consider extrinsic 
evidence in an effort to find the intentions of the parties 
in entering into the agreement Plaintiff argues, 
however, that the extrinsic evidence in this case does 
not support a finding that the agreement contemplated 
a release of his permanent total disability claim In this 
regard, plaintiff urges application of the doctrine that 
ambiguities m a contract should be construed against 
the party responsible for its drafting 
A Construction Against Drafter 
[2] Plaintiff misapprehends the doctrine that 
contracts should be construed against the drafter (FN1 
) The doctrine does not operate in dispositive fashion 
simply because ambiguity has been found Once a 
contract is deemed ambiguous, the next order of 
business is to admit extrinsic evidence to aid in 
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mterpietation of the contiact It is only after extrinsic 
evidence is considered and the court is still uncertain as 
to the intention of the parties that ambiguities should be 
construed against the drafter (FN2) In other words, 
the doctrine of construing ambiguities m a contract 
against the drafter functions as a kind of tie-breaker, 
used as a last resort by the fact-finder after the receipt 
and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic evidence 
has left unresolved what the parties actually intended 
This rule has been summarized as follows 
*586 After applying all of the ordinary processes 
of interpretation, including all existing usages, 
general, local, technical, trade, and the custom and 
agreement of the two parties with each other, 
having admitted in evidence and duly weighed all 
the relevant circumstances and communications 
between the parties, there may still be doubt as to 
the meaning that should be given and made 
effective by the court If the remaining doubt as 
to the proper interpretation is merely as to which of 
two possible and reasonable meanings should be 
adopted, the court will adopt that one which is les* 
favorable m its legal effect to the party who chose 
the words 
3 A Corbm, Cor bin on Contracts § 559 (1960) 
B Extrinsic Evidence 
[3] In this case, the judge received extrinsic 
evidence, including testimony of the Commission's 
former legal counsel who approved the agreement, 
plaintiffs own testimony, and other testimony on the 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, and 
concluded, as a matter of fact, that the agreement was 
validly executed by the parties as a settlement of a 
disputed claim, including for permanent total disability 
benefits Although the evidence was in conflict, amp>le 
evidence supports the judge's findings m this regard 
Reviewing the record, we have some doubt about 
whether the decision reached by the judge was the 
fairest or the most appropriate m view of the extrinsic 
evidence However, our approval or disapproval of the 
substantive decision reached is largely irrelevant 
"[W]e give maximum deference to the basic facts 
determined by the agency, which will be sustained if 
there is evidence of any substance that can be 
reasonably regarded as supporting the determination 
made " Wilson v Industnal Comm'n 735 P 2d 403, 
405 (Utah Ct App 1987) (citing Allen & Assoc v 
Industrial Comm'n 732 P 2d 508, 508-09 (Utah 1987) 
) Deference, always due by appellate courts to fact-
finders, is maximized where, as here the Legislature 
has comprehensively delegated responsibility over a 
particular subject to a specialized administrative 
agency Utah Code Ann § 35-1-16 (1987) See eg, 
Department of Admin Servs v Public Sei-v Comm'n, 
658 P 2d 601, 608 10 (Utah 1983), Central Bank & 
Tiust Co v Brimhall 28 Utah 2d 14, 16, 497 P 2d 
638,641(1972) 
SECTION 35-1-90 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the contract and 
the findings of the administrative law judge, plaintiff 
argues that the agreement is nonetheless void as against 
public policy and in violation of § 35-1-90 of Utah's 
Workers' Compensation statutes Section 35-1-90 
provides, in relevant part "No agreement by an 
employee to waive his rights to compensation under 
this title shall be valid " Utah Code Ann § 35-1-90 
(1974) 
[4] Under this provision, settlements are 
appropriate only when the compensable nature of the 
worker's injury is disputed and the worker's right to 
recover is doubtful See Brigham Young Umv v 
Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 349, 279 P 889 (1929) 
Conversely, when the compensability of a workers' 
compensation claim is not disputed, an employee 
cannot waive his claim by agreement Barber Asphalt 
Corp v Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 135 P 2d 
266(1943) 
[5] The administrative law judge in this case 
focused on the effect of these two cases on plaintiffs 
claim and determined that the settlement should be 
enforced only if there had been a bona fide dispute as 
to the compensability of plaintiffs claim Recognizing 
that the issue was not so much whether the judge 
believed the applicant sustained a compensable 
accident as it was a matter of what the parties believed 
and acted upon, the administrative law judge reversed 
his initial, tentative decision and found that the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement was validly 
executed by the parties as a settlement of a disputed 
claim, including for permanent total disability, and was 
not in violation of § 35-1-90 
While we v/ould have no difficulty m finding the 
applicant's claim compensable, *587 we agree with 
the administrative law judge that this determination 
cannot "supplant the judgment of those who earlier, in 
good faith, viewed this claim as one of doubtful 
compensability" (FN3) Since there is sufficient 
evidence to support the judge's finding that the parties 
had a good faith dispute as to the compensability of the 
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claim, we defer to that determination In view of that 
finding, § 35-1-90 is no bar to enforceability of the 
agreement 
TOWARDS A MORE REGULAR PROCEDURE 
[6] We acknowledge, as did the administrative law 
judge, the "harsh consequences" of this decision but 
agree that "compassion for the Applicant does not 
justify the erosion of a principle and policy pertaining 
to compensation agreements generally " The parties 
tell us that it has been the policy of the Industrial 
Commission to encourage the settlement of claims and 
that it has been the practice of the Commission to 
approve settlement agreements before their execution 
The Legislature specifically granted to the Industrial 
Commission the power and authority to promote the 
expedited resolution of claims under the Workers' 
Compensation statutes Section 35-1-16 provides 
It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall 
have full power, jurisdiction, and authority 
(5) To promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation 
and conciliation of disputes between employers and 
employees (FN4) 
Utah Code Ann §35-1-16(1974) 
The Commission is likewise vested with the 
authority to promulgate rules for governing these 
procedures Utah Code Ann § 35-1-10 (1974) 
Clearly, then, the Commission has the prerogative to 
adopt regulations governing the settlement of claims 
Implicit in the Commission's practice of reviewing 
proposed settlements is the concomitant responsibility 
of the Commission to assure that an applicant is aware 
of the scope and consequences of his or her settlement 
agreement Moreover, when important rights are at 
issue, they should not be left to the vagaries of self-
serving recall If it is true, as defendants suggest, that 
the Industrial Commission approves as many as fifty of 
these settlements a year, then the Commission should 
implement a process which will operate, as the 
administrative law judge stated, to "safeguard against 
abuses that might otherwise occur, if an unscrupulous 
employer or insurance carrier attemptfs] to take 
advantage of an unsophisticated worker seeking to 
settle a claim without the advice of counsel " 
[7] It seems to us that the Commission should 
formalize its long-standing practice of getting involved 
in the settlement of claims Pursuant to its rule making 
authority, the Commission should adopt piocedures 
defining its role in settlements To help avoid disputes 
like the instant one, it might, by rule, require the use of 
a standard, unambiguous form specifically delineating 
which claims are released and which, if any, are 
preserved by the agreement (FN5) While such a 
regularized process of review and approval of 
settlements by the Commission seems clearly 
preferable, we cannot say the failure heretofore to have 
adopted such a process is so arbitrary *588. and 
capricious as to warrant reversal in this case 
The Industrial Commission's order is affirmed 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ , concur 
(FN1 ) Several Utah cases have invoked the doctrine 
but have typically not elaborated on its proper role 
See, eg, Sears v Riemersma, 655 P 2d 1105, 1107 
(Utah 1982) ("The well-established rule in Utah is 
that any uncertainty with respect to construction of 
a contract should be resolved against the party who 
had drawn the agreement "), Parks Enters , Inc v 
New Century Realty, Inc, 652 P 2d 918, 920 (Utah 
1982) ("It is also settled law that a contract will be 
construed against the drafter "), In re Estate of 
Orris, 622 P 2d 337, 339 (Utah 1980) (language of 
an ambiguous instrument should be construed most 
strictly against the party who drafted the 
instrument) The case of Wells Fargo Bank v 
Midwest Realty & Fin, Inc, 544 P 2d 882 (Utah 
1975), recognizes that where a document is 
ambiguous, it is appropriate to construe it "strictly 
against the party who wrote it," but also appropriate 
to "take extraneous evidence and look to the total 
circumstances to determine what the parties should 
reasonably be deemed to have understood thereby " 
Id at 885 While the opinion does not say so, it is 
obvious there is nothing left to construe~"strictly 
against the party who wrote it" or otherwise—if 
extraneous evidence clearly establishes "what the 
parties should reasonably be deemed to have 
understood" m executing an agreement 
(FN2 ) There are arguable exceptions to this rule, 
including where insurance and surety contracts are 
concerned See, eg, Shelter America Corp v 
Ohio Cas & Ins Co, 745 P 2d 843 (Utah 
Ct App 1987) However, such exceptions may be 
explained, at least m part, by the fact that such 
contracts are ordinarily not preceded by discussion 
or negotiation of specific terms and, thus, absent 
meaningful extrinsic evidence as to intent, recourse 
must be had directly to the maxim that ambiguities 
should be construed against the drafter 
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(FN3.) Interstate Electric's argument about the 
"compensability" of Wilburn's claim was not 
altogether implausible given the state of flux 
surrounding the definition of "accident" at the time 
plaintiffs claim was filed. See, e.g., Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
(FN4.) Subsequent legislation has changed the format 
of, but not the language quoted from, § 35-1-16. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-16(l)(e) (1987). 
(FN5.) The Commission has developed a 
"Compensation Agreement" form. "This form is 
used by the parties to a workers' compensation 
claim to enter into an agreement as to a permanent 
partial impairment award, and must be submitted to 
the Commission for approval." Workers' 
Compensation Rules and Regulations § 
R490-1-2(P) (effective March 4, 1986, as 
amended). The "Compensation Agreement," the 
Commission's Form 019, is used in situations where 
there is no dispute about the occurrence or 
compensability of an accident to document that a 
claimant "accepts the compensation and Medical 
payments paid to date and agrees with the 
permanent partial disability rating shown above." 
© 2004 West, a Thomson business. No claim to original U.S. Govt, works. 
SECTION D 
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flichele Mattsson, Esq. 
3hief Appellate Mediator 
®taf) Court of appeals 
APPELLATE MEDIATION OFFICE 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Telephone (801) 238-7805 
Facsimile (801) 238-7014 
February 26, 2004 
Floyd W. Holm, Esq. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Dear Floyd: 
We received the settlement documents and thank you for your 
efforts to resolve this matter. Your kindness, patience, 
attention to detail, and professionalism are greatly appreciated. 
Please thank Kim for her assistance in resolving the case as 
well. You both played a key role in the success of the process. 
As indicated by the enclosed order, the appeal has been 
dismissed. A questionnaire-about the Appellate Mediation Office 
is included if you wish to make comments. 
It was a pleasure working with you. We, hope to have the 
opportunity to work with you in the near future. 
Regards, 
Michele Mattsson, 
Chief Appellate Mediate: 
MM/jm 
Ends. 
